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Abstract
We all make decisions of varying levels of importance every day. Because making a decision
implies that there are alternative choices to be considered, almost all decision involves some
conflicts or dissatisfaction. Traditional economic models esteem that a person must weight the
positive and negative outcomes of each option, and based on all these inferences, determines
which option is the best for that particular situation. However, individuals rather act as ir-
rational agents and tend to deviate from these rational choices. They somewhat evaluate the
outcomes’ subjective value, namely, when they face a risky choice leading to losses, people are
inclined to have some preference for risk over certainty, while when facing a risky choice leading
to gains, people often avoid to take risks and choose the most certain option. Yet, it is assumed
that decision making is balanced between deliberative and emotional components. Distinct
neural regions underpin these factors: the deliberative pathway that corresponds to executive
functions, implies the activation of the prefrontal cortex, while the emotional pathway tends to
activate the limbic system. These circuits appear to be altered in individuals with ADHD, and
result, amongst others, in impaired decision making capacities. Their impulsive and inattentive
behaviors are likely to be the cause of their irrational attitude towards risk taking. Still, a
possible solution is to administrate these individuals a drug treatment, with the knowledge that
it might have several side effects. However, an alternative treatment that relies on cognitive
rehabilitation might be appropriate.
This project was therefore aimed at investigate whether an intensive working memory train-
ing could have a spillover effect on decision making in adults with ADHD and in age-matched
healthy controls. We designed a decision making task where the participants had to select an
amount to gamble with the chance of 1/3 to win four times the chosen amount, while in the
other cases they could loose their investment. Their performances were recorded using elec-
troencephalography prior and after a one-month Dual N-Back training and the possible near
and far transfer effects were investigated.
Overall, we found that the performance during the gambling task was modulated by per-
sonality factors and by the importance of the symptoms at the pretest session. At posttest, we
found that all individuals demonstrated an improvement on the Dual N-Back and on similar
untrained dimensions. In addition, we discovered that not only the adults with ADHD showed
a stable decrease of the symptomatology, as evaluated by the CAARS inventory, but this reduc-
tion was also detected in the control samples. In addition, Event-Related Potential (ERP) data
are in favor of an change within prefrontal and parietal cortices.
These results suggest that cognitive remediation can be effective in adults with ADHD,
and in healthy controls. An important complement of this work would be the examination of
the data in regard to the attentional networks, which could empower the fact that complex
programs covering the remediation of several executive functions’ dimensions is not required, a
unique working memory training can be sufficient.
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Re´sume´
Nous prenons tous chaque jour des de´cisions ayant des niveaux d’importance variables. Toutes
les de´cisions ont une composante conflictuelle et d’insatisfaction, car prendre une de´cision im-
plique qu’il y ait des choix alternatifs a` conside´rer. Les mode`les e´conomiques traditionnels
estiment qu’une personne doit peser les conse´quences positives et ne´gatives de chaque option
et en se basant sur ces infe´rences, de´termine quelle option est la meilleure dans une situation
particulie`re. Cependant, les individus peuvent de´vier de ces choix rationnels. Ils e´valuent plutoˆt
les valeur subjective des re´sultats, c’est-a`-dire que lorsqu’ils sont face a` un choix risque´ pouvant
les mener a` des pertes, les gens ont tendance a` avoir des pre´fe´rences pour le risque a` la place de
la certitude, tandis que lorsqu’ils sont face a` un choix risque´ pouvant les conduire a` un gain, ils
e´vitent de prendre des risques et choisissent l’option la plus suˆre. De nos jours, il est conside´re´
que la prise de de´cision est balance´e entre des composantes de´libe´ratives et e´motionnelles. Ces
facteurs sont sous-tendus par des re´gions neurales distinctes: le chemin de´libe´ratif, correspon-
dant aux fonctions exe´cutives, implique l’activation du cortex pre´frontal, tandis que le chemin
e´motionnel active le syste`me limbique. Ces circuits semblent eˆtre dysfonctionnels chez les indi-
vidus ayant un TDAH, et re´sulte, entre autres, en des capacite´s de prise de de´cision alte´re´es.
Leurs comportements impulsifs et inattentifs sont probablement la cause de ces attitudes irra-
tionnelles face au risque. Cependant, une solution possible est de leur administrer un traitement
me´dicamenteux, en prenant en compte les potentiels effets secondaires. Un traitement alternatif
se reposant sur une re´habilitation cognitive pourrait eˆtre approprie´e.
Le but de ce projet est donc de de´terminer si un entrainement intensif de la me´moire de
travail peut avoir un effet sur la prise de de´cision chez des adultes ayant un TDAH et chez des
controˆles sains du meˆme aˆge. Nous avons conc¸u une taˆche de prise de de´cision dans laquelle les
participants devaient se´lectionner un montant a` jouer en ayant une chance sur trois de gagner
quatre fois le montant choisi, alors que dans l’autre cas, ils pouvaient perdre leur investissement.
Leurs performances ont e´te´ enregistre´es en utilisant l’e´lectroence´phalographie avant et apre`s un
entrainement d’un mois au Dual N-Back, et nous avons e´tudie´ les possibles effets de transfert.
Dans l’ensemble, nous avons trouve´ au pre´-test que les performances au cours du jeu d’argent
e´taient module´es par les facteurs de personnalite´, et par le degre´ des symptoˆmes. Au post-test,
nous avons non seulement trouve´ que les adultes ayant un TDAH montraient une diminutions
stable des symptoˆmes, qui e´taient e´value´s par le questionnaire du CAARS, mais que cette
re´duction e´tait e´galement perc¸ue dans l’e´chantillon des controˆles. Les rsultats expe´rimentaux
mesure´s a` l’aide de l’e´le´ctroence´phalographie sugge`rent un changement dans les cortex pre´frontaux
et parie´taux.
Ces re´sultats sugge`rent que la reme´diation cognitive est efficace chez les adultes ayant un
TDAH, mais produit aussi un effet chez les controˆles sains. Un comple´ment important de ce
travail pourrait examiner les donne´es sur l’attention, qui pourraient renforcer l’ide qu’il n’est pas
ne´cessaire d’utiliser des programmes complexes englobant la reme´diation de plusieurs dimensions
des fonctions exe´cutives, un simple entraiment de la me´moire de travail devrait suffire.
v
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1 Introduction
Human behavior is determined by the interaction of several internal and external bodily factors.
The why and how of the behavior can therefore be complex. The animals have only involuntary
reflexes subject to the laws of nature, but man can execute behavior on a voluntary basis.
Decision making is a talent being tested everyday, that each individual faces consciously or
unconsciously. But what is decision making? It can be defined as the process of making choices
among possible alternatives, with varying levels of risk. Several areas have started to study
this phenomenon, including economics, psychology and neurosciences and gave rise to the new
research field called neuroeconomics.
1.1 Psychological concepts
In the early 20th century, when psychology has tried to establish itself as an independent disci-
pline, Behaviorism was a school of thought that was influenced by Darwin. It was solely based
on the observation of the behavior and on the conditions in which it takes place. The unobserv-
able processes happened in a “black box” and did not constitute an object of research. During
the 30s and 40s, the rational approach came back in a more modern form. The observation of
laboratory rats allowed to demonstrate that there was not only learned responses, but also new
answers. It was therefore necessary to understand how an organism perceives its environment.
Classical and operant conditioning
Classical conditioning is a form of learning that combines several types of stimuli, to induce a
reflex response which is not naturally induced. This concept was experimented by Pavlov, by
teaching his dog to associate the sound of a bell, the neutral stimulus, with food, the uncon-
ditional stimulus, resulting the salivation, the unconditional reaction. By presenting regularly
some food while the bell was ringing, the dog learned to associate the bell sound to the fact
that he would be fed, thus evoking the salivation. The neutral stimuli became a conditioned
stimulus, and the unconditioned reaction became a conditional response. Once an organism has
learned to associate a conditioned stimulus to an unconditioned stimulus, it can also respond to
similar type of stimuli (Pavlov and Anrep, 2003; Watson and Rayner, 1920).
Skinner later introduced the term of operant conditioning. The main idea is that all be-
haviors are determined by their consequences, that can either be positive, like a reward, or
negative, such as a penalty. Behavioral responses are thought to precede environmental events
that produce the future behavior. Reinforcements can either be positive (the presentation of
the stimulus increases the probability to have a behavior) or negative (the elimination of the
stimulus increases the probability to have a behavior) (Skinner, 1938).
Behavioral activation and inhibition systems
Gray proposed a biopsychological theory of personality in 1970 based on extensive animal re-
search. Gray’s theory was based on the existence of three independent but interacting systems
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that underlie behaviors: the activation and inhibition behavioral systems (BAS and BIS respec-
tively), and the fight-flight-freezing system (FFFS ). The BAS system is activated by signals of
reward or withdrawal of a punishment, and is thought to be responsible for approach behaviors.
The BIS system is responsible for the interruption of a ordinary behavior, and is activated when
there are some conflicting goals, which causes an anxious response. The FFFS is activated by
potential punishment signals and is responsible for the leakage behavior. Generally, the BAS
would be associated with positive affect, BIS to anxiety states, and FFFS with negative emo-
tions (Corr, 2002, 2004; Gray, 1970; Gray and McNaughton, 2003).
Executive functions
There is no consensus on the executive functions’ definition, but their common feature defines a
list of skills allowing individuals to adapt their behavior to their environment. All of them are
related to a hierarchical system handling and executing high-level cognitive processes, localized
within the frontal lobes. According to Luria, there are four phases: an initial data analysis,
the development of a program to arrange and organize the various steps necessary for the re-
alization of the task, the execution of the program and finally the comparison of the result
with the initial data (Luria, 1966). The model of Stuss (1992) covers specific functions such
as anticipation, selection of goals, the formulation of plans, evaluation and control of behavior,
attentional functions such as selectivity and persistence. This illustrates the role management
and regulation of behavior. The Shallice’s supervisor attentional model distinguishes three dif-
ferent levels of action’s control, there are two automatic levels and one supervisory attentional
system located in the prefrontal lobes. The first level is used for controlling the action through
automated schematics units. The second level, “contention scheduling” is the conflict manager:
it is automatically activated when two schemes that do not require attentional resources are
activated at the same time. Finally, the supervisory attentional system intervenes when the
other two levels are exceeded, in a new situation which can not be resolved by automatisms
(Shallice, 1982). Baddeley’s model of working memory is composed of three slave systems and
a coordination system. The first three components are the phonological loop, head of verbal
information, the visuospatial sketchpad, responsible for visual information and episodic buffer,
responsible for retrieving information allowing the consolidation to long term memory. These
three systems operate in a loop within working memory, in order to supply informations to the
Central Executive. The Central Executive is the central component that coordinates the slave
systems and keeps the information available. It is the equivalent of the supervisory attentional
system of Norman Shallice’s model (Baddeley, 1992, 2000). Together, these models have listed
the abilities allowing the brain to adapt to non-routine situations, namely, planning, attention,
anticipation, working memory, inhibition, and mental flexibility, skills that appear to be funda-
mental components involved in decision making processes (Del Missier et al., 2012).
Emotions
2
“Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems,
no one knows” (Fehr and Russell, 1984).
One proposition of definition has been advanced by Scherer (2005):
Emotion is defined as an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states
of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an
external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism.
The components of an emotion episode are the respective states of the five subsystems
and the process consists of the coordinated changes over time.
Historically, many theories have been advanced trying to understand the manner by which
emotions were processed. William James is an American philosopher and psychologist, who is
considered as the father of experimental psychology. His theory postulates that the emotions are
triggered by the perception of bodily changes using a specific peripheral pattern of activation.
The process would be as follows: first, the individual perceives the event, then all the body
modifications arise, and only after these changes the emotion is identified. The revolution of his
theory is that the bodily changes are necessary and precede emotions (James, 1884).
This theory was criticized by Walter Cannon, an American physiologist, founder of the
concept of homeostasis, by saying that if the emotions were generated by the perception of
bodily changes, then they should be totally dependent on the integrity of the sensory cortex.
Following experiments on animals, he discovered that emotional behavior was not impaired when
the viscera were disconnected from the brain, and thus argued that the source of the emotion
should be in the central nervous system, rather than in the viscera (Cannon, 1931).
In 1937, the anatomist James Papez proposed one of the most influential theories on the
cerebral substrate of emotions. He suggested that a brain circuit was involved in emotional
processing. This circuit was revolutionary and would connect the hypothalamus to the medial
cortex. The main idea was that when an emotional stimulus arise, it is sent to a very important
first relay, the thalamus. Then, there are two possible pathways, the normal route through the
sensory cortex and then the expressway, which is directly linked to the hypothalamus, giving
rise to an emotional response (Papez, 1937).
Finally, the somatic markers hypothesis postulated by Damasio is certainly the one that has
the most inspired researchers. Everything started with the story of Phineas Gage, the most
famous case studied in neuropsychology. He worked as a foreman for a railway construction
company during the mid-19th century. One day, an explosion was triggered due to mishandling
of dynamite, and projected an iron bar which pierced his skull, causing a lesion to the prefrontal
cortex. He did not die after the accident, and was treated for several months. Although there
was no sign of neurological impairment, his relatives noticed a drastic change in his behavior. He
was moody, sometimes coarse, unstable and capricious. His social status changed, resulting in a
chaotic professional career. He died 13 years later, after a series of severe seizures. The history
of this clinical case has triggered the beginning of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio,
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2010). The somatic marker hypothesis postulates that the prefrontal cortex is responsible for
the creation of neurobiological markers. These markers are the result of an association between
life events and emotional states and feelings, stored in memory in order to be consciously or
unconsciously reactivated when required, for instance when an individual has to make a decision.
The use of somatic markers allows individuals to automatically reject certain negative values
and to give priority to other positive values, by reducing the number of alternatives for the
decision. Structures such as the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex appear to be
fundamental components of somatic markers model. Damasio’s assumption was therefore that
inappropriate behaviors came from an inability to recall somatic states previously associated with
similar social situations (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1996). This theory was powered
by the observation of clinical cases having the same lesions than Phineas Gage, localized within
the ventral and medial parts of the prefrontal cortex. Surprisingly, the intellectual capacities of
such patients were not affected, but their ability to make rational decisions regarding social or
personal aspects were totally disrupted, usually leading them to financial bankrupt and social
isolation.
1.1.1 Experimental methods
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
The functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a technique for measuring and map-
ping brain activity based on the fact that the nucleus of a hydrogen atom behaves like a small
magnet. The application of a radio frequency magnetic pulse at a certain frequency provokes
the generation of a faint signal by the hydrogen nuclei detected by the magnetic coils of the
device. The topographic distribution of the excitable hydrogen nuclei generates an image and
the changes in their distribution as a function of an external event generate a functional image.
Changes in neural activity are associated with changes in oxygen consumption and blood flow.
Hemoglobin binds oxygen in blood and oxygen-rich blood and oxygen-poor blood have different
magnetic properties related to hydrogen nuclei in water and their surroundings. An activated
brain area consumes more oxygen and blood flow to the active area must be increased to meet
this demand. Hence, during a specific mental process, fMRI can be used to produce activation
maps showing the areas of the brain that are involved (Belliveau et al., 1991; Ogawa et al., 1990).
Positron Emission Tomography
Brain activity can also be measured with thePositron Emission Tomography (PET) technique.
This technique uses trace amounts of short-lived positron-emitting radionuclides (tracers) in-
jected into the body on a biologically active molecule. The physical principle is that as the
tracer undergoes positron emission decay (also known as positive beta decay) (Basdevant and
Rich, 2005), it emits a positron. The encounters of the positrons and the electrons belonging to
the local tissue annihilate both particles and produce pairs of gamma rays going approximately
into opposite directions. Gamma rays arriving in temporal pairs from opposite directions are
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detected by specific devices and a map of radioactivities can be constructed showing the loca-
tions in which the molecular tracer was concentrated. Based on a principle similar to fMRI, the
tracer Oxygen-15 is used to measure indirectly the blood flow to different parts of the brain.
The localization of energy intake in a given region being associated with glucose consumption
and cerebral activity can be measured by the injection of a tracer such as Fluorine-18. This
radionuclide is generally used to label fluorodeoxyglucose (also called FDG or fludeoxyglucose)
that is a glucose analogue that produces intense radiolabeling of tissues with high glucose up-
take. Carbon-11 is a radionuclide generally used to label ligands for specific neuroreceptors
thus allowing the visualization of neuroreceptor pools associated with psychological processes or
disorders and brain activity (Nutt, 2002; Pichler et al., 2008).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Yet, another tool has proven itself in the research field, the Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMS). By applying a featured magnetic stimulus to a specific part of the cortex, TMS has
become an attractive instrument, eliciting a reversible and controlled perturbation within the
brain (Curra´ et al., 2002). The principle of this technique is to use electromagnetic induction
to induce weak electric currents in the brain using a rapidly changing magnetic field (Polson
et al., 1982). A magnetic coil placed near a selected cortical area generates short electromagnetic
pulses that pass through the skull and provoke electrical currents that cause depolarization or
hyperpolarization in the neurons of the targeted area. Single, paired pulses or repetitive pulses
at specific frequencies may provoke very different effects when applied to the same cortical area
(Fitzgerald et al., 2006).
Despite the remarkable advances brought by the advent of imaging techniques related to nu-
clear medicine, Electroencephalography (EEG) recording remains the most widely used method
to record human brain activity with high temporal resolution (1 ms time scale) in a non-invasive
way from the human scalp by means of external electrodes placed over many standard locations
determined by skull landmarks.
1.2 Event-Related Potentials
The brain is the site of a spontaneous electrical activity generated by nerve cells, giving rise to
fluctuations in electrical potential that can be recorded on the scalp as a difference between a
reference electrode and a measuring electrode. The recorded signals are characterized by waves,
which are the result of the summation of postsynaptic action potentials synchronized from a
large number of neurons. An electrode does not measures the activity of neurons located directly
below it, it rather represents the sum of all neural activations within the head, as demonstrated
by the paper of Cobb and Sears (1960), which reports one of the most impressive demonstration
of volume conduction phenomenon. Four patients with hemispherectomy were studied. Their
hemicranial cavities were half-filled with air and their heads were positioned so that either air
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on cerebrospinal fluid was under the target electrode. The potentials over air were higher than
over cerebrospinal fluid, demonstrating that superimposition of signals are produced everywhere
in the brain (Fabiani et al., 2000; Luck, 2005).
It is possible to extract so-called Event-Related Potential (ERP) from EEG signals. They
represent the changes in electrical potential produced by the nervous system in response to sen-
sory and motor stimuli, but also to internal cognitive time-locked events. Compared to EEG
signal, ERPs have a low intensity and are superimposed on the spontaneous EEG activity, which
is much larger in amplitude. Therefore, to extract the event-related responses, it is necessary
to use an averaging technique, in order to increase the signal to noise ratio, thus removing the
background noise to keep the stimulation specificities. Traditionally, a distinction has been made
between exogenous and endogenous components. Exogenous components are always obtained
with an external sensory or motor stimulation, they vary depending on the physical character-
istics of a stimulus and tend to be observed early after stimulus onset. Endogenous components
tend to be observed later following an internal stimulation, and vary depending on different as-
pects of cognitive processing. ERPs are usually called after their polarity and peaking latency,
for instance P300 or P3 means that the wave is positive, and is peaking around 300 millisec-
onds (Fabiani et al., 2000; Ibanez et al., 2012b; Luck, 2005). An illustration of the major ERP
component is provided in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Representation of the main Event-Related Potentials with lag.
1.2.1 Main Event-Related Potentials components
P1, N1 and P2
P1 is a positive component typically onsets at around 60–90 ms following the stimulus presen-
tation in the lateral occipital cortex. It has generally been reported to reflect exogenous sensory
responses elicited by visual stimulation, however, P1 can be responsive to internal factors such
as attention (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Luck and Ford, 1998; Luck, 2005). N1 usually peaks
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between 100–200 ms post-onset on posterior sites. Two subcomponent have been identified, the
first one is thought to be generated by the occipital cortex in response to discrimination process,
while the second one is rather sensitive to spatial attention when arising from the parietal cortex
(Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Luck and Ford, 1998; Luck, 2005). The N1 wave is followed by
P2, a positive component peaking at around 200 ms following the stimulus presentation. Within
the anterior sites, P2 has been linked to selective attention and to stimulus frequency (Ibanez
et al., 2012b; Luck, 2005).
N2
N2 is a negative wave usually peaking in between 180–320 ms that has been divided into 3
main subcomponents. The first subcomponent has been labeled N2a or Mismatch Negativity
(MMN), because of its sensitivity to novelty or mismatch in the auditory modality, with higher
amplitudes following unfrequent stimulation. The “classical” N2, sometimes called N2b, has
a more anterior distribution. It has consistently been reported to be associated to cognitive
control processes, and is thought to be an index of response conflict, because of its sensitivity
to stimulus’ probability. N2b is larger in response to nontarget compared to target, even if it
is elicited by both types of stimuli in visual and auditory modalities. The last subcomponent,
the N2c, has a more posterior distribution for the visual modality, and a more frontocentral
distribution for the auditory stimuli. This component has been linked to attentional processes,
because it requires a conscious attention. It is generally larger for target stimuli compared to
nontargets, and its latency varies with reaction time (Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004; Folstein
and Van Petten, 2008; Ibanez et al., 2012b; Luck, 2005; Patel and Azzam, 2005).
P3
P3 is a positive ongoing ERP, peaking at around 250–600 ms post-stimulus presentation and can
be divided into two subcomponents: the P3a and the P3b. P3a is thought to reflect attentional
load, because its amplitude can be modulated by the amount of attentional resources engaged
in the task performance and processing of novel stimuli. It is generally larger on frontal sites
and appear to peak between 250–280 ms and its amplitude has been reported to be enhanced in
response to novel stimuli, but habituates rapidly when the stimuli are repeated. P3b, or classical
P3 component has been associated to active attention and working memory processes, because
of its responsiveness to stimulus probability, with enhanced amplitude following rare stimuli,
and to workload capacity. P3b is maximal on posterior sites and tends to peak approximately
100 ms after P3a (Ibanez et al., 2012b; Luck, 2005; Mennes et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005a; Patel and Azzam, 2005; Polich, 2007; Pontifex et al., 2009; Squires et al., 1975).
N400
The N400 is a positive ERP wave typically evoked near 400 ms post stimulus. It has been widely
linked to language processing in both visual and auditory modalities, with greater amplitudes
for semantic violation over left temporal lobe. It is also possible to elicit a N400 following mean-
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ingful stimuli containing non-verbal informations. Syntactic violations however, are more likely
to evoke a P600 potential, having the same sensitivity as the N400 (Fabiani et al., 2000; Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011; Luck, 2005).
Late Positive Potential and Contingent Negative Variation
The Late Positive Potential (LPP) is a component arising approximately from 300 to 400 ms
following onset. It has been detected in various experimental designs in association with the
processing of affective content. The amplitude of the LPP has been reported to be larger for
positive and negative stimuli compared to neutral, and has been linked to structures associated
with visual and emotional processing (Dennis and Hajcak, 2009; Schupp et al., 2004; Singhal
et al., 2012; Weinberg and Hajcak, 2010). The Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) is a slow
negative wave occurring in between two stimuli, a first warning stimulus and a second imperative
stimulus, appearing after about 30 trials. It has been linked to the motor preparation to the
upcoming target, and is generally larger on central and frontal areas (Fabiani et al., 2000; Luck,
2005; Tecce, 1972).
1.2.2 Event-Related Potentials in decision making
The processes of decision making have been shelled in terms of milliseconds, thereby providing
important and complementary information to the data provided by brain imaging. Many studies
have focused on the mechanisms underlying outcome evaluation and reward processing and
several components have been identified. The most important one are the Feedback Related
Negativity (FRN), and the P3 (San Mart´ın, 2012).
The FRN is a negative component peaking at around 250 ms following the presentation of
the outcome and is generated by the anterior cingulate cortex (Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005b). Several studies reported an effect of valence, with an enhanced amplitude evoked
by negative feedback, in comparison to positive outcomes in paradigms involving monetary and
non monetary rewards (Cui et al., 2013; Luque et al., 2012; Polezzi et al., 2010; Sato et al., 2005;
Wu and Zhou, 2009; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yu and Zhou, 2009; Yu et al., 2011). Contradictory
results were found in regard to outcome magnitude. Some researches have failed to detect an
effect, (Cui et al., 2013; Polezzi et al., 2010; Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004), another
study perceived an more negative wave for larger outcomes (Yu and Zhou, 2009), and another
one reported the opposite pattern (Wu and Zhou, 2009). Moreover, not only the violation of the
expected reward magnitude has been found to provoke a greater FRN when the outcomes were
not expected, compared with expected rewards (Wu and Zhou, 2009), but also reward probability
(Yu et al., 2011). These difference could have been caused by the method employed to measure
the wave (San Mart´ın, 2012; Wu and Zhou, 2009). Together these findings are aligned with
the reinforcement learning theory, a learning technique borrowed to machine learning discipline,
explaining how individuals learn while interacting with their environment. The foundations of
this technique are based on actions: by using the trial and error method, individuals are able to
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optimize their behavior and choices (Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998). According to this
theory, FRN would be a reflection of the prediction error, indicating the response of the anterior
cingulate cortex (Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Sallet et al., 2013). Learning would be encoded by
the phasic activity of dopamine neurons via the basal ganglia and frontal cortex. These neurons
are believed to signal to the individual the magnitude of the error between its estimate of current
and future value (prediction error) (Glimcher, 2011), and the anterior cingulate cortex would
be a kind of filter used to select the response in accordance with the signal sent by dopamine
neurons, and in some way learns how to have a better efficiency. Yet, available data indicate
that the anterior cingulate cortex is modulated by impact of dopamine, therefore modifying the
amplitude of the FRN, a phasic decrease of dopamine is associated with an enhancement of
FRN, while a phasic increase is associated with a FRN reduction (San Mart´ın, 2012).
In the decision making area, P3 has been considered to be generated by the temporal parietal
junction following the examination of patients with lesions of this region showing great reduction
of the P3 (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a; Robertson et al., 1988; Verleger et al., 1994). Unlike the
FRN, the P3 seems to be responsive to the magnitude of the outcome. This assumption has
been demonstrated several times as illustrated in many research papers. Overall, the results of
these studies indicate that the P3 becomes gradually wider as the outcome magnitude increases
(Bellebaum et al., 2010; Cui et al., 2013; Goyer et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011; Polezzi et al.,
2010; Sato et al., 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009). The responsiveness of the P3 to the outcome
valence did not obtain an unanimous support. Although some reports associate a valence effect
to the P3, (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Cui et al., 2013; Li et al., 2010a; Polezzi et al., 2010; Sallet
et al., 2013), others could not perceive any effect (Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2005a) speculated that the P3 was modulated by the activity of the Locus
Coeruleus Norepinephrine System (LC–NE). The main source of norepinephrine is the locus
coeruleus within the neocortex, and it innervates the prefrontal and parietal cortex (Morrison
and Foote, 1986). Physiological recordings have delivered data highlighting two types of activity
of these neurons, a phasic activity and a tonic activity (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). The
assumption linking the P3 to this system is supported by the fact that the phasic activity of
norepinephrine neurons discharge at the same latencies as the P3. In addition, both the P3
and the LC–NE seem to respond to similar events, particularly to the valence of stimuli and
probability of occurrence (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a; San Mart´ın,
2012). Thus the modulation of the P3 would be expressed be the LC–NE phasic activity involved
in the outcome evaluation and decision making processes.
1.3 Decision neuroscience
The term of neuroeconomics appeared for the first time in a book written by Paul W. Glimcher
in the early 2000s, titled Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics
(Glimcher, 2004). Today neuroeconomics shows a growing scientific interest, particularly since
the psychologist Daniel Kahneman was awarded with the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002.
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Around the world, universities have developed multidisciplinary research laboratories and in-
cluded this discipline in economics or in neuroscience programs. Neuroeconomics encompasses
a broad variety of research areas, but is particularly interested in the study of decision making
in contexts of risk.
1.3.1 Behavioral economics
Traditional economics models assume that risk taking is the result of individuals’ ability to
think as rational agents (Thaler, 2000). Work derived from behavioral economics are based
on the principle that individuals have preferences on probabilities. When they are confronted
with a choice, they calculate each option’s (x) “Utility”, measuring its welfare or degree of
satisfaction, and its associated probability (p) in order to select the option that has the greatest
yield, called “expected value” (EV(x)), expressed by the following formula (1) (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944):
EV(x) =
∑
p(x) × x (1)
Four axioms were derived from this rational perspective: completeness (equation (2)), tran-
sitivity (equation (3)), independence (equation (4)), and continuity (equation (5)):
1. Completeness assumes that an individual can establish a preference between two lotteries.
Either A ≥ B or A ≤ B (2)
2. Transitivity assumes that preferences are transitive.
If A ≥ B and B ≥ C, then A ≥ C (3)
3. Independence assumes that two gambles mixed with a third one maintain the same pref-
erence order as when the two are presented independently of the third one.
If A > B, then for any number n ∈ [0, 1] and any lottery C, nA+(1−n)C ≥ B+(1−n)C
(4)
4. Continuity assumes that when there are three lotteries and if the individual prefers A
to B and B to C, then there should be a possible combination of A and C in which the
individual is then indifferent between this mix and the lottery B.
If A > B, then for some number n ∈ [0, 1];nA+ (1− n)B ≥ B (5)
However, a choice is not solely based on reward or on probabilities, it is also a reflection
of the attitude of the individual towards risk. Under conditions of uncertainty, people rather
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tend to avoid risky choices in favor of safer options, phenomenon called “risk aversion”, which
decreases according to the increase in wealth (Bernoulli, 1954). This fundamental concept of
risk aversion was illustrated by the famous St Petersburg paradox, which has given evidence
that making a choice over another is more likely to be linked to its consequences rather than
to its underlying probabilities. This paradox is illustrated by a heads or tails game. Originally,
the start amount is fixed at 2 ducats and the coin is tossed. If head appears, the player wins 2
ducats and the game is stopped. Otherwise, the coin is relaunched, as long as the coin lands on
tails. Mathematically, the problem is exposed as follows (equation (6)):
EV (X) = (0.5 ∗ 2) + (0.25 ∗ 4) + (0.125 ∗ 8) + etc. (6)
Although this model provides a simple and rational framework, it is not representative of
decisions made in the real world. In fact, a growing literature has shown that, in many situations
and under some conditions, the human violates the rationality and risk preferences assumptions
(Allais, 1953; Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). When facing a risky
choice leading to losses, people rather adopt a “risk seeking” behavior, while when facing a risky
choice leading to gains, people rather adopt a “risk averse” behavior, meaning that individuals’
chances of success are rather evaluated by the outcomes’ subjective values in terms of gains or
losses over certainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984).
1.3.2 Neuropsychology
The IIowa Gambling Task (IGT) was developed to understand the mechanisms linking emotional
deficits to decision making in real life context exhibited by patients with prefrontal lesions. In
this task, participants are asked to maximize their gains by selecting a card among four decks.
Each deck is associated with various levels of rewards and and penalties. Over the game, partici-
pants should learn that some decks, the “good decks”, provide smaller gains and lower penalties,
leading to a final gain, while others, the “bad decks”, are characterized by larger gains, but even
higher penalties, resulting in a final loss. The main results of those experiments showed that in-
dividuals having ventromedial prefrontal lobe lesions systematically choose the disadvantageous
decks favoring immediate reward options, but finalizing in a loss of total earnings in long term.
Those results indicate that these patients are insensitive to future consequences (Bechara et al.,
1994). Another candidate brain region seems to be part of the network. Using the same task,
patients with amygdala lesion demonstrated similar impairments by persistently selecting the
most unfavorable options. In addition, the lack of anticipatory physiological responses, allowed
the group of Damasio to demonstrate that amygdala is a key structure involved in the activation
of somatic markers. (Bechara et al., 1999; Damasio, 2010). Nevertheless, both areas seem to
have distinct function: the amygdala is involved in the recognition and evaluation of the emo-
tional valence of sensory stimuli, thus its injury prevents the individual to assign affective states
to stimuli (Zald, 2003), while the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) is more related to
the information’s integration of the somatic state. A recent meta-analysis reviewed the findings
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linking the IGT with regard to executive functions. The results indicated that the performance
in the gambling task seem to be dissociated from impulsivity set shifting, working memory and
intelligence (Toplak et al., 2010). It is important to notice that this task was originally aimed
at assessing “myopia for the future” in patients showing similar lesions than Phineas Gage, thus
it may not be the best task to evaluate a link between cognitive abilities and decision making.
A recent study designed to investigate how individual differences might influence decision
making competence found that the capacity to have consistent judgements towards risky events
was linked to higher shifting capacities, while the ability to apply decision rules was associ-
ated with higher capacities to inhibit interfering or irrelevant information. (Del Missier et al.,
2010). In a latter study, the same group argued that various executive components were in-
deed associated to some aspects of decision making, but decision making competence might also
depend on other cognitive and non-cognitive abilities (Del Missier et al., 2012). In line with
these results, more recent theories have proposed a new approach that involves a dual model of
decision making reflecting a dissociation between so called “hot components”, from the “cold
components”. The hot system corresponds to a more automatic emotional processing, while the
cold system reflects more deliberative decisions, and involves executive functions (Figner et al.,
2009; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Krain et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 2014).
The IGT became a reference tool assessing decision making in populations with mental
disorders such as schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, addiction to substances,
pathological gambling, mood or anxiety disorders, personality disorders, etc (Li et al., 2010b).
Since then, several other paradigms have been developed, such as the Cambridge Gambling
Task (CGT), (Rogers et al., 1999), the Game of Dice Task (GDT) (Brand et al., 2005), and the
Balloon Analogue Risk Taking Task (Lejuez et al., 2002). The CGT measures risk taking in a
gambling situation. Participants have to guess where is located a yellow token hidden behind a
row of 10 boxes divided into an unbalanced number of red and blue boxes, that change at each
trial. In the gambling stages, participants have the possibility to select an amount of points to
bet on the gamble, reflecting their judgement confidence in the gamble. If they find the right
color, the amount is added to their saving, but if they choose the wrong color, the amount
is subtracted. The aim of the game is to accumulate as many points as possible. The GDT
was designed to assess the influence of executive functions on decision making in a gambling
situation. In this game, participants are asked to increase their capital by throwing a die. At
each trial, participants have to bet on the number that will occur in the next throw. They have
the possibility to select from one to four numbers prior to the throw, however, wins and losses
are adjusted to the outcome probability of the combination selected, meaning that selecting one
die results in larger wins, but also higher levels of risk taking than the other combinations. If
the selected number coincides with the outcome, the participant earns some money, whereas if
the trial is unsuccessful, he will loose some money. The Balloon Analogue Risk Taking Task
(BART) is a measure of risk taking behavior. In this task, participant are asked to win money by
pumping up a virtual balloon. Each pump results in an inflation of the balloon size, and of total
earned money, but also increases the risk of explosion. If the ballon explodes, the participant
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looses all saved money, but he has the possibility to cash-out before its explosion.
Another task was developed to evaluate the modulators of the so-called “myopic loss aver-
sion” phenomenon. This concept is a combination of loss aversion, where individuals tend to
weigh losses more heavily than gains, and mental accounting, which refers to people’s ability to
classify and evaluate economic outcomes (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). In this game, participants
had to select an amount of points to gamble in a risky lottery, where they had a probability of
1/3 to win two and a half times the amount bet, and a probability of 2/3 to loose the amount
bet. They were informed about the objective probabilities of winning and losing. In a first
sequence, participants were endowed with a certain amount of points at the beginning of each
trial, but did not have the possibility to bet the money accumulated. In a second sequence of
the game, participants were not longer endowed with points but had to bet with the money ac-
cumulated during the first sequence. In both sequences, the feedback frequency of the outcome
was manipulated. In the high frequency treatment, the outcomes were delivered immediately
following each gamble, whereas in the low frequency treatment, the outcomes were presented
following a block of three trials. In the high frequency of feedback condition, participants could
bet at each trial, while they had to choose only one bet per block in the low feedback condition,
meaning that the bet was similar for the three trials.
1.3.3 Neural correlates
The growing number of imaging studies indicate that some brain activity changes are affecting
the quality of decision making. Advances in imaging technologies allowed scholars to open the
“black box” and to provide some insights about the organization of decision making.
Different aspects of risk
Uncertainty is a term that can have different meanings depending on the area of expertise of
the person. What is called risk for an economist can therefore mean uncertainty for a psychol-
ogist. A proper use of uncertainty needs to be defined in order that everyone could understand
which kind of risk is assessed in the document they read. Risk can been defined as a situation
where individuals know the exact probabilities of outcome, while ambiguity refer to risk where
individuals can not infer the outcomes’ probabilities (Hsu et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2010; Platt
and Huettel, 2008). Nonetheless, it is important to stress that one should always beware when
reading a paper to be sure that there is no confusion. Neural investigations has given evidence
that these two forms of uncertainty were linked to different brain areas; ambiguity is associated
with the activation of the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (dlPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex,
and parts of the parietal cortex, while risk involves Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC), parts of the
rostral anterior cingulate, and parietal cortex (Krain et al., 2006). A recent meta-analysis inves-
tigated whereas the decision to take a risk, or its anticipation could be differentiated within the
brain. From their analyses resulted that both decision and anticipation of risk activated bilateral
insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and thalamus. However, the decision to take a risk acti-
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vated right insula, dlPFC, parietal cortex, striatum, and occipital cortex, while anticipation was
more likely to activate left insula, and left superior temporal gyrus. In addition, they addressed
the same questions in regard to gains and losses, and found that in the presence of potential
losses, left insula, left superior temporal gyrus and left precentral gyrus was activated, whereas
possible gains were more likely to activate dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dlPFC, right parietal
cortex, thalamus and occipital cortex. A model of risk processing was then proposed: when
the risky stimulus is perceived, it is evaluated through the interaction of emotional and cogni-
tive processes, but modulated by distinct brain areas. The emotional component is processed
by insula and thalamus, while the cognitive component is evaluated by dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex. Following the anticipation processes, the decision would activate dlPFC and parietal
cortices (Mohr et al., 2010).
Valuation
Some studies have provided evidence that there is a valuation system within the prefrontal
cortex. In a simple task, when monkeys had to choose between different types of juices, the
implication of the OFC in the valuation process was stressed. In fact, within this structure, there
are distinct groups of neurons that encode the value of offered and chosen goods. This results
support the conclusion that the OFC is part of a network that assigns the value of economic
choices (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009, 2013). Another study
found that the activity of phasically active neurons in monkey striatum were correlated to action
values, chosen value, and choice neurons. The action value responses occurred at the time of
the monkey’s choice, while chosen value responses was closer to the time of reward (Lau and
Glimcher, 2008). Using the same kind of paradigm, McCoy and Platt (2005) showed that the
neurons located in the posterior cingulate cortex were sensitive to risk, and to the subjective
target utility. In addition, Kennerley et al. (2006) found that the anterior cingulate cortex was
involved in the learning processes helping to guide the choices based on value actions.
In humans, the valuation role of the OFC has been replicated within studies (Hare et al.,
2008; Plassmann et al., 2007; Stalnaker et al., 2015), but vmPFC appeared to be most frequently
concerned by value-based decision making tasks (Wallis, 2012). One study has suggested that
these two structures might have different attributions, choices could be guided through their
association with anticipated emotions, involving the vmPFC, while emotions might signal a
modification of the behavior following the choices, process handled by OFC (Levens et al.,
2014). The amygdala appeared also to be involved in the valuations process in combination
with OFC. Conditioning paradigms have allowed to emphasize their implication following the
devaluation of the target stimulus. The activation of amygdala and OFC were decreased com-
pared to stimuli that were not devaluated, leading to the conclusion that reward representation
within the brain was encoded in these areas (Gottfried et al., 2003). One possible explanation
differentiating both structures is that the value signals encoded by the OFC could be influenced
by the amygdala (Jenison et al., 2011). This hypothesis was supported by a two-choice reward-
guided task in monkeys. Amygdalectomy was found to reduce the number of value-encoding
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cells in OFC, but not entirely the encoding of reward value recorded before and after the re-
ward delivery, thus suggesting that the amygdala have an influence on OFC (Rudebeck et al.,
2013). Other structures might be part of the the system. In a delay discounting task, Kable and
Glimcher (2007) found that ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate
cortex correlated with the subjective value of the delayed reward. This activity was negatively
associated with the degree of impulsivity of the subject, the more impulsive they scored, the
lesser the activity within these region was pronounced. Striatum and anterior cingulate cortex
activity have been linked to changes in risky choices in a gambling task. Participants’ striatal
activity was responsive to the value’s magnitude independently from their utility, while anterior
cingulate cortex contributed to risk coding. These results suggest that the brain encodes the
choices’ properties and combines neural signals to compute a choice (Christopoulos et al., 2009).
1.4 Attention deficit hyperactive disorder
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) is a neurodevelopemental disorder usually di-
agnosed during childhood. The prevalence of ADHD can vary across studies, but it is generally
assume that it affects more than 4% of the children, with a greater representation of boys (Brown
et al., 2001; Faraone et al., 2003; Polanczyk et al., 2007; Willcutt, 2012). Individuals living with
this condition manifest attentional impairments, such as daydreaming, distractibility, difficul-
ties in concentrating and maintaining focused attention, high degree of impulsivity, as well as
excessive level of activity and talking. Disturbance associated with ADHD during childhood
may also include learning difficulties that can lead to academic failure and social issues, thus
increasing the risk of substance abuse and low self-esteem (Biederman, 2005). In addition, it is
not uncommon to observe a multiple range of associated disorders. Comorbidity rates may vary
depending on the study, but the most commonly reported diseases represent both internal and
external disorders, such as oppositional defiant disorder, and conduct disorder, mood and anxi-
ety disorders, bipolar disorder, tic disorders including Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive
disorders, schizophrenia and other non-affective psychotic conditions, substance use disorders,
and personality disorders (Gillberg et al., 2004).
1.4.1 Diagnostic
ADHD is a disorder that has aroused great interest for many years. Some illustrations from
the 19th century already describe the major symptoms characterizing the current definition of
ADHD, for instance, the story of “Fidgety Phil” in 1845, depicts a scene where a restless child
drives the dinner particularly hectic (Hoffmann, 2006). What is now called ADHD has undergone
many definitions over time. The most popular theories have named the disorder minimal brain
damage (Pincus and Glaser, 1966; Lange et al., 2010), minimal brain dysfunction (Menkes et al.,
1967; Wender, 1975), hyperkinetic reaction of childhood (Conners, 1970; American Psychiatric
Association (APA), 1968), attention deficit disorder with and without hyperactivity (Barkley
et al., 1992; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1980), and attention deficit hyperactive
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disorder (Barkley, 1997; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000, 2013).
ADHD has long been regarded as a childhood disease, but in recent years, scientific proofs
have demonstrated that the symptoms did not decrease during adolescence, on the contrary, it
can persist into adulthood (Avisar and Shalev, 2011; Biederman et al., 2007a; Hervey et al.,
2004). The frequency, severity of symptoms, and associated disorders can vary among indi-
viduals, leading to difficulties in the establishment of the diagnosis. There are no simple tests
allowing practitioners to detect ADHD, however, several types of evaluation grids have cur-
rently been developed to confirm the presence of the disorder and to assess the severity of the
symptoms. These methods take into account the evaluation by close relatives, by teachers and
by self-assessment questionnaires. A medical examination is required, as well as a physical
examination. In addition, it is preferable to specify the strength and weakness of the child’s
neuropsychological condition, by including batteries evaluating IQ, and cognitive functioning
during the diagnostic interview.
The DSM-V classifies ADHD in the group of neurodevelopemental disorder and defines
specific diagnostic criteria:
A. A persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning
or development, as characterized by (1) and/or (2):
1. Inattention: Six (or more) of the following symptoms have persisted for at least 6 months
to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level and that negatively impacts directly
on social and academic/occupational activities:
Note: The symptoms are not solely a manifestation of oppositional behavior, defiance,
hostility, or failure to understand tasks or instructions. For older adolescents and adults
(age 17 and older), at least five symptoms are required.
a. Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in schoolwork,
at work, or during other activities (e.g., overlooks or misses details, work is inaccurate).
b. Often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities (e.g., has difficulty
remaining focused during lectures, conversations, or lengthy reading).
c. Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly (e.g., mind seems elsewhere,
even in the absence of any obvious distraction).
d. Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork, chores,
or duties in the workplace (e.g., starts tasks but quickly loses focus and is easily
sidetracked).
e. Often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities (e.g., difficulty managing sequential
tasks; difficulty keeping materials and belongings in order; messy, disorganized work;
has poor time management; fails to meet deadlines).
f. Often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental
effort (e.g., schoolwork or homework; for older adolescents and adults, preparing reports,
completing forms, reviewing lengthy papers).
g. Often loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g., school materials, pencils,
books, tools, wallets, keys, paperwork, eyeglasses, mobile telephones).
h. Is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli (for older adolescents and adults,
may include unrelated thoughts).
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i. Is often forgetful in daily activities (e.g., doing chores, running errands; for older
adolescents and adults, returning calls, paying bills, keeping appointments).
2. Hyperactivity and impuisivity: Six (or more) of the following symptoms have persisted
for at least 6 months to a degree that is inconsistent with developmental level and that
negatively impacts directly on social and academic/occupational activities:
Note: The symptoms are not solely a manifestation of oppositional behavior, defiance,
hostility, or a failure to understand tasks or instructions. For older adolescents and
adults (age 17 and older), at least five symptoms are required.
a. Often fidgets with or taps hands or feet or squirms in seat.
b. Often leaves seat in situations when remaining seated is expected (e.g., leaves his
or her place in the classroom, in the office or other workplace, or in other situations
that require remaining in place).
c. Often runs about or climbs in situations where it is inappropriate. (Note: In adolescents
or adults, may be limited to feeling restless).
d. Often unable to play or engage in leisure activities quietly.
e. Is often ‘‘on the go,’’ acting as if ‘‘driven by a motor’’ (e.g., is unable to be or
uncomfortable being still for extended time, as in restaurants, meetings; may be experienced
by others as being restless or difficult to keep up with).
f. Often talks excessively.
g. Often blurts out an answer before a question has been completed (e.g., completes people’s
sentences; cannot wait for turn in conversation).
h. Often has difficulty waiting his or her turn (e.g., while waiting in line).
i. Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into conversations, games, or activities;
may start using other people’s things without asking or receiving permission; for adolescents
and adults, may intrude into or take over what others are doing).
B. Several inattentive or hyperactive-impulsive symptoms were present prior to age 12 years.
C. Several inattentive or hyperactive-impulsive symptoms are present in two or more settings (e.g.,
at home, school, or work; with friends or relatives; in other activities).
D. There is clear evidence that the symptoms interfere with, or reduce the quality of, social,
academic, or occupational functioning.
E. The symptoms do not occur exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or another psychotic
disorder and are not better explained by another mental disorder (e.g., mood disorder, anxiety
disorder, dissociative disorder, personality disorder, substance intoxication or withdrawal).
Specify whether:
Combined presentation: If both Criterion A1 (inattention) and Criterion A2 (hyperactivity-impulsivity)
are met for the past 6 months.
Predominantly inattentive presentation: If Criterion A1 (inattention) is met but Criterion
A2 (hyperactivity-impulsivity) is not met for the past 6 months.
Predominantly hyperactive/impulsive presentation: If Criterion A2 (hyperactivity- impulsivity)
is met and Criterion A1 (inattention) is not met for the past 6 months.
Specify if:
in partial remission: When full criteria were previously met, fewer than the full criteria
have been met for the past 6 months, and the symptoms still result in impairment in social,
academic, or occupational functioning.
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Specify current severity:
Few, if any, symptoms in excess of those required to make the diagnosis are present, and symptoms
result in no more than minor impairments in social or occupational functioning.
Moderate: Symptoms or functional impairment between ‘‘mild’’ and ‘‘severe’’ are present.
Severe: Many symptoms in excess of those required to make the diagnosis, or several symptoms
that are particularly severe, are present, or the symptoms result in marked impairment in social
or occupational functioning.
1.4.2 Etiology
A better understanding of etiological factors involved in the disorder entails progress in the
understanding of the risk factors. Different theories have been advanced, however, there is
still no clear consensus. To date, the result of scientific work demonstrates that there are sev-
eral possible etiologies, including genetic, neurobiological, and neuropsychological factors. To
assess the underlying determinants of ADHD, a growing number of studies have been conducted.
Genetic factors
Data from family studies support the hypothesis that genetic factors are involved in causing
ADHD, by showing that relatives had a much higher chance of developing the disorder than
in the general population. A review evaluated that diagnostic criteria were met in 25% of
first-degree relatives, against 5% in the control population (Biederman et al., 1990). A comple-
mentary study concluded that ADHD would be less frequently reported in more distant families
(Faraone et al., 1994). Further, children adopted within healthy families, but having biologi-
cal parent carrier of the disease exhibit more frequently the symptoms of ADHD compared to
those adopted but having healthy biological parents (Sprich et al., 2000). Twin studies have
also demonstrated its inheritance character, the mean heritability rate has been evaluated to be
much more higher in comparison with other disorders (Larsson et al., 2004; Levy et al., 1997;
Sherman et al., 1997). Moreover, monozygotic twins have a concordance rate of the disorder 2 to
3 times higher than dizygotic twins (Eaves et al., 1997). Together, these findings are consistent
with the hypothesis that some genetic factors may underlie ADHD.
Neuropsychological factors
Research conducted on the neurobiological characteristics of ADHD includes the work assessing
the impairments that people with ADHD have to live with. Through these investigations, some
neuropsychological and neurobiological factors have been identified. Most consistent findings
have shown a link between ADHD and executive functions. These studies agree on the fact
that some aspects are deficient in the clinical populations, such as response inhibition, working
memory, planning, and set shifting (Biederman et al., 2004; Nigg et al., 2002a; Pennington and
Ozonoff, 1996; Quay, 1997; Willcutt et al., 2005).
A prominent theory attempt to explain the origin of ADHD’s symptoms was foremost pro-
posed by Quay (1988), and further reedited by Barkley (1997). They assumed that poor behav-
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ioral inhibition was the key of the disease. Barkley’s unified model had identified the cause of
the symptoms as being related to a disturbance of the neurocognitive circuit underpinning the
executive functions. More particularly, ADHD is perceived as a developmental disorder affect-
ing behavioral inhibition ability, rather than an attentional disorder as suggested by its name.
Response inhibition would be the main cause of the symptoms, while attention problems are
likely to be its consequences. For Barkley, behavioral inhibition is used to inhibit immediate
responses, to terminate the ongoing responses and to limit interference. It is linked to 4 pro-
cesses: working memory, allowing the maintenance of events in memory, and to act accordingly;
emotional and motivational autoregulation, creating a response time to give the individuals the
opportunity to withdraw from the event; internalization of language, which influences the be-
havior by encouraging questioning and internal reflection; and the reconstitution, providing the
means to analyze and to synthesize the behavior.
More recently appeared a new theoretical current that shifted the focus from impaired in-
hibition to the conception of delay aversion. The model of Sonuga-Barke (2003) suggests that
hyperactive behaviors are not the consequence of a behavioral inhibition default but rather an
expression of an underlying motivational state, which leads them to seek to escape from delay,
which is able to cause them hyperactivity, inattention, and impulsivity symptoms. According to
this model, the proposition presented by Barkley did not totally encompass the motivational-
related dysfunction. In particular, when faced with a choice between a small but immediate
reward and a strong but more distant gratification in time, ADHD individuals will prefer imme-
diacy. Cognitive disorders appear to be the consequences of a particular attitude, related to time
sequence. The main idea is that ADHD individuals operate in order to escape the experience of
delay by allocating their attention towards non-temporal environmental cues, otherwise creating
themselves non-temporal stimulation. The model is divided into tho main pathways: the first
pathway is likely to be associated with dysfunctions of the executive circuit, while the second
one would be linked to the reward circuit signaling delay aversion. Evidence has been brought to
confirm the complementary aspect of these two pathways, rather than perceiving them as being
in competition: the first dysexecutive function pathway would be linked with the dlPFC, while
the reward/motivational pathway would be associated with the OFC. Both pathways present
functional abnormalities within these loops, resulting by the expression of different symptoms.
Hyperactivity and inattention are more likely to be related to motivational and reward con-
structs, while impulsivity would be more representative of the inhibitory deficit (Sonuga-Barke,
2003, 2005).
Neurobiological factors
Several studies have focused on the role of dopamine in the expression of symptoms associated
with ADHD. Dopamine is a neurotransmitter belonging to the class of catecholamines, mainly
produced in the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area, located in the midbrain. It plays
a vital modulatory role in motor and cognitive functions, as well as in the reward circuit (Fallon
and Moore, 1978; Schultz, 2007). Some evidences might suggest a connection between dopamine
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dysfunction and ADHD. For instance, stimulant-based treatment have been shown to improve
cognitive skills by producing an increase of dopamine transporter (Coghill et al., 2014). Fur-
thermore, depletion of the DAT gene in mice produced similar disturbances than individuals
with ADHD (Gainetdinov and Caron, 2000). Finally, some studies have shown that dopamine
receptor density was weaker than in healthy individuals. It has been suggested that the DAT-1
dopamine transporter and DRD4 receptor were implicated in this reduction, but this effect may
be weak given the relatively low level of variance explained by these studies (Cortese, 2012;
Sharma and Couture, 2014; Swanson et al., 2000).
1.4.3 Clinical treatment
There seems to be no treatment to cure ADHD. The objective of the care is to reduce the
symptoms of ADHD in children and adults. Actual treatments are divided into 2 currents: drug
treatments and non-pharmacological treatments, such as psychological assistance or cognitive
remediation, and neurofeedback (Arns et al., 2009; Jensen et al., 1999; Sharma and Couture,
2014). Only methylphenidate psychostimulant medication and cognitive remediation will be
introduced here.
Pharmacology
The most common treatment is Methylphenidate (MPH), a stimulant of the central nervous
system acting by blocking the reuptake of dopamine. It was synthesize in 1944, and prescribed
in 1954, but its intended audience was initially for patients with depression and narcolepsy, and
since the end of the 50s has been indicated for patients with ADHD. From a pharmacological
point of view, its action is close to cocaine, but it does not lead to dependance. The main
difference between the two molecules is the mode of administration. Being orally ingested,
MPH does not have the time to produce the reinforcing effects associated with rapid changes
in serum concentrations and presumably fast dopamine increases, as obtained using intravenous
injection or insuﬄation, while the therapeutic effects are associated with a slow increase of the
serum concentration and presumably a gradual increase in dopamine levels. At therapeutic
doses, MPH acts in order to increase the value of stimuli having difficulty to elicit dopamine
responses, which could be amplified by being more salient and drive interest and attention
(Casey and Durston, 2014; Kimko et al., 1999; Leonard et al., 2004; Patrick and Markowitz,
1997; Volkow and Swanson, 2003; Volkow et al., 2005). Different effects of this treatment have
been reported in literature, for instance, it seems to have a positive impact on the symptoms
severity. In addition, executive functions deficits, academic performance and emotional status
have been shown to be significantly improved (Coghill et al., 2014; Hechtman et al., 2004; Kimko
et al., 1999; Sunohara et al., 1999; Yildiz et al., 2011). A recent meta-analysis was interested
in estimating the neurocognitive effects of MPH. The results emerging from this analysis show
that during inhibition tasks, stimulants increased the activation of the frontal cortex/insula, and
at a lower level, the putamen, thus enhancing the cognitive control region of the brain (Rubia
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et al., 2014). Another study indicated that psychostimulants improved the performance during
attentional tasks by suppressing the default-mode activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and
in the ventral posterior cingulate cortex. They concluded that this type of medication improves
performance by normalizing the activity of the circuit (Peterson et al., 2009).
Evidence from ERP studies have also emphasized the effects of stimulant on various ERP
components disturbances. For instance, Verbaten et al. (1994) reported that children with
ADHD taking MPH had an improved N2 and P3 amplitude, but did not find any effect on
N1 and P2 waves. Winsberg et al. (1997) reported an increased P3 amplitude in an auditory
oddball task, but no effect on neither the MMN nor N2. These results can been explained by the
fact that this medical treatment leads to an increase of alertness and accuracy. In an auditory
and visual selective attention task, the frontal processing negativity and P3b amplitudes were
greater in both modalities with children under medication. The authors concluded that MPH
affects selective attentional processing, even if the performances were not improved. (Jonkman
et al., 1997). The same group reported further an enhancement of P3 amplitude following task-
relevant stimuli, but not the P3 novelty component (Jonkman et al., 2000), suggesting that MPH
did not improve the capacity-allocation deficit of ADHD children. In a decision making task,
feedback-related P2 and LPP components were found to be similar in MPH-treated children with
ADHD and control children (Groen et al., 2013b). In addition, following a cure of 8 weeks with
a washout period of 2 of MPH treatment, children with ADHD showed an increase of the CNV
induced by a Attentional Network Test (Kratz et al., 2012). This enhancement was not found in
those treated with atomoxetine, the alternative non-stimulant medication, suggesting that both
treatments do not have the same impact on attentional networks, even if behavioral symptoms
were improved in both conditions; MPH rather have an impact on dopaminergic neurons within
the cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuit. Another study has highlighted a dose-dependent
effect of MPH. While performing a continuous performance test, only the P3 latency became
comparable to those of individuals controls after taking a low dose of the drug, while a high
dose normalized both N2 and P3 latencies (Sunohara et al., 1999).
Cognitive remediation
ADHD is considered a chronic disorder, thus, the need to continue a treatment for a prolonged
period can be costly and problematic. Particularly, it is important to notice that medical
treatment using psychostimulant can raise some questions, including the use of psychotropic
drugs for children, the risk of over-medicalization, or merely the fact that everyone does not
respond in the same manner to this treatment; some people tolerate it quite well, while others
manifest a long list of side effects that can lead to the decision to head towards another type of
therapy, or simply to avoid to treat themselves (Halperin and Healey, 2011; Leonard et al., 2004;
Patrick and Markowitz, 1997; Yildiz et al., 2011). When the drug option is not conceivable, it
is possible to test another type of therapy, such as cognitive remediation.
Cognitive training programs have been developed relatively recently. The aim of these train-
ings is to provide a treatment with long lasting effects, on the contrary to medicated treatments.
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They are essentially based on the improvement of attention and of working memory. Several pro-
grams have been used in the ADHD community, such as “Pay Attention!” (Kerns et al., 1999),
the “Computerized Progressive Attentional Training” (Shalev et al., 2007), and the “Cogmed
Working Memory Training Program” (Klingberg et al., 2002, 2005). These programs have been
linked to improvement on several neurocognitive and academic skills, as well as a reduction of
the symptoms. However, as they implement several type of tasks, it can be difficult to find out
specifically which was the one responsible for these improvements.
The N-Back is a game which has been developed in the late 50s in order to study the
age-related effects on short-term memory (Kirchner, 1958). It is now frequently used to assess
Working Memory (WM) capacity in various populations (Carter et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2005;
Jaeggi et al., 2010; Tsuchida and Fellows, 2009; Valera et al., 2014). Programs using N-back or
Dual N-Back tasks have shown that WM performances can be improved significantly. In addition
to WM enhancements, some studies have shown that other untrained constructs might benefit
from WM trainings with these tasks, such as temporary memory measures, fluid intelligence
and to some aspects of executive functions (task switching, attention, cognitive control, reading
comprehension), while other studies did not found any near or far transfer effect, neither on
general fluid intelligence, nor on executive function skills (Chooi and Thompson, 2012; Dahlin
et al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2008; Lilienthal et al., 2013; Morrison and Chein, 2011; Oelhafen et al.,
2013; Owens et al., 2013; Redick et al., 2013; Salminen et al., 2012; Thompson et al., 2013). The
difference perceived between studies might be due to several factors, including methodological
issues within studies or the lack of consistency between studies, as well as motivation and
expectancy of the participants (Morrison and Chein, 2011).
1.4.4 Neuroanatomic imaging data
Numerous studies have examined the neural characteristics of ADHD. Findings have identified
cortical differences affecting some specific areas. Overall, volumetric analyses have reported a
reduction of the total brain volume, and global reductions in gray matter volumes in children
affected by ADHD. In addition, more specific areas of the brain appear to be smaller than those
of healthy individuals. A decreased size of the regions within frontal lobe have been reported as
well as differences in the symmetry of the prefrontal region, due to a significant decrease in right
prefrontal area (dlPFC). In addition, reductions of globus pallidus, caudate nucleus, cerebellum,
putamen, and parietal cortex have been consistently described (Aylward et al., 1996; Castellanos
et al., 1996, 2002; Krain and Castellanos, 2006; Nakao et al., 2011). Shaw and colleagues showed
that the development of cortical thickness and surface area, more specifically prefrontal cortex,
was delayed in young ADHD subjects. These delays were mostly evident in regions controlling
cognitive processes including motor skills and attention planning (Shaw et al., 2007, 2012).
Several studies have indicated that ADHD symptoms are still present in adulthood. Indeed,
it has been reported that approximately 40% of individuals still meet the diagnostic criteria.
Hyperactivity and impulsive symptoms seem to be reduced, leaving room to attention deficits
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(Barkley et al., 2002; Biederman et al., 2000, 2007a, 2010; Shaw et al., 2013). In line with these
behavioral reports, the cortical abnormalities appear also to be maintained into adulthood.
The group of Makris found that ADHD adults presented a diminished volume of right dlPFC,
anterior cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobule, regions linked to attention and executive
functions (Makris et al., 2007). These results are in agreement with those reported by Shaw
(Shaw et al., 2013). In this longitudinal study, the findings allowed further the authors to discuss
an association between cortical thickness to the severity of symptoms in adults with ADHD.
1.4.5 Event-Related Potentials correlates
Owing to their high temporal resolution, ERPs have been used to study brain responses related
to specific events. Research conducted in ADHD patients have allowed to bring some insights
about brain waves’ characteristics in regard to sensory and cognitive processing.
Attention
Attentional processes have been widely examined through ERP reports. The findings demon-
strate that early preparatory processes might be impaired in ADHD patients, as shown by
absence or decreased amplitude of the CNV wave reported by several studies (Banaschewski
et al., 2003, 2008; Doehnert et al., 2010; Dumais-Huber and Rothenberger, 1992; Perchet et al.,
2001). Moreover, IQ and executive functions capacities have been found to be associated with
the amplitude of CNV, suggesting that the severity of executive impairments in ADHD are
reflected by the differential activity of the CNV (Sartory et al., 2002).
Other works have demonstrated that various attentional stages of processing might differ in
comparison from healthy controls. For instance, discrimination processes, as reflected by the
N1 component, have been shown to be reduced or inexistent in children and adults with ADHD
(Banaschewski et al., 2003; Barry et al., 2009; Bekker et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2005; Lawrence
et al., 2005; Sable et al., 2013). Moreover, most studies have reported abnormal N2 and P3
amplitude while performing active attentional tasks in both children and adult community (An-
jana et al., 2010; Doehnert et al., 2010; Lazzaro et al., 2001; MacLaren et al., 2007; Satterfield
et al., 1994). Yet, the results are not unanimous, some studies failed to find such difference
with normal controls, in both children and adult samples (Barry et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2005;
Fisher et al., 2011; Karch et al., 2010; Lopez et al., 2006). In sum, these findings suggest that
ADHD show attentional processes alterations, they tend to exhibit readiness deficits, as well as
deviant resources allocation and processing of attentional stimuli.
Inhibition
Inhibitory control has also been widely considered in the ADHD community. Reduction of N2
and P3 responses have been consistently detected following stimuli requiring inhibition of the
response (Fallgatter et al., 2005; Gow et al., 2012; Johnstone et al., 2010b; Liotti et al., 2005,
2010). A meta-analysis conducted in adults with ADHD pointed out consistent findings in regard
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with the P3 component. Most of the studies analyzed in this work were in accordance with the
reduction of the amplitude during target detection, with only one exception found in Barry et al.
(2009). It was further demonstrated that this decrease was associated with age and gender, the
older the people are, the more negative is the effect size, and the higher percentage of males in
the ADHD group is, the less negative is the effect size (Szuromi et al., 2011). The diminution of
the P3 activity has been associated with a dysfunction of the LC-NE network, suggesting that
the P3 activity may reflect a reduction of inhibitory control in ADHD (Fallgatter et al., 2005).
Together, these ERP results adjust behavioral data supporting a deficit of behavioral inhibition
in ADHD populations.
Overall, it appears that results are quite consistent between studies, with some exceptions.
Several factors could have been affecting the results. Firstly, since the 90s, the definition of
ADHD has been changed many times, thus, the difference found in comparison with older stud-
ies could have been due to the update of diagnostic criteria. Secondly, the differences between
these studies may be related to the age, gender and comorbid factors within the groups of pa-
tients studied. In addition, the diversity of experimental paradigms may have also impacted
the results. Finally, comparison between studies always implies methodological issues, for in-
stance the number of subjects that have participated in the study, or even the method used to
analyze the data. These factors have certainly influenced both latencies and amplitude of ERP
components, which are quite sensitive to the environment and context.
1.4.6 Decision making and ADHD
Individuals with ADHD tend to be implicated in greater situation where they meet risk. Some
studies have pointed out the over-representation of road accidents and violation of traffic rules
(Barkley et al., 1996), or abuse of substances such as alcohol or drugs (Lee et al., 2011). Other
researches have also examined risk in ADHD by showing that these irrational attitudes towards
risk taking were not limited only to the field of safety and health, but also in the financial sector.
For this purpose, several research studies have been conducted to highlight correlates of decision
making in adults with ADHD.
Some studies reported that ADHD were characterized by more risky performance compared
to normal controls, however, other reports did not found impaired performances. Specifically,
in a double blind placebo experiment, using the IGT, Agay et al. (2010) did not detect any
significant difference nor in the selection of bad decks neither in the total net score between all
groups. In contrast, whilst playing to the Foregone Payoff Gambling Task, a modified version
of the IGT where participants could see all hidden cards following the choice, they found that
ADHD adults in both placebo and drug administration pools had chosen significantly more cards
from the bad decks compared to the controls, suggesting that the additional information might
have distracted ADHD individuals. They concluded that MPH administration on the gambling
task did not affect performance. Much like Agay et al. (2010), another study did not find any
behavioral difference between the ADHD group and the healthy controls (Ernst et al., 2003).
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However, PET data highlighted the recruitment of other neural networks and reduced activation
of the vmPFC, dlPFC and insular cortices. On the contrary to these data, other studies have
pointed out a more risky behavior using the IGT. ADHD disclosed a lower total score compared
with a control group (Malloy-Diniz et al., 2007). Additionally, Ma¨ntyla¨ et al. (2012) analyzed
the behavioral performances in 4 different tasks, two subtests of the A-DMC battery, evaluating
the ability to apply decision rules and participant’s confidence judgement respectively, the IGT
and the BART task, where individuals had to earn money by pumping up balloons as much
as possible before it exploded. ADHD were not impaired in their confidence’ judgment ability,
but showed significant difference in the 3 other tasks. In the IGT, the total earned money
was significantly lower than in the normal control group and they also took greater risks in
the BART task, reflecting poor decision making capacities, which may have been mediated
by executive functioning impairments. In line with these results, the Game of Dice Task has
provide contradictory data. In particular, Matthies et al. (2012) found that individuals with
ADHD were more likely to perform the task in a riskier fashion, as indicated by the number of
disadvantageous alternative’s selection, but Wilbertz et al. (2012) did not detect such behavior.
Several hypothesis have been postulated in order to explain the suboptimal decision making
abilities characterizing individuals with ADHD (Sonuga-Barke and Fairchild, 2012). The first
hypothesis stipulates that the medial prefrontal cortex–posterior cingulate cortex circuitry is
involved in the abilities to have a self-referential thought, to have a sense of self, and to pursue
specific goals. This circuitry has been shown to be less effective in ADHD, and might explain
goal setting impairments, planing difficulties and intention deficits involved in the processes of
valuation and intention to take risks. The second hypothesis explains difficulties that ADHD
patients encounter towards uncertainty and delayed rewards. It includes the dlPFC, underpin-
ning executive functioning deficits in ADHD. This hypothesis postulates that working memory
deficits prevent from holding information in mind, resulting in poor economic decision making
capacities. The last hypothesis involves dopaminergic dysregulation in ventral frontostriatal
loops supporting outcome prediction and evaluation, and learning competences, that have been
reported to be less efficient in ADHD individuals.
1.5 Aim of the project
ADHD is a neuropsychiatric disorder that evolves continuously between childhood and adult-
hood. Yet, each individual presents a specific profile, making the diagnosis difficult to establish.
Most common negative symptoms being reported are attention deficit, which may be accom-
panied by disturbances of motor activity expressed through hyperkinesia in some individuals.
Inattention problems are also frequent and can lead to many difficulties in daily life. An ef-
fective way to fight against these symptoms is to follow a treatment with methylphenidate, a
psychostimulant acting on dopamine transporters. Its effect is fast, but requires several admin-
istrations per day depending on the intensity of the disorder. Moreover this treatment may not
suit everyone, some people have severe side effects that can lead to discontinuation of treatment
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in favor of other methods that can be harmful, such as drugs or alcohol intake.
Other therapies have also proved their worth, such as cognitive remediation. These methods
can reduce symptoms and improve some deficient aspects, such as improving executive functions
capacities on more extended periods. In particular, cognitive trainings conducted with the
Dual N-Back have shown significant symptoms reduction, as well as positive effects on working
memory. The aim of the present study is therefore to examine the effects of an intensive working
memory training conducted with the Dual N-back task in a population of young adults with
ADHD and match-controls through various measures including electroencephalography. In the
context of an original interdisciplinary collaboration, the results of this research will provide
objective measures of the impact of working memory training on cognitive processes, but will
not be limited to a theoretical contribution on economic decision making abilities, they will also
provide new perspectives in the evaluation of interactions between the executive and decision
making process in adults with ADHD.
This study could also show the benefits of cognitive training in healthy subjects, which would
provide public health arguments against the current trends of self-administration of drugs and
psychoactive substances to boost attention in high-pressure work environments. According to
the research results, applications could be developed for target populations, such as cerebral
cognitive deficits, addiction to electronic games, and pathological gamblers, using cognitive
training on working memory, attentional control, impulsivity and decision making.
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2 Methods and Materials
2.1 Participants
Two hundred and thirty-two subjects below the age of thirty were selected to participate in this
study (see Table 1). Ninety-six clinically referred young adult ADHD patients were recruited ei-
ther in the Psychiatric Department of the University Hospital of Lausanne or at a psychiatrist’s
practice in collaboration with the University Hospital, following an initial screening appoint-
ment, to ensure that they were fulfilling the criteria defined by the DSM-IV-TR for inattentive,
hyperactive/impulsive or mixed subtypes (American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000). Sub-
jects with neuropsychiatric conditions such as acute mood/anxious disorder, bipolar disorder,
psychosis, autism or Asperger’s syndrome, antecedent of Tourette’s syndrome, presence of motor
tics, suicidal behavior, chronic medical conditions were excluded from this study. Any subjects
taking other psychotropic agents such as anti-depressants, mood stabilizers, non-stimulant med-
ications for ADHD, or dopamine receptor-blocking agents were also excluded from this study.
Subjects taking psychostimulants at time of the study were required to stop medication 24 hours
prior to testing (Cross-Villasana et al., 2015; Groom et al., 2008; Mazaheri et al., 2014).
The University of Lausanne or EPFL volunteer students were approached through the
ORSEE database, based on their scores reported by a questionnaire evaluating ADHD symp-
toms. We created an index of Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS) scores (ASRS, described
below) based on the presence of symptoms assessed by 6 essential items. That is, the index was
build only with the answers of those questions. Individuals that had a score below 10 points
on this index constituted the low ASRS group, while those having a score above 22 points were
placed in the high ASRS group (see Figure 2). Following a short explanation on the aims of our
study, 93 individuals having strictly lower or greater predefined scores responding to our criteria
were selected.
In order to form the second control group composed of apprentices, flyers were posted in
professional schools to attract young volunteers’ curiosity. The advantage of this group is that
it allowed us to find young adults having a level of education comparable to the ADHD patients
group, and who were naive to experimental manipulations, unlike the university campus students
who have long been accustomed to this practice. All control participants were screened prior to
the experimental session to ensure that they would not report any neuropsychiatric disorders
or any other exclusion criteria. None of them were taking any psychoactive medications. One
student was excluded from the study following the report of psychosis antecedent.
The study was carried out in accordance with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki
(World Medical Association., 2000) and approved by the Ethics Committees of the Faculty of
Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne, and by the Cantonal Ethics Committee
of Canton Vaud on behalf of the Swiss Federal Authorities. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, none reported a history of sustained head injury.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the index of the ASRS’ score in all individuals (N=1300) who responded online to the
survey. UNIL/EPFL students with a score below 10 points constituted the low ASRS group, while those having
a score higher than 22 were selected in the high ASRS group.
2.2 Procedure
To shorten the duration of the testing period in the laboratory, online questionnaires were sent to
the subjects two weeks before the appointment. The questionnaires included the HEXACO per-
sonality inventory (Lee and Ashton, 2004), an instrument that assesses the six major dimensions
of personality (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness
and Openness to Experience); the Current Behavior Scale (CBS), (Biederman et al., 2007b) de-
veloped to examine executive function deficits in adults with ADHD; the Conners Adult ADHD
Rating Scales Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS-S:SV), (Conners et al., 1999), and
the ASRS Symptom Checklist (Kessler et al., 2005), both covering features of adults with ADHD.
Participants’ clinical assessment are summarized in the Table 2.
The whole protocol was divided into three parts: a pretesting session taking place in the
experimental laboratory (Labex, HEC–UNIL), a 20-period of Working Memory Training (WMT)
at home, and finally a posttest session back in the Labex. The whole procedure is summarized
in the Figure 3.
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Table 1: Demographic characteristics of all participants
Training Total at Total at Gendera Agea,b Lateralitya,c Withdrawals
type pretest posttest (M/F) (Y. old) (%Right)
U
N
IL
/
E
P
F
L
L
o
w
sc
o
re Baseline
21 83
25 22 10/12 20±0.4 90±7 3
Adaptive
22 68
22 21 14/7 21±0.6 90±14 2
H
ig
h
sc
o
re Baseline
22 83
23 21 12/9 21±0.8 90±9 2
Adaptive
21 84
23 20 13/7 21±0.5 90±9 3
P
ro
f.
S
ch
o
ol Baseline
22 89
20 20 9/11 22±0.9 90±5 0
Adaptive
22 80
23 21 11/10 22±0.4 90±9 2
A
D
H
D
N
o
M
P
H Baseline
22 68
23 17 14/3 21±0.6 90±12 6
Adaptive
22 62
23 17 11/6 19±0.8 90±14 6
M
P
H
Baseline
22 82
26 21 10/11 21±0.6 95±8 5
Adaptive
23 64
24 21 13/8 23±0.7 84±11 3
a Participants who completed the study; b Mean, median ±SEM ; cEvaluated by the Edinburg
Handedness Inventory
2.2.1 Experimental sessions in the Labex
On the first experimental day in the Labex, participants were welcomed and requested to com-
plete the Edinburg Handedness Inventory (EHI), (Oldfield, 1971)), and underwent the Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI), (Sheehan et al., 1998)), a short structured
diagnostic interview assessing psychiatric disorders, under the supervision of a trained clini-
cal psychologist. Following a short explanation about the EEG technique, participants were
prepared for the testing session. The sound and light attenuated testing room measured ap-
proximately 6 m2 and was equipped with a 19” computer monitor, where they were comfortably
seated at a distance of 65 cm. All participants started the protocol by playing to the Prob-
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Table 2: Clinical assessment of participants having completed the study
Training ASRS CAARS CAARS CAARS CAARS
type A B C D
U
N
IL
/E
P
F
L
L
o
w
sc
o
re
Baseline
33 50 46 48 44
33±1.4 43±3 41±2.5 42±2.8 41±2.2
Adaptive
35 48 47 48 45
35±0.9 46±2 44±2.7 43±2.7 42±1.4
H
ig
h
sc
o
re
Baseline
62 62 53 59 54
61±1.9 61±3 51±2.4 57±2.5 55±1.7
Adaptive
60 67 57 65 57
61±1.7 68±3 58±3 65±3.2 54±2.1
P
ro
f.
S
ch
o
ol
Baseline
46 57 50 55 51
48±1.9 56±3 52±2 58±2.1 50±1.4
Adaptive
45 49 45 47 45
47±1.9 51±2 41±2.1 45±1.8 45±1.8
A
D
H
D
N
o
M
P
H
Baseline
60 74 64 73 59
60±2.8 76±3 69±2.5 79±3.1 57±2.1
Adaptive
48 69 60 65 56
55±2.3 74±3 59±2.7 65±4.3 57±2.2
M
P
H
Baseline
62 78 65 76 66
68±2.3 80±2 69±4 80±2.3 68±2.5
Adaptive
60 73 57 68 60
61±2.8 75±2 59±3.9 69±3 60±2.5
Mean, median ±SEM measures of ASRS and CAARS A–D indexes. CAARS A,
DSM-IV Inattentive symptoms; CAARS B, DSM-IV Hyperactive/impulsive
symptoms; CAARS C, DSM-IV ADHD symptoms total, CAARS D, ADHD
index.
abilistic Gambling Task (PGT), a modified version of the Gneezy and Potters’ task (Gneezy
and Potters, 1997), which lasted around 25 minutes. Subsequently, subjects exercised the Dual
N-Back task (Jaeggi et al., 2008) for 25-30 minutes, and finally, 25-minutes of Attentional Net-
work Test (ANT), (Fan et al., 2002) concluded the EEG recording testing period. Following the
removal of EEG’s equipment, participants had the opportunity to take a short break to wash
their hair. Before the end of the session, two complementary span tasks were administered: the
WAIS-IV digit span task (Wechsler, 2008), and the Corsi Block-Tapping task (Kessels et al.,
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Figure 3: Experimental procedure of the whole study. In the first step, participants were invited in the experi-
mental laboratory (Labex, HEC–UNIL) for a pretest session. The second step consisted in a 20-period of working
memory training at home. The posttest session was the last step of the study.
EHI: Edinburg Handedness Inventory; MINI: Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview; PGT: Probabilistic
Gambling Task; ANT: Attentional Network Test.
2000). The whole EEG registration had a total length of time of approximately 90 minutes,
whereas the complete protocol duration was three hours.
The posttest session was held in the same manner as the pretest, except for the administration
of EHI and MINI questionnaires. If necessary, an explanation of EEG was recalled before starting
the preparation of the subject. The session was shortened by 30 minutes compared to the pretest.
2.2.2 Working memory training
Working memory training began the day after the pretest. Participants were asked to perform
20 trainings composed of 20 blocks during an entire month. They were told that they would
have to practice the Dual N-Back task for about 30 minutes per day during the week and to
rest for two-day in the weekend. Each experimental group was divided into two conditions, the
first half made a progressive training (adaptive training), while the other half was blocked at
the level 1 during the whole training phase (baseline training). Participants were monitored
through a specific program, allowing us to verify whether if the trainings were done correctly.
In case of problems, they were advised to retrieve the incomplete sessions during the weekends.
Were excluded from the study those who did not completed successfully at least 18 complete
sessions.
2.3 Tasks
2.3.1 Probabilistic Gambling Task
At the beginning of each trial, subjects were endowed with 20 points and were asked to gamble
a certain amount of these points in the PGT among the following choices: 0, 4, 8. 12, 16,
20. The outcome of the gambling was either to win four times the chosen amount, with a
probability Pwin = 1/3, or to loose the entire amount with a probability Ploose = 2/3 with a
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Figure 4: Experimental design of the Probabilistic Gambling Task. Each trial begins by pressing the spacebar
(S), which is immediately followed by a message on the computer-controlled monitor with the request to choose a
selected amount of points to gamble in a game. The reaction time (RT) is determined by selecting the amount to
gamble (I). After an additional fixed interval of 4 seconds (I+4s) the participant was informed about the outcome
of the gambling (HF Loss or HF Win) in the HF condition or simply informed about the determination of the
gambling in the LF condition.
uniformly distributed probability. In the high frequency feedback (HF) condition, the participant
was informed about the overall amount of points owned after gambling (e.g., if the participant
selected 8 points, the outcome would be 12 = (20− 8) in case of loss, or 44 = (20− 8) + (8× 4)
in case of win). In the low frequency feedback (LF) condition, the participant was just informed
that the outcome of the gambling was determined. In both conditions, participants had the
possibility to modify their initial choice during 4 seconds. The overall amount of points held by
the participant was displayed every four trials. Each participant played the PGT in 10 alternated
blocks of HF and LF 16 trials each, hence 80 trials for each condition. The procedure of the
Investment Game is summarized in the Figure 4.
2.3.2 Dual N-Back Task
The Dual N-Back task was adapted in French from the task proposed by Jaeggi et al. (2008).
The task consisted of 20 blocks of 20+N trials. Each trial was composed of an auditory and a
visual stimuli presented simultaneously. Visuals stimuli were represented by 3.8 x 3.8 cm blue
squares, taking place at one of 8 possible locations on the computer screen. Auditory stimuli
were one of 8 letters (Q, D, H, G, K, M, R and Z) delivered by a female voice. Subjects were
asked to detect and to press a key if any of the current stimuli corresponded to the ones presented
in the previous trial. They had to press the “A” keyboard letter to report the correspondence
with a visual target while the auditory target required the pressing of the “L” key (Figure 5).
6 targets had to be discovered within each modality at each block. The level of difficulty was
adjusted in function of the performance (adaptive difficulty). If the response was correct, a
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Figure 5: Experimental design of the Dual N-Back Task. Subjects were asked to press the “A” key and/or the
“L” key to signal the presence of the identical visual and/or auditory stimuli as presented N-trials before. The
figure illustrates a Dual 2-Back condition.
green warning light switched on, whereas a red light indicated a wrong response. In the case
where participant made less than 3 mistakes in both modalities, the difficulty was increased
by 1, while 5 errors in any modality resulted in a decrease of the level. In the other cases,
the level remained unchanged. All subjects played the same version of the Dual N-Back in the
laboratory. Each trial lasted 3000 ms. The visual stimulus was presented for 500 ms together
with the auditory stimulus. Participants had to give an answer for 2500 ms before the next trial,
otherwise accounted as no response.
2.3.3 Attentional Network Test
This task was originally reproduced from the original ANT designed by Fan et al. (2002).
Subjects were requested to determine as quickly as possible the direction of a target located in
the center of a line constituted of 5 items. Targets were arrows surrounded on both sides by 2
congruent (same direction), incongruent (opposite direction) or neutral (simple lines) flankers,
presented above or under a fixation cross. A right click was needed if the target arrow was
pointing on the right, while a left click was required in the other case. Prior to the occurrence
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of the stimuli appeared either a center cue (superimposed on the fixation cross), a double cue
(disposed above and under the fixation cross), a spatial cue presented either above or under the
fixation cross, in the same location as the imminent stimulus, or no cue at all (Figure 6).
The practice block was composed of a 24 trials, and subjects were informed on their reaction
time and accuracy, while the experimental session gathered 3 block of 96 trials. The total length
of a trial was 4000 ms and was divided into 5 events. First, the fixation cross appeared in
the center of the screen for a variable duration (400–1600 ms); second, the cue emerged for
100 ms; then, the fixation cross remained alone for 400 ms; after that, the stimulus occurred
until the participant’s response, but did not exceed 1700 ms; finally, the fixation cross remained
alone until the end of the trial. Targets, flankers and cues were pseudo-randomly assigned. The
practice block lasted approximately 2 minutes whereas one experimental block required around
6 minutes.
2.4 EEG recordings
Electrophysiological signals were recorded using 64 scalp Ag/AgCl active electrodes (ActiveTwo
MARK II Biosemi EEG System, BioSemi B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands), mounted on a
headcap (extended international 10/20 layout (Klem et al., 1999), NeuroSpec Quick Cap, see
Figure 7) and referenced to the linked earlobes.
Vertical and horizontal ocular movements were recorded using two pairs of bipolar electrodes
placed beneath and above each eye next to the lateral canthi. The data acquisition (DC am-
plifiers and software by Biosemi, USA) was set with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz at 24 bits
resolution and band-passed filtered with lower cutoff at 0.05 Hz and upper cut-off at 200 Hz.
Electrode impedances were checked and kept always below 20 kΩ for all channels before starting
the continuous recording of the EEG (Kappenman and Luck, 2010).
At the begin of the recording session, the EEG was recorded during two minutes while the
participants kept the eyes closed, and during two minutes while they fixated a cross on the
center of the computer screen. In order to reduce the saccadic eye movements all graphical
messages were displayed in a screen area corresponding to a vertical angle of 3 degrees and an
horizontal angle of 8 degrees, hence falling within the range of the normal human parafoveal
region in reading (Rayner, 1998). Participants were asked to restrain their movements, especially
concerning their eye motions during the whole performance.
2.5 Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were performed with the R language and environment for statistical com-
puting (R Core Team, 2013; Venables and Ripley, 2002), and with the SPSS package (IBM
Corp. Released 2012. IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 21.0. Armonk, NY: IBM
Corp., only for the first article). All statistical hypotheses were tested with a two-tailed level
of significance of 2p = .05, unless otherwise reported. Student’s t-test was used to determine if
unpaired or paired two-samples of data were significantly different from each other, reporting
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Figure 6: Experimental design of the Attentional Network Test. Participants were requested to indicate the
direction of the target (circled in red) as fast as possible. A: This figure illustrates the presentation of a spatial
cue delivered under the fixation’s cross preceding the apparition of a congruent stimulus; B: Double cue condition
preceding the apparition of an incongruent stimulus; C: No cue condition preceding a neutral stimulus.
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Figure 7: International 10–20 system for EEG with 64 + 2 channels. The system is based on the relationship
between the location of an electrode and the underlying area of cerebral cortex. The 10–20 system refers to
the actual distances between adjacent electrodes, measured between the nasion (bridge of the nose) and inion
(occipital pretuberance) landmarks. Cz represents the top of the head. The other electrodes are either 10% or
20% of the total front-back or right-left distance of the skull. The additional CMS and DRL channels replace
the ground electrodes. CMS, Common Mode Sense, active electrode; DRL, Driven Right Leg, passive electrode.
Hemisphere location is defined by a specific letter and number on the top of each electrode. Fp, frontopolar; F,
frontal; T, temporal; C, central; P, parietal; O, occipital, I, inion.
the values of the test statistic (t), two-tailed level of significance (2p) and Cohen’s d effect size.
For Chi-squared tests the effect size is reported by Cramer’s V (Liebetrau, 1983). Nonpara-
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metric comparisons of sample distributions (Zeileis et al., 2008) were assessed by the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test using the Z statistic for paired observations and by the Mann-Whitney U test
for independent samples with effect size (r). In the second article and additional results, we
used robust statistics throughout all the analyses (Boudt et al., 2012; Bodenhofer et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2014; Rousseeuw et al., 2015), including the robust mixed effects model (Koller,
2014) and otherwise stated the linear mixed-effects models for within-subject factorial analyses
(Bates et al., 2014).
Behavioral analysis
The performance of the participants was assessed by the total gains earned after the end of
playing the whole task (Total Gains (TotG)), during low frequency feedback trials (TG(LF)),
during high frequency feedback trials (TG(HF)), and by three risk indexes. The relative num-
ber of trials a participant gambled 0, 4, or 8 points defined a low risk index LR. A high risk
index HR was defined for gambling amounts of 12, 16, or 20 points. A Global Risk Index (RI)
centralized within the range [-1, +1] was calculated as RI = (HR− LR)/(HR+ LR). Then, a
RI towards -1 is characteristic of a risk-averse strategy, an index towards +1 for a risk-seeking
participant, and RI ≈ 0 being associated with a risk-neutral attitude. Each participant could be
further characterized with the corresponding RIs calculated following the feedback frequency
trials, i.e. RI(LF ) and RI(HF ). The behavior of the participants was also assessed by measur-
ing the reaction times (RT) in ms. The trials with RT < 250 ms and RT > 10 seconds were
discarded. Additional trials detected as outliers on the basis of a robust analysis (Breunig et al.,
2000) were also discarded from further analyses.
ERP analysis
The brain signals were preprocessed and analyzed with BrainVision Analyzer 2.0.4 (Brain Prod-
ucts, Gilching, Germany) for the PGT. Visual inspection of the EEG was performed to remove
immediately those trials containing high amplitude muscle activity related noise, large eye blinks
and other easily identifiable artifacts. Saccade-related eye movements were corrected using In-
fomax Independent Component Analysis (ICA), (Luck, 2005). Markers were used off-line to
segment the continuous EEG data into epochs triggered by pressing the spacebar (event S in
Figure 4) and by clicking on the selected amount to gamble (event I). The epochs were further
scanned and visually inspected to detect any contamination by residual minor artifacts. For the
analysis of ERP the trials were cut into epochs lasting 1500 ms ranging from -500 to +1000 ms
around the trigger events of interest (i.e., events S and I). ERP analyses were performed on the
artifact-free trials, band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 30 Hz (-12dB/octave). Subsequently the
trials were baseline corrected to the interval 500 ms prior to trigger onset and averaged for both
conditions LF and HF.
Differential waveform analysis
For each participant we calculated separately the ERPs for HF and LF trials. The feedback
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related differential ERPs were obtained by subtracting the ERP recorded during LF from the
ERP recorded during HF condition. In order to assess the group factor we compared the
feedback related differential ERPs for controls and ADHD participants triggered by the trial
start and by the gambling choice.
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3 Summary of the results
3.1 Imperfect Decision Making and Risk Taking are affected by Personality
Sarah K. Mesrobian1, Michel Bader2, Lorenz Go¨tte3, Alessandro E.P. Villa1, and Alessandra Lintas1
1 Neuroheuristic Research Group, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
2 Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (SUPEA), Faculty of Medicine, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
3 Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
In Decision Making: Uncertainty, Imperfection, Deliberation and Scalability (pp. 145-184).
Springer International Publishing.
Abstract: Classic game theory predicts that individuals should behave as rational agents in
order to maximize their gain. In real life situations it is observed that human decision making
does not follow this theory. Specific patterns of activity in several brain circuits identified in
recent years have been associated with irrational and imperfect decision making. Brain activity
modulated by dopamine and serotonin is assumed to be among the main drivers of the expression
of personality traits and patients affected by Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
are characterized by altered activity in those neuromodulating circuits. We investigated the
effect of fairness and personality traits on neuronal and psychological mechanisms of decision
making and risk taking in two sets of experiments based on the Ultimatum Game (UG) and
the Investment Game (IG). In the UG we found that Fairness and Conscientiousness were
associated with responder’s gain and with event-related potentials (ERP) components Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN) and Late Positive component (LPP). In the IG the sum gained during
the risky gambling task were presented immediately after half of the trials (condition “high
frequency feedback”, HFFB), while the other half were presented at the end of each block
(condition “low frequency feedback”, LFFB). Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Sincerity
influenced latencies of the negative deflection occurring at around 200 ms (N200) and the positive
wave peaking at around 250 ms (P250) components. The contingent negative variation CNV
component was affected in a different way in controls and participants with ADHD as a function
of the feedback frequency (HFFB vs. LFFB). These results clearly show that imperfect decision
making and risk taking are affected by personality traits and cannot be accounted by models
based on rational computations.
Contribution: Recruitment of participants and data acquisition for both studies. Data anal-
ysis, and writing for study 2.
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3.2 Decision Making Processes in Young Adults Affected by Attention-Deficit/
Hyperactivity Disorder Revealed by Event-Related Potentials During a
Gambling Task
Sarah K. Mesrobian1, Alessandra Lintas1, Michel Bader2, Lorenz Go¨tte3, and Alessandro E.P. Villa1
1 Neuroheuristic Research Group, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
2 Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (SUPEA), Faculty of Medicine, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
3 Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
In preparation to be submitted to Biological psychiatry
Abstract: Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a neurodevelopmental disor-
der characterized by deficits of executive functions with electrophysiological correlates during
childhood and adolescence. Contradictory results exist whether altered event-related potentials
(ERPs) in adults are associated with the tendency of ADHD patients towards risky behavior.
Clinically diagnosed ADHD patients and healthy controls, aged less than 30 years, were screened
with the Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating Scales and assessed by the Mini-International Neuropsy-
chiatric Interview, adult ADHD Self-Report Scale, and by the 60-item HEXACO Personality
Inventory. All ADHD (n = 18) and controls (n = 18) performed a probability gambling task
(PGT), adapted from the Gneezy-Potters’ task, with two frequencies of the feedback informa-
tion of the outcome. For each trial ERPs were triggered by the self-paced trial start and by the
gamble selection. ADHD patients tended to express impulsivity associated with lower values
of the agreeableness personality dimension. Both groups exhibited a broad range of individual
strategies irrespective of the frequency of the outcome feedback. The latency of the first N2-
P3a ERP component, associated with the attentional load, was shorter in the ADHD group. A
larger N400-like component in the ADHD in the high feedback frequency condition suggested a
larger affective stake confirmed by longer reaction times compared with low feedback frequency.
ERP markers showed the build-up of a fronto-parietal activity associated with the emotional
percept accompanying the motor response. Our results indicate that in young adult ADHD
patients ERP analyses offer as a tool more sensitive than classical behavioral markers to assess
the neural dynamics involved in decision making processes.
Contribution: Recruitment of participants, data acquisition and analysis, and writing the
paper.
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3.3 Additional results
This section summarizes the effects of the Working Memory Training that were not reported
in the original papers. The analyses were performed using robust statistical packages from the
“R” software.
3.3.1 Dual N-Back performance
At pretest, all individuals reached the level 2 whilst playing to the Dual N-Back task, inde-
pendently of the training treatment (baseline and adaptive, χ2(1) = 0.74, 2p = .39, V = .06).
However, we found that there were differences between specific groups (χ2(4) = 24.2, 2p < .001,
V = .17), in particular, the group of students UNIL/EPFL with high ASRS score reached sig-
nificantly higher levels than both ADHD groups, as indicated in the Figure 8. We did not find
other group difference at pretest stage of the study with regard to this task.
Following the training, performance on the dual N-Back was enhanced in all groups, in-
cluding individuals that were assigned with the baseline training (χ2(1) = 104.2, 2p < .001,
V = .50). Nonetheless, we found significant differences between the type of training (χ2(1) = 89.1,
2p < .001, V = .68) and between the groups (χ2(4) = 28.9, 2p < .001, V = .19), more specifi-
cally, patients with medication reached significantly lesser levels than the three students groups,
whereas the non medicated group was only less efficient than the UNIL/EPFL high ASRS group
(see figure 8). Interestingly, we did not find significant performance difference between the 2
UNIL/EPFL groups, neither between the two ADHD groups, nor between the 2 UNIL/EPFL
and the students recruited in professional schools. The time at which the participants completed
the trainings is illustrated in the figure 9.
3.3.2 Span task performance
We were also interested to investigate whether the WMT could have a spillover effect on similar
working memory tasks. For this purpose, the WAIS-IV digit span task subtests (global score,
DS-TOT ; number correct forward, DS-F ; number correct backward, DS-B ; number in ascending
order, DS-A), as well as the Corsi Block-Tapping task (correct forward only), evaluating the
verbal and visuospatial constructs respectively were administered before the end of the session
in the laboratory.
In line with the Dual N-Back data, the pretest span tasks’ performance were not equivalent
between the groups (χ2DS−TOT (4) = 30.2, 2p < .001, V = .18, and χ
2
Corsi(4) = 11.1, 2p = .003,
V = .11). In particular, performance was markedly different between the patient groups and
the three students groups (only a trend between UNIL/EPFL students and ADHD with MPH),
the patients were characterized by lower scores in the DS-TOT dimension compared with the
students, while no difference was found within all students groups and within both patient
groups. In addition, a group effect was also found in the three subtests (χ2DS−F (4) = 12.13,
2p = .02, V = .12, χ2DS−B(4) = 28.13, 2p < .001, V = .18, χ
2
DS−A(4) = 22.48, 2p < .001, V = .16).
In regard to the Corsi, the only dissimilarity was found between ADHD with medication and
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Figure 8: Dual N-Back performance at pretest (left side) and at posttest (right side) sessions in each group, cal-
culated with the nonparametic Mann-Whitney U test with a two-tailed (2p) level of significance. 1, UNIL/EPFL
student with low ASRS score; 2, UNIL/EPFL student with high ASRS score; 3 professional school students; 4,
ADHD without MPH medication; 5, ADHD with MPH medication. ***2p≤ .001; **2p≤ .01; *2p≤ .05
the students from professional schools. Among these comparisons, results indicated that the
patient group had lower scores in all tests compared with the students. No difference according
to the training type was found within the groups for all tasks.
At the posttest session, all individuals increased their memory span in each task (see table
3, χ2DS−TOT (1) = 60.3, 2p < .001, V = .37, and χ
2
Corsi(1) = 9.3, 2p = .002, V = .15). Further-
more, we found a main effect of the group for the digit span task DS-TOT (χ2DS−TOT (4) = 13.2,
2p = .01, V = .13). This effect was mainly driven by the fact that all students from professional
schools performed much better than the patients groups with MPH medication. We did not
find any other difference between the groups. In addition, DS-B subtest was also marked by
a group effect (χ2(4) = 18.73, 2p < .001, V = .16), whereas this effect was close to significance
in the DS-A (χ2(4) = 9.45, 2p = .051, V = .11). In DS-F subtest, performance at posttest ses-
sion was comparable between the groups (χ2(4) = 5.85, 2p = .21, V = .08), and the training type
did not impact performance in all digit span dimensions (χ2DS−TOT (1) = 1.17, 2p = .28, V = .08,
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Figure 9: Time at which each participants’ group performed the trainings at home
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χ2DS−F (1) = 1.53, 2p = .21, V = .09, χ
2
DS−B(1) = 0.03, 2p = .87, V = .01, and χ
2
DS−A(1) = 0.03,
2p = .86, V = .01). Additionally, among the visuospatial dimension, we did not find neither sig-
nificant group effect (χ2(4) = 0.92, 2p = .92, V = .04), nor effect of the training type (χ2(1) = 2.08,
2p = .15, V = .11).
3.3.3 Probabilistic Gambling Task
At the end of the posttest session, the UNIL/EPFL students with low and high ASRS score
gained respectively in the PGT (median points ± SEM, more details are depicted in Table 4):
3672 ± 57.8, and 3900 ± 70.2 points, the students from professional schools earned 3844 ± 71
points, and the ADHD patients without and with MPH treatment, 3664 ± 54.7 and 3898 ± 50
points respectively. The TotG were not different from pretest session (χ2(1) = 1.80, 2p = .18,
V = .06), and were not affected by the outcomes’ frequency of feedback (χ2(1) = 1.99, 2p = .16,
V = .07). However, the analysis revealed a significant effect of the group (χ2(4) = 12.49, 2p = .02,
V = .0.12), but when computing the contrasts, no pairwise comparison reached significance.
Index of risk (IR, as calculated in both papers) tended to be different from pretest session
(see table 4, median ± SEM: 0.074 ±0.02 at pretest, and 0.109 ±0.03 at posttest session,
χ2(1) = 3.72, 2p = .054, V = .09), suggesting that individuals had the tendency to take a few more
risks following the WMT. However, those indexes are really close to 0, and should be interpreted
as an indication that all participants have used a variety of strategies in this task. We did not
find any significant difference neither between the groups (χ2(4) = 7.72, 2p = .10, V = .10), nor
between the training type at the posttest session for both measures (χ2TotG(1) = 0.25, 2p = .62,
V = .03, and χ2IR(1) = 0.23, 2p = .63, V = .03).
We also investigated the impact of training on the reaction time in this task, and the results
highlighted a main effect of the testing session (χ2(1) = 80.26, 2p < .001, V = .43), as well
as a main effect of the feedback condition (χ2(1) = 50.57, 2p < .001, V = .33), and a significant
feedback condition x session interaction (χ2(1) = 8.19, 2p = .004, V = .19). Together these effects
indicate that reaction times were reduced in the LF condition, and that this effect was even
more pronounced during the posttest session (Table 4). We did not find neither a group nor a
training type effect at the posttesting session on reaction times (χ2(4) = 5.43, 2p < .24, V = .08,
and χ2(1) = 2.10, 2p < .15, V = .10, respectively).
3.3.4 Symptoms evolution at follow-up
Participants that have completed the study were invited to fill in the CAARS-S:SV questionnaire
after a period of three and six months following the end of the study, to investigate the evolution
of ADHD symptoms. Four measures were analyzed, the DSM-IV Inattentive Symptoms (TA),
DSM-IV Hyperactive-Impulsive Symptoms (TB), DSM-IV Total ADHD Symptoms (TC ), and
ADHD Index (TD).
At pretest session, all groups’ score were significantly different on the four scales (see table
2 χ2TA(4) = 210.17, 2p < .001, V = .49; χ
2
TB(4) = 62.1, 2p < .001, V = .27; χ
2
TC(4) = 162.85,
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Table 3: Behavioral performance among the Digit span task and Corsi Bock Tapping Task
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Table 4: Behavioral performance among the PGT at pretest (left side) and posttest (right side) sessions
Training Total Index Reaction Total Index Reaction
type Gains Risk Time (ms) Gains Risk Time (ms)
Prestest session Posttest session
U
N
IL
/E
P
F
L
L
o
w
sc
o
re Baseline
3775 0.11 1198 3767 0.16 976
3690±82 0.19±0.1 1133±100 3714±100 0.11±0.1 816±149
Adaptive
3615 -0-02 1663 3690 0.19 1089
3536±72 -0.04±0.1 1356±193 3636±57 0.12±0.1 860±219
H
ig
h
sc
o
re Baseline
3893 0.25 1498 3936 0.23 1114
3880±90 0.33±0.1 1367±177 3920±87 0.24±0.1 852±210
Adaptive
3831 0.14 1325 3900 0.27 849
3688±114 0.13±0.1 1235±144 3842±114 0.41±0.1 675±109
P
ro
f.
S
ch
o
ol Baseline
3830 0.16 1429 3969 0.18 906
3786±73 0.12±0.1 1262±158 3904±98 0.02±0.1 871±88
Adaptive
3727 -0.05 1976 3894 0.00 1088
3804±52 -0.06±0.1 1360±336 3784±104 -0.01±0.1 985±146
A
D
H
D
N
o
M
P
H Baseline
3691 0.08 1525 3722 0.05 1023
3652±61 0.18±0.1 1531±124 3672±75 0.12±0.2 1063±98
Adaptive
3813 -0.06 1794 3689 -0.14 1266
3752±70 0.03±0.1 1485±183 3656±83 -0.27±0.1 1047±181
M
P
H
Baseline
3870 0.06 1768 3870 -0.01 1067
3806±66 0.14±0.1 1472±237 3876±73 0.01±0.1 1024±93
Adaptive
3735 0.08 1898 3951 0.11 1630
3742±91 0.06±0.1 1512±258 3916±69 0.16±0.1 1110±329
Performance (Mean, median ± SEM) at the Probabilistic Gambling Task (PGT). NB: Total gains were
evaluated in points earned among the whole task without distinction of feedback frequency of outcome
conditions.
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2p < .001, V = .43; χ2TD(4) = 105.53, 2p < .001, V = .35). Globally, UNIL/EPFL students with
low levels of ASRS had lower scores than UNIL/EPFL students with high levels of ASRS on
each measure. Their scores were also lower than the ones of both ADHD groups, but were
not different from those of the professional schools’ students. UNIL/EPFL students with high
levels of ASRS did not differ compared to ADHD having MPH treatment on the Hyperactive-
Impulsive subscale, but had reduced scores on all other measures compared with both ADHD
groups. Nonetheless, they had higher scores than students from professional schools among all
subscales. ADHD with and without MPH treatment did not differ from each other, but had
higher scores than professional schools’ students.
Participants who took part in the 3- and 6-month follow-up demonstrated a significant
decrease of symptoms among the whole measures (see Table 5, χ2TA(2) = 44.37, 2p < .001,
V = .31; χ2TB(2) = 32.04, 2p < .001, V = .27; χ
2
TC(2) = 40.60, 2p < .001, V = .30; χ
2
TD(2) =
45.99, 2p < .001, V = .32). The symptoms’ reduction was appreciable at 3-months follow-up,
compared to the pretest session, and stayed constant at 6-months, as indicated by similar range
of scores between 3- and 6-months’ evaluations. In spite of finding no effect of the train-
ing on the modification of the symptoms (χ2TA(1) = 1.99, 2p = .16, V = .09; χ
2
TB(1) = 2.22,
2p = .14, V = .10; χ2TC(1) = 2.26, 2p = .13, V = .10; χ
2
TD(1) = 2.44, 2p = .11, V = .10), we did
found a main effect of group (χ2TA(4) = 145.26, 2p < .001, V = .40; χ
2
TB(4) = 54.36, 2p < .001,
V = .25; χ2TC(4) = 54.37, 2p < .001, V = .25; χ
2
TD(4) = 101.48, 2p < .001, V = .34). In particular,
UNIL/EPFL students having low levels of ASRS demonstrated a greater reduction compared to
the other groups (mean decrease of 6 points ±1.67 SEM on the whole subscales), followed by the
patients with ADHD without MPH treatment (5.5 ±2.33 points decrease), then UNIL/EPFL
students having high levels of ASRS (4.3 ±2.14 points decrease), next the ADHD with MPH
group (3.5 ±2.20 points decrease), and finally the students from professional schools (1.5 ±1.86
points decrease). Reductions were more considerable on the Inattentive subscale (TA, with
a mean reduction of 5.6 ±2.25 points among all participants) compared to the Hyperactive-
Impulsive (TB, with 5 ±2.17 points of diminution).
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Table 5: Clinical assessment of participants after 3 and 6 months of follow-up
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4 Discussion
4.1 Gambling Behavior
Individuals suffering from ADHD generally exhibit hyperactivity, inattention and impulsivity
since their childhood and are associated with cognitive impairments in inhibitory control and ex-
ecutive function, problems in social interaction, increased risk of depression and substance abuse.
Medications used to treat ADHD suggest that a deficit in dopamine regulation may constitute
the primary neurochemical basis leading to ADHD symptoms, with anomalous interaction of the
dopaminergic neuronal systems (Oades, 2008; Sharma and Couture, 2014). ADHD individuals
are characterized by an increased likelihood to take more risks than age-matched controls in
activities such as extreme driving and substance abuse (Barkley et al., 1996; Lee et al., 2011).
It is recognized that childhood ADHD history has a strong influence on persistent pathological
gambling (Breyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez-Jimenez et al., 2006). However, recent findings point
out that pathological gambling in adulthood is associated with a comparable elevated level of
impulsivity in ADHD and non-ADHD gamblers (Davtian et al., 2012).
Adult ADHD individuals were usually tested by implicit gambling tasks such as the IGT
and the BART (Groen et al., 2013a). There is rather consensus among the studies to show no
group effect neither in IGT (Agay et al., 2010; Ernst et al., 2003; Ibanez et al., 2012a; Malloy-
Diniz et al., 2007), nor in BART (Ma¨ntyla¨ et al., 2012; Weafer et al., 2011). The GDT is an
explicit task used for the assessment of risky decision making that could not reveal any salient
difference in behavior between ADHD adults and controls (Wilbertz et al., 2012; Matthies et al.,
2012). The Probabilistic Gambling Task (PGT) used in the current study is an explicit task
with two conditions of feedback frequency of the outcome. Overall, we could not find any dif-
ference neither in total gains (TotG) earned by each group nor in the RI at pretest. However,
we observed a very significant interaction with CAARS-S:SV score with the total earning: the
lower the score the higher the gains in controls, but the lower the score the lower the gains
in ADHD participants. This result shows that control and ADHD individuals sampled in this
study behave in a complex and different way while executing of the task.
Personality
Individuals characterized by ADHD symptoms exhibit affective and motivational deficits in ad-
dition to cognitive impairments (Ma¨ntyla¨ et al., 2012; Sonuga-Barke, 2005; Toplak et al., 2005).
Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and contribute to shape personality traits.
Individuals’ characteristics within usual pattern of behaviors that remain stable during adult-
hood served as the basis to personality traits theories. Basic personality traits described by the
HEXACO model emerged from lexical studies of personality structure in several languages (Ash-
ton et al., 2004; Lee and Ashton, 2004; Lee et al., 2005). This model includes six dimensions,
i.e., Honesty-Humility (H ), Emotionality (E ), eXtraversion (X ), Agreeableness (vs. anger) (A),
Conscientiousness (C ) and Openness to Experience (O). It is known that risky decision mak-
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ing is associated with personality traits (Weller and Tikir, 2011; Weller and Thulin, 2012) and
that dopamine and serotonin are essential modulators of the expression of personality traits
and decision making brain circuits (Carver and Miller, 2006; DeYoung, 2013), but the associa-
tion between personality traits and risk taking has been investigated with contradictory results
(Ashton et al., 2010; Vries et al., 2009). In fact, when it comes to financial risk taking, only the
dimensions of Honesty-Humility, Emotionality and Conscientiousness appear to be associated
with risky decision-making (Weller and Tikir, 2011; Weller and Thulin, 2012). ADHD patients
have been recently characterized by specific personality traits, with lower scores on Conscien-
tiousness, Emotionality and Agreeableness dimensions compared to control subjects (Gomez and
Corr, 2014), but their relation with risk taking behavior has not been investigated in detail.
The present study is the first one, to our knowledge, to investigate the personality dimensions
of ADHD individuals with the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009). Anal-
yses based on the Big Five model of personality have consistently characterized the personality
traits of ADHD adults by lower scores of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness and higher score
of Neuroticism (Jacob et al., 2007; Martel et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2008; Nigg et al., 2002b;
Parker et al., 2004). Conscientiousness is defined in an identical way in the two models, whereas
Agreeableness is only partially overlapping, and for both traits we observed significant lower
scores in ADHD adults, fully in agreement with the previous studies. Inattention and disorgani-
zation are widely recognized to be strongly related to low Conscientiousness (Nigg et al., 2002b;
Parker et al., 2004). In a structural equation modeling approach impulsivity was associated with
lower Agreeableness while hyperactivity was associated with higher eXtraversion (Knouse et al.,
2013). On the contrary to this model we observed a significant lower score for eXtraversion
in the ADHD group. This difference may be interpreted by the fact that motor hyperactivity
in adults is likely to represent a different symptom with distinct neural correlates compared to
childhood and adolescence (Kessler et al., 2010). In fact a previous study reported lower scores
for eXtraversion in ADHD adults (Jacob et al., 2007) and one more study reported such lower
scores in particular in the inattentive ADHD group and that eXtraversion was positively corre-
lated with agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Parker et al., 2004). It is important to notice
that the control group was selected according to a strict criterion of CAARS-S:SV T -score< 56.
This criterion may have introduced a bias with respect to other studies towards a group of con-
trol individuals characterized by a high score of eXtraversion. Openness and eXtraversion are
two traits that overlap in the HEXACO and Big Five models. We observed a score to Openness
higher in the ADHD group, while most of other studies did not report any significant result
regarding this personality trait in ADHD individuals. It is noteworthy that there are studies
not involving ADHD individuals showing an association of higher score of Openness with risk
taking and sensation seeking behaviors (Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Vries et al., 2009).
In addition to significant lower Agreeableness score than controls, we observed that the lower
the scores of Agreeableness the higher the values of the risk index RI in the ADHD group, thus
showing a tendency to take more risk in PGT. Hence, our results support the model of a strong
association between low levels of Agreeableness with impulsivity and gambling behavior. In-
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deed several recent studies performed in groups other than ADHD patients have highlighted an
association between low Agreeableness and gambling behavior (Fang and Mowen, 2009; Hanss
et al., 2014; Tackett et al., 2014), or risk taking (Vries et al., 2009; Weller and Tikir, 2011).
Effect of feedback frequency
Loss aversion, which refers to the individuals’ tendency to be more affected by losses than by
comparable gains, can be modified by manipulation of factors such as the feedback frequency
of the outcome as in the original Gneezy and Potters’ task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997), and in
several other studies (Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and List, 2005; Langer and Weber, 2008;
Sutter, 2007; Thaler et al., 1997). The overall main observation of these studies was the in-
vestment of higher stakes when outcomes were presented less frequently in accordance with the
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). In the original version of the Gneezy
Potters’ task, the participants had to choose in advance the amount to invest for a set of three
consecutive trials in the low frequency feedback condition only. In our PGT, the participants
were given at each trial the possibility to select the amount to gamble regardless of the condition.
In our studies, we found differing results in the light of strategies adopted during the PGT
in regard to the frequency of feedback conditions. In the first study, the results indicated that
ADHD tended to take more risk in the HF condition, compared to LF, while the second study
did not find any difference between both conditions. This dissimilarity might be due to the
selection of individuals enrolled in the two studies. The ADHD participants were not screened
in the same way; the second study focused on a much more rigorous selection in terms of
the CAARS-S:SV’ criteria and comorbid disorders, whereas the first study was more tolerant.
Moreover, the control groups were not recruited in the same institutions, in the first paper,
we selected UNIL/EPFL individuals, while in the second article, the controls were enrolled in
professional schools. Nevertheless, in both studies, the behavioral results indicated that control
participants exhibited a broad range of strategies, from poor to high risk taking, but their
strategy tended to be unaffected by the feedback frequency of the outcome. This result suggests
that control participants were more likely to evaluate each trial separately in agreement with the
Subjective Utility Theory (SEU) (Savage, 2012). Therefore, the results of the original task have
not been replicated. However, the modification of the experimental manipulations may explain
the difference between the original and the current studies; the discount of an endowment at the
beginning of each trial in both conditions is likely to have left unaffected the participants’ risk
perception in our PGT. The fact that individuals of either group tended to express the same
behavior in LF and HF conditions in the second study suggests that the feedback frequency of the
outcome might have evoked a perception not comparable to the one evoked in the other studies.
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the reaction times during LF were faster than
during HF condition, irrespective of the group. Moreover, during either condition the reaction
times of the ADHD individuals tended to be larger than the controls. These findings further
suggest that the decision making processes during PGT are indeed affected by the feedback
frequency and differences in reaction times are likely to be associated with distinct brain network
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dynamics in ADHD and control participants.
4.2 Event-Related Potentials
In both studies, we were interested in investigating the electroencephalographic correlates sur-
rounding decision making processes, to wit the self-paced Start of trial (Event S), and the
gambling choice (Event I), as illustrated in the Figure 4. We consistently reported several ERP
components, which were linked to personality factors in the first study, while the second report
provided a more deeper examination of such components.
Start of trial
The current task is characterized by a free-operant behavior, given that the trial onset is as-
sociated with pressing the keyboard spacebar. In this goal-directed task, the participants are
informed that they would play trials alternatively distributed in blocks of low and high feedback
frequency of the outcome. At trial start it is likely that the participants develop their most
adapted cognitive strategy by balancing the costs and benefits of making a decision regarding
the amount to gamble (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Fantino, 1998; Shanks et al., 2002). Hence,
the current task might be considered a kind of reinforcement learning in which each participant
has to optimize the amount to gamble and the delay necessary to perform that choice (Niv et al.,
2006).
Start of trial was characterized by a premotor activity appearing approximately 150 ms prior
to stimulus onset. The spacebar pressing evoked a N2–P3a complex, which was followed by a
P3b and further a slow negative wave usually referred as the CNV. N2 is a negative component
that has been observed to peak between 180 and 325 ms after stimulus onset in several tasks,
such as Oddball, Stroop, Go No-Go and Flanker tasks. Specific subcomponents of N2 have been
associated with changes in the frequency of stimulus presentation and to the difference of target
and non target items, and is usually followed by a P3a (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Garrido
et al., 2009; Patel and Azzam, 2005). In the present PGT, clicking on the spacebar started
the actual trial and raised the presentation of the the six possible amount to gamble. The
participants reported to have some insights about the sum to invest during this stage, hence,
the presentation of the gamble’s options appeared as a target amount surrounded by flankers, a
condition well known to evoke N2. We observed that N2 peak latencies were shorter at parietal
locations in ADHD compared to controls, and that P3a latencies were also shorter in ADHD,
in agreement with another study (Rodriguez and Baylis, 2007). The P3a component has been
associated with stimulus-driven attention engagement and thus depending on an active orienting
process (Polich, 2007; Squires et al., 1975), and frontal areas as well as the insula contribute
mainly to P3a (Bledowski et al., 2004). We found indeed that differences in frontal areas activity
were larger at this latency between the groups. No differences between groups were observed for
the P3b component after trial start. These observations may suggest that ADHD individuals are
characterized by the activation of a less extended brain network engaged in the stimulus-driven
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attention, thus resulting in shorter N2–P3a latencies.
Although we did not find any significant difference according the the outcomes’ frequency of
feedback conditions in the second study, LF condition was associated with shorter N2 latencies
compared to HF condition in the first study. This effect was mainly driven by the fact individuals
were chosen according to specific personality criteria. In addition, the CNV wave was also
modulated by the feedback condition, the amplitude were larger in the LF condition, but only
in the control group. Its reduced amplitude has been reported in children and adults with ADHD
(Valko et al., 2009), suggesting that motor preparation to an imminent stimulus is impaired in
ADHD. In line with this result, the lack of CNV enhancement within the patient group might
imply that they did not recruit the necessary resources for the motor preparation in the LF
condition, as it was the case in the control group.
It is interesting to notice that shorter N2 latencies were found in control individuals having
higher Conscientiousness scores, and in highly Sincere (facet belonging to the Honesty/Humility
dimension) ADHD participants in the HF condition, compared to individuals respectively with
low scores. The lateral prefrontal cortex is likely to be associated with behavioral inhibition
(Kra¨mer et al., 2013), which can suggest that individuals with a high score of Conscientiousness
are likely to inhibit response to flankers faster than low score individuals. Sincerity has been
associated to ethical and to the health and safety aspects of risky decision making (Weller and
Tikir, 2011). In control participants performing the PGT, N2 peaked earlier for individuals
with lower scores of Sincerity only at the parietal sites, while, in ADHD participants, this
effect was noticeable only at the fronto-central sites. This latter finding, along the same line of
interpretation of N2 mentioned above, suggests that in these ADHD participants, the activity
of the lateral prefrontal cortex was likely to inhibit the responses to flankers.
Differential wave analysis revealed in second paper a negative component located on fronto-
central sites peaking at approximately 500 ms. This late component distinguished ADHD from
controls, with a larger amplitude during HF condition. This may further suggest that this con-
dition would be associated with a specific affective and motivational value in the ADHD group,
somehow reflecting an emotional conflict revealed by N500 or N400-like ERP components in
other studies (Chen et al., 2010; Williamson et al., 1991). Hence, at trial start the ADHD indi-
viduals, who are aware of playing a trial in the HF condition, are likely to engage less attentional
resources and larger emotional stake.
Gambling Choice
Following the gamble selection onset we observed several ERP correlates of the executive func-
tions that distinguished ADHD from the controls, namely a N2–P3a complex was characterized
by larger peak latencies in ADHD compared to controls, in particular at fronto-central sites,
followed by a P3b, which was evoked on fronto-central sites in with shorter peak latency in the
ADHD sample, compared with the controls. If we assume that this ERP complex has always
been associated with the brain network engaged in the stimulus-driven attention (Mennes et al.,
2008; Yang et al., 2007), it is rationale to suggest that the build-up of a higher emotional percept
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of the gambling choice in the ADHD group is likely to be associated with an extension of the
processing network, thus resulting in larger N2–P3a latencies. The executive attention network
is responsible of error processing and conflict monitoring. The observation of shorter P3b la-
tencies in the ADHD group suggests a dissociation between perceptual and response conflicts,
in agreement with other studies (Yang et al., 2007). The behavioral outcome would result in
higher levels of impulsivity revealed by shorter P3b latency.
In a decision making design, the P3a wave is likely to be generated by the cognitive processing
that follows the feeling of “dissonance”, the possibility of being wrong after taking a decision
(Brehm, 1956). The effects of personality on the P3a latency was mainly visible for individuals
with higher score of Conscientiousness in the control group and, to a lesser extent, only at
fronto-central sites for the ADHD participants. Within high score individuals, this component
was evoked earlier in comparison to the ones that had the lowest scores. Conscientiousness has
been found to modulate the activation in the lateral prefrontal cortex, a region which is involved
in planning as well as in the voluntary control of behavior (DeYoung et al., 2010). Thus, a
possible explanation for these results is that individuals with high levels of Conscientiousness
may have reached their decision’s evaluation more rapidly than the least conscientious subjects.
In the controls, this processes appears to involve posterior regions that are likely to be less
activated in ADHD.
In addition, P3a peaked earlier for controls with lower score of Agreeableness, but in ADHD
participants P3a peaked earlier in higher ranked individuals. Several studies have shown a
negative relation between Agreeableness and decision making (Ashton et al., 2010; De Vries et al.,
2009). Agreeableness has also been linked to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, and ventral striatum activations, as well as superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate
cortex, and fusiform gyrus, regions involved in social interaction, and deliberation processes
(Koelsch et al., 2013; DeYoung et al., 2010; Sonuga-Barke and Fairchild, 2012). Moreover, the
P3a wave has been related to interpersonal conflict, and to susceptibility to framing (Graziano
et al., 1996; Weber and Johnson, 2009). These results might therefore suggest that patients
with ADHD used different circuits to implement decision making processes leading to choice
deliberation and emotion regulation to evaluate interpersonal conflicts.
The last factor of personality that was examined was Sincerity, a facet that belongs to the
Honesty/humility trait. This dimension, and in particular this facet has been found to correlate
negatively with risk taking (Ashton et al., 2010; De Vries et al., 2009), and more specifically to
ethical risk taking (Weller and Tikir, 2011). We found that participants characterized with low
score of sincerity were more likely to evoke an earlier P3a wave in comparison to more sincere
participants, leading to the interpretation that the evaluation of decision might be reached
faster in the less sincere individuals. Hence, this component could represent a good marker
being sensitive to the ethical aspect of gambling.
A differential feedback frequency-wave followed P3b. This event was qualified by a negative
deflection that occurred at a latency centered on 490 ms, with a larger amplitude during the
LF compared to the HF condition in the ADHD sample. It was located over the midline, more
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particularly at Cz, and was relevant in the frontal areas. This N400-like component, may be
compared to a similar ERP component reported in studies assessing conflict (Chen et al., 2010;
Polezzi et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2007; Yang and Zhang, 2011). This topographical distribution is
compatible with a generator mainly located in the anterior cingulate cortex, an area associated
with the detection of conflict (Botvinick and Carter, 2004; Mai et al., 2004; Van Veen and
Carter, 2002). Recent data reported that N400-like amplitude was positively related to the level
of impulsivity, in line with the previous neural correlates discussed here (Checa et al., 2014).
4.3 Working Memory Training’s effects
Cognitive remediation has been hypothesized to reduce neuropsychological impairments and
to reduce ADHD symptomatology. Therefore, this approach was proposed with the aim to
complement, or even eliminate a drug treatment that can be both costly and troublesome for
these patients. Those training programs have usually employed computerized programs, such
as Cogmed Working Memory Training, Pay Attention!, or Captain’s Log, which focuses on
attentional and WM processes, or mixed WM and attentional tasks programs (Chacko et al.,
2014; Cortese et al., 2015; Egeland et al., 2013; Green et al., 2012; Hovik et al., 2013; Johnstone
et al., 2010a, 2012; Klingberg et al., 2005; van Dongen-Boomsma et al., 2014). More particularly,
the Cogmed method allows to train WM processes, and has been used to decrease attentional
problems caused by poor WM. This method has become increasingly utilized and has shown
its beneficial effects not only on untrained WM tasks, but also among components of executive
functions, such as response inhibition and reasoning. In addition, academic achievement has been
shown to take advantage of these training sessions, and some studies even reported a significant
reduction of the ADHD symptomatology, as reported by parent and teachers’ ratings. (Chacko
et al., 2014; Egeland et al., 2013; Green et al., 2012; Hovik et al., 2013; Johnstone et al., 2012;
Klingberg et al., 2005; van Dongen-Boomsma et al., 2014).
These cognitive trainings do not only target individuals with impaired skills, but may also
be useful for all kinds of people. A currently popular method employs the Dual N-Back task as a
WMT, which lasts about a month, and that can be practiced with a computer at home or even on
transportable devices. Research conducted on healthy individuals were sometimes contradictory,
some argued that an intensiveWMT can have beneficial effects on similar untrained tasks, but
also on further domains, such as intelligence, cognitive control, or reading comprehension (Chein
and Morrison, 2010; Jaeggi et al., 2008; Salminen et al., 2012). These findings have been strongly
undervalued, on the basis of reports that could not detect any kind of improvements, neither
on related constructs, nor on more distant material, such general fluid intelligence, episodic
memory, verbal fluency, reasoning, and other cognitive abilities (Chooi and Thompson, 2012;
Dahlin et al., 2008; Redick et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2013).
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4.3.1 Dual N-Back task
Results from the current study demonstrated a general improvement on the trained task, the
Dual N-Back, in all groups. This effect appeared to be quite large (V = .50), and even stronger
according to the training type (V = .68), (Cunha and De Oliveira, 2000; Gravetter and Wallnau,
2013), just as those in the original and other studies (Chooi and Thompson, 2012; Dahlin et al.,
2008; Jaeggi et al., 2008; Lilienthal et al., 2013; Morrison and Chein, 2011; Oelhafen et al., 2013;
Owens et al., 2013; Redick et al., 2013; Salminen et al., 2012; Thompson et al., 2013). In addition,
it is interesting to notice that the participants assigned to the baseline training also improved
their performance, result which is in line with other studies that had the same active control
group (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Lilienthal et al., 2013). Jaeggi et al. (2008) argued that this gain was
likely to be owed to a retest effect. This seems to be in agreement with the report of Lilienthal
et al. (2013). In their study, the effects of the WMT was evaluated in three groups, an adaptive
training group, a non adaptive training group, and finally a no contact control group. Their
results demonstrated that the no contact group displayed also a positive gain at the posttest
session on the trained task, suggesting that the insights of Jaeggi et al. (2008) were suitable.
However, this enhancement has been reported to be the result of an increase of activation within
the prefrontal and parietal areas of the brain, systems that underlie WM, indicating that other
untrained tasks should benefit from the effects of the training (Olesen et al., 2004).
None of the studies conducted on children with ADHD used the Dual N-Back as main
training task. In fact each study was based on a cognitive program using more than 2 tasks.
However, the present project exploited only the Dual N-Back, and was able to demonstrate that
adults with ADHD could improve significantly their performance on this task. The results are
comparable with the ones reported on trainings solely based on WM in children with ADHD,
suggesting that WM can be enhanced regardless of the task and of ADHD patients’ age (Chacko
et al., 2014; Egeland et al., 2013; Green et al., 2012; Hovik et al., 2013; Johnstone et al., 2012;
Klingberg et al., 2005; van Dongen-Boomsma et al., 2014).
4.3.2 Near transfer effects
Near transfer effects were evaluated using the WAIS-IV digit span task Forward, Backward
and Ascending order, as well as the Corsi Block-Tapping task Forward only. Following the
training, we found that all groups improved their performance on both auditory and visual span
tasks. These effects can be qualified as medium (V = .37) and rather small (V = .17) (Cunha
and De Oliveira, 2000; Gravetter and Wallnau, 2013) for the digit span and Corsi, respectively,
which implies that the effects of an intensive WMT can be transferred to other untrained WM
tasks, in accordance with the work of Jaeggi et al. (2008) in healthy controls, and in ADHD
individuals (Chacko et al., 2014; Green et al., 2012; Johnstone et al., 2012; Klingberg et al.,
2005). Unfortunately, we did not find any effect related to the type of training. By looking more
closely at the results, we observed differences for the digit span Backward subtest between the
participants with ADHD and both students from professional school and UNIL/EPFL students
56
with low ASRS scores, while the other subtests did not yield significant difference between the
groups. These results may seem surprising, but can be explained in several ways. Nowadays,
the effects of motivation on learning are no longer questioned (Nicholls, 1984). Thus, ADHD
individuals were more likely to be much more involved and motivated than the control groups
in this project, because this training might have a direct effect on their daily functioning, which
is not the case for other groups. In addition, the intensity of the current motivation corresponds
to the level of subjective difficulty, as long as the demand is considered to be possible and
useful to face a challenge (Brehm and Self, 1989). Therefore, untrained subtests (digit span
task Forward and Ascending order, and the Corsi Forward) could have been exercised more
successfully than the most difficult subtest (digit span task Backward), which may have be
perceived as too difficult for the ADHD patients. Moreover, the UNIL/EPFL students have long
been accustomed to experimentations. We decided further not to include students belonging to
Psychology (SSP) and Economics (HEC) faculties to limit these side effects, but they are still
very familiar with the experimental processes. Nevertheless, most of them have participated
in this project for financial reasons (they were compensated with 350 CHF at the end of the
experimental testings), and not for research. A second control group enrolled in professional
schools allowed us to have a group which was naive to experiments, none of them had previously
participated in any project. These facts have been reflected in the behavioral performance within
these near transfer tasks, we were expecting to see higher differences between the UNIL/EPFL
students and the ADHD patients, but finally, the results were truly comparable between these
groups.
4.3.3 Far transfer effects
Human behavior is far from economically rational theories and humans failed to reproduce
the Homo Economicus’s behavior (Thaler, 2000). The perspective of the “rational agent” was
investigated by Kahneman and Tversky on “bounded rationality” by emphasizing heuristics
and bias in decision making under uncertainty and choice under risk (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). They analyzed how a rational agent would behave in those various contexts and they
demonstrated that contrary to the expected utility theory, the value function (which assigns
a value to an outcome) is not symmetrical. Indeed, the value function is steeper than the
gain function, meaning that a loss is much more painful as an equivalent gain is pleasurable, a
phenomenon called loss aversion.
At the beginning of each trial, the individuals were endowed with 20 points to gamble in a
risk project. The gains were not placed back in the game following the gamble, therefore, the
participants could not be faced to losses at the end of the game. The most effective strategy
would have been to bet the maximum of points at each trial, as demonstrated by the following
equations (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13):
G(x) = p(Gain) + p(Loss), where p(Gain) = 1/3 ∗ 4x+ (20− x) and p(Loss) = 2/3 ∗ (20− x) (7)
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G(20) = [(20 ∗ 4 + 0) + 2 ∗ (0)]/3 = 26.7 (8)
G(16) = [(16 ∗ 4 + 4) + 2 ∗ (4)]/3 = 25.3 (9)
G(12) = [(12 ∗ 4 + 8) + 2 ∗ (8)]/3 = 24 (10)
G(8) = [(8 ∗ 4 + 12) + 2 ∗ (12)]/3 = 22.7 (11)
G(4) = [(4 ∗ 4 + 16) + 2 ∗ (16)]/3 = 21.3 (12)
G(0) = [(0 ∗ 4 + 20) + 2 ∗ (20)]/3 = 20 (13)
At pretest, the risk index were close to 0, indicating that the individuals did not think as
rational agents, they were rather driven by their unwillingness to take high risks in order to
avoid losses. However, the results of this study suggests that working memory training resulted
in a increase of risky behavior in our PGT among the participants, suggesting that the training
caused a unification of the strategies towards a more rational behavior. These effects were neither
selective to the training type, nor to the group, and did not affect the total gains. Nonetheless,
we observed a large decrease in reaction time in this task after the training irrespective of the
training condition or of the group. This result indicates that the repetition of trials has allowed
the individuals to become more experienced, therefore to select an amount to gamble much
faster at posttest.
To our knowledge, there is only one study that assessed the effects of a WMT on decision
making (Bickel et al., 2011). This research was able to demonstrate that stimulant-dependent
individuals displayed a decrease in discounting of delayed rewards after the training, which did
not affect the heathy controls, indicating that these changes resulted from the enhancement
of WM. A delay discounting task is a game where individuals have to choose between a small
immediate, and a large delayed amount of money, a task designed to measure the degree of
impulse control. It is important to stress that in the latter study, the authors did not find any
transfer effect on the BART task, a game which is more representative of the gambling behavior
assessed in our study. Therefore our results appeared to be in line with those results, in addition
to the other studies that could not find any far transfer effect either in controls or in the ADHD
population (Chacko et al., 2014; Chooi and Thompson, 2012; Dahlin et al., 2008; Redick et al.,
2013; Thompson et al., 2013; van Dongen-Boomsma et al., 2014).
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4.3.4 Changes in ADHD symptomatology
ADHD is a neurodevelopemental disorder usually diagnosed during childhood. It is generally
assumed that it affects more than 4% of the children, with a greater representation of boys
(Brown et al., 2001; Faraone et al., 2003; Polanczyk et al., 2007; Willcutt, 2012). Individuals
living with this condition manifest attentional impairments, such as daydreaming, distractibility,
difficulties in concentrating and maintaining focused attention, high degree of impulsivity, as well
as excessive level of activity and talking. Disturbance associated with ADHD during childhood
may also include learning difficulties that can lead to academic failure and social issues, thus
increasing the risk of substance abuse and low self-esteem (Biederman, 2005). ADHD has long
been regarded as a childhood disease, but in recent years, scientific proofs have demonstrated that
the symptoms did not decrease during adolescence, on the contrary, it can persist into adulthood
(Avisar and Shalev, 2011; Biederman et al., 2007a; Hervey et al., 2004). The Conners’ Adult
ADHD Rating Scale is a multidimensional instrument that can help to assess the presence and
severity of ADHD in adults. It allows to investigate several symptomatic dimensions, to wit, the
DSM-IV Inattentive Symptoms (TA), DSM-IV Hyperactive-Impulsive Symptoms (TB), DSM-
IV Total ADHD Symptoms (TC ), and ADHD Index (TD) (Conners et al., 1999). Participants
completed the self-assessment form, but it would also have been possible to ask their relatives
to fill-in the adapted forms, in order to have complementary data. The particular issue of this
intensive WMT could involve a possible improvement of ADHD symptoms, which could result
in a complementary therapy or even as a substitute to a drug treatment for these patients.
In the present project, all participants filled this questionnaire prior to the beginning of
the testing period. We also got back in contact with them three and six months after the
end of the study to ask them to fill in again this evaluation form in order to evaluate any
changes in ADHD symptomatology. Overall the results indicated a significant reduction of the
symptoms on each subscale at 3-months follow-up. The effect size were in between .27 and
.49, which can be considered as large (Cunha and De Oliveira, 2000; Gravetter and Wallnau,
2013). These reductions were not affected by the training type, indicating that the WMT had a
positive impact on inattentive and hyperactive/impulsive symptoms in all training conditions.
Although one study did not find any significant effect of the training (van Dongen-Boomsma
et al., 2014), some other reports on children with ADHD could also detect improvement on
attentional and hyperactive/impulsive symptoms, based on parents’ and/or teachers’ ratings
(Chacko et al., 2014; Green et al., 2012; Klingberg et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2015). Even if
the training program was not the same in the latter studies, they all used the Cogmed cognitive
remediation’s program. This divergence of methodology provides evidence that WM is a key
system acting in the phenotype of ADHD impairments (Barkley, 1997; Barkley and Murphy,
2011; Brown et al., 2009). In addition, we did not notice any changes between 3- and 6-months
follow-up, which suggests that the symptoms’ improvement could last over the long term.
An interesting discovery is that this effect was modulated by the groups. Indeed, we found
that not only ADHD participants had benefited from these effects, but also the healthy controls
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demonstrated a decrease of inattention and hyperactive/impulsive scores on the CAARS-S:SV’
scales. This result implies that the effects of the training are not limited to populations with
specific deficits such as ADHD, and present a great interest for public health arguments against
self-administration of alcohol or drugs to enhance the performance or reduce stressors in the
context of high pressure and work overload (Frone, 2008; Newbury-Birch et al., 2000; Webb
et al., 1996).
4.4 Experimental limitations
4.4.1 Control tasks
It is important to state the limitations of the span tasks. First, these tasks had a limited number
of trials, for instance, in the digit span task Forward, we observed that some students reached
the maximum level already at pretest, thus it did not allow to assess the improvements of such
students at the posttest session. If the levels were more numerous, we would certainly have been
able to demonstrate better effects of the training in this subtest.
Second, the effects of the training could have been biased by the fact that the protocol was
very long. The results of the span tasks have also shown that the easiest subtest (digit span
task Forward) was often less well practiced at posttest by some participants than the other
subtests, indicating that following the break, the participants were completely distracted. The
individuals were all very tired by the training and wanted to finish the study as fast as possible,
thus did not optimally execute these last tasks. We could have avoided this bias by shifting the
tasks at the beginning of the testing sessions, or by separating the appointments. However the
separation of the sessions would have been really difficult. It was already demanding to find two
matching appointments for an individual, and would have been even more difficult to find four
appointments for the same person.
4.4.2 Probabilistic Gambling Task
The PGT is a task which was rearranged from a task seeking to evaluate the risk taking modu-
lators among investors. The way it was modified could have been more effective in this project.
First, it is likely that the participants were not really motivated whilst gambling, as revealed
by the index of risk close to zero. A possible solution could be the way of compensation, they
earned 350 CHF for the whole procedure, but it is possible to imagine that they could have
earned a fixed amount of 300 CHF plus the selection of two random trials played during the
game. The method of administration could have been more attractive by handling the points
differently. In our study, 20 points were attributed to the participants at the beginning of each
trial, but it could be possible to endow them with a fixed amount within each block, in order
to evaluate how the participants manage their money during the two conditions. Further, it
would also have been possible to assess their preferences towards risk using a self-administrated
questionnaire. Thus, the performances could have been controlled in light of each individual’s
scores.
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Nevertheless, one strength of the PGT analyses is the time-frames defined to assess decision
making with EEG. As a matter of fact, most studies have investigated reward or feedback
processing, because ERP correlates are better understood and allow a better analysis of the
results. The present investigation has enabled us to study the processes surrounding decision
making, which are not yet fully assimilated, in particular in adult ADHD individuals. Moreover,
putting in perspective the data with personality factors allowed us to show that some differences
are specific to particular traits, not just at the behavioral level but also within the neural level.
4.4.3 Training session
The Dual N-Back is a task that has been recognized to properly assess the dimensions of working
memory, a training on that basis is therefore very suitable. However, all individuals did not
understand the task at first sight, in particular the patients with ADHD. It is possible to
improve this point by adding a practice period prior to the test. We noticed that individuals
evaluated the game as being relatively difficult, especially the patients. Many of them have
reported to have lack of motivation to do the trainings each day, and we had to accompany
some participants quite closely. Still, we had to exclude a number of participants due to their
lack of discipline. The difficulty of the training and the involvement of the participants were
key factors in the choice of the compensation of participants. This is why we chose a relatively
high amount of 350 CHF. This amount attracted many students, because most of the studies
that take place at the university of Lausanne do not offer this kind of money. We observed that
the majority of the UNIL/EPFL students were only motivated by the financial compensation,
which was evident in regard to their Dual N-Back performance (among other facts). This is one
of the reasons we chose to add another control group to the study. Therefore, we decided to
select individuals that were naive to experimentations to avoid this bias. Another way to escape
this side effect could have been to eliminate the financial compensation to prevent from poor
performance (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). We can not dismiss the fact that it could have been
possible for the individuals to ask other people to complete the training for them, or, on the
contrary, to have increased the number of practice with the smartphone application.
It is important to notice that the ADHD patients that have withdrawn from the study
were the ones that had the higher rates of comorbidity. In addition, we noticed that there was
a positive correlation between those patients and the number of major artifacts in the EEG
signals, which were excluded from the ERP analyses. In spite of these exclusions, individuals
who completed the study, especially the patients, have expressed their enthusiasm in respect
to this game, and noticed some behavioral changes in their daily functioning. We were really
pleased to have such feedback.
4.5 General conclusions
ADHD is a neuropsychiatric disorder that evolves continuously between childhood and adult-
hood. Yet, each individual presents a specific profile, making the diagnosis difficult to establish.
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Most common negative symptoms being reported are attention deficit, which may be accompa-
nied by hyperactivity and impulsivity. Inattention problems are also frequent and can lead to
many difficulties in daily life, such as academic failure, social isolation, and emotional troubles.
The administration of a drug treatment is an effective way to fight against these symptoms. The
effects are fast, but require several administrations per day depending on the intensity of the
disorder. Other therapies have started to become more attractive, namely, cognitive remedia-
tion. These methods have have allowed to reduce the symptoms and to improve some deficient
aspects, such as working memory functions on more extended periods.
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of an intensive working memory
training conducted with the Dual N-back task in a population of young adults with ADHD and
match-controls through various measures including electroencephalography.
In opposition to most other studies assessing decision making, our work was interested in
events surrounding decision making processes. Overall, the results indicated that spacebar
pressing evoked a N2–P3a complex, which was followed by a P3b and further a slow negative
wave usually referred as the CNV. Following the gamble selection onset, another N2–P3a complex
was evoked. These components appeared to be different in both groups, N2 and P3a were shorter
in the ADHD sample after the start of trial, while this complex was evoked at longer latencies
in the ADHD at the second stage of decision making.
Further, we observed that specific traits of personality were associated with risky decision
making, not only at the behavioral level, but also in regard with neurocognitive processes.
In particular, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Sincerity modulated the latencies of the
negative wave occurring at around 200ms (N2) and of the positive deflection peaking at around
250ms (P3a) components at decision stages. N2 peaked earlier in individuals with high levels of
Conscientiousness, controls with low score of Sincerity and highly sincere patients with ADHD
following the appearance of the gamble choices. Furthermore, after selecting the chosen amount,
P250 peaked earlier in highly Conscientious individuals, controls with low levels of Agreeableness
and ADHD patients with high levels of Agreeableness, and likewise for Sincerity.
In addition, we found that the working memory training had a spillover effect on near con-
structs, as assessed by untrained working memory span tasks in all groups, independently of the
training type. However, these effects were rather absent on decision making behaviors. Nonethe-
less, an interesting discovery is that the CAARS-S:SV scores in all participants were reduced
following the training. Together, these results suggest that selected differences characterizing
ADHD might be enhanced by a cognitive training solely based on working memory.
4.5.1 Future directions
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of an intensive working memory training
conducted with the Dual N-Back task in a population of young adults with ADHD and with
age-matched healthy controls. This study took place at the University of Lausanne with the
interdisciplinary collaboration of diverse departments, namely the Department of Information
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Systems, and the Department of Economics, from the Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC),
and the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (SUPEA), from the Faculty of Medicine.
This project lasted over three years: the first year was spent with the elaboration of the tasks,
the set-up of the laboratory, and the pilot studies that have allowed to validate the protocol.
The second and third years were dedicated to the recruitment and to the experimental sessions
that included more than 430 testing periods in the laboratory. During this period, we also
intended International meetings and published one peer-reviewed article, while another one is
in preparation.
An important issue for future research would be the examination of all the data we have
collected. At the beginning of the project, we planned to study the effects of this training
on attention, as measured by the Attentional Network Test (ANT ), and to evaluate the brain
responses that resulted following the training not only for trained task but also on decision mak-
ing. Unfortunately, the data collection and their examination took much longer than expected,
especially because of the addition of a third control group. Nevertheless, it is possible to make
some assumptions regarding these unexploited data.
It has been reported that the N-Back/Dual N-Back task evoked a N2 and P3 waves following
the presentation of the stimuli (Stroux et al., 2015; Watter et al., 2001). These studies were more
interested in the behavior of the P3 component and found that the increase of the cognitive load
resulted in its amplitude decrease, as well as a diminution of its peak latency. This component
was also larger for non-match stimuli, compared to those that matched, and appeared to be
maximal at parietal sites, compared to central and frontal areas (Oelhafen et al., 2013; Watter
et al., 2001). However, in ADHD, cognitive load did not modulate the P3 as it was the case
in the control group, suggesting a deficient interference control in these patients (Stroux et al.,
2015).
A recent study showed that brain activity within frontal, parietal and temporal regions was
increased following an intensive training using the Cogmed program, in addition to enhancements
of WM performance and symptomatology in an ADHD population (Stevens et al., 2015). These
results appear to be similar to those found in healthy populations (Olesen et al., 2004). Moreover,
the P3 has been hypothesized to be generated within the temporal parietal junction and to be
modulated by the activity of the locus coeruleus norepinephrine system (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005a). According to these facts and to the behavioral results found in the present project,
it is possible to consider that the WMT would modify both latency and amplitude of the P3
component following the stimulus presentation in the Dual N-Back task. We would expect an
increase latency in both groups, and more especially a normalization of the P3 amplitude in
ADHD.
The ANT is a test assessing attentional capacity of individuals within three different con-
structs: alerting, orienting, and conflict networks. It has been shown that adults with ADHD
present accuracy impairments and reaction time fluctuations compared to healthy controls (Lun-
dervold et al., 2011). Although some studies did not find any far transfer effects following a
WMT, others have found more positive results (Chacko et al., 2014; Klingberg et al., 2005).
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Thus we would expect an enhancement of ADHD performance in regard to the ANT, more
particularly in regard with the reaction times.
The main aim of this project was to assess the neural changes following this intensive training
on decision making using a gambling task. Although we do not currently have published any
data, some preliminary results have been presented last year in the annual meeting of the Society
for Neuroeconomics. These preliminary results highlighted selected differences in the activity
triggered by both time frames investigated during the PGT. We observed that the amplitude
of the P3a was larger in all trained individuals in both LF and HF conditions. In addition, the
activity evoked by the selection of the invested amount was larger in all trained participants in
the LF condition. Moreover, in the HF, similar observations were measured in the controls on
parietal sites, while these differences were mostly perceptible on the frontal site in the ADHD
participants. These results might highlight that the early brain activity was indeed affected by
the training.
We hope to expand these results and generalize them to all the participants of our study.
We would expect not see no difference between the three control groups, however, it may be
possible that N2–P3a peak latencies in ADHD individuals become normalized following the
training, with a higher improvement in the adaptive group.
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Chapter 6
Imperfect Decision Making and Risk
Taking Are Affected by Personality
Sarah K. Mesrobian, Michel Bader, Lorenz Götte,
Alessandro E.P. Villa and Alessandra Lintas
Abstract Classic game theory predicts that individuals should behave as rational
agents in order to maximize their gain. In real life situations it is observed that
human decision making does not follow this theory. Specific patterns of activity in
several brain circuits identified in recent years have been associated with irrational
and imperfect decision making. Brain activity modulated by dopamine and sero-
tonin is assumed to be among the main drivers of the expression of personality traits
and patients affected by Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are char-
acterized by altered activity in those neuromodulating circuits. We investigated the
effect of fairness and personality traits on neuronal and psychological mechanisms
of decision making and risk taking in two sets of experiments based on the Ultima-
tum Game (UG) and the Investment Game (IG). In the UG we found that Fairness
and Conscientiousness were associated with responder’s gain and with event-related
potentials (ERP) components Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and Late Positive
component (LPP). In the IG the sum gained during the risky gambling task were
presented immediately after half of the trials (condition “high frequency feedback”,
HFFB), while the other half were presented at the end of each block (condition
“low frequency feedback”, LFFB). Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Sincerity
influenced latencies of the negative deflection occurring at around 200 ms (N200)
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and the positive wave peaking at around 250 ms (P250) components. The contingent
negative variation (CNV) component was affected in a different way in controls
and participants with ADHD as a function of the feedback frequency (HFFB versus
LFFB). These results clearly show that imperfect decision making and risk taking are
affected by personality traits and cannot be accounted by models based on rational
computations.
6.1 Homo Economicus and Homo Sociologicus
Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary field whose aims include studying the neural
foundations of decision making under risk. Uncertainty can be defined as the psy-
chological state in which a decision maker lacks knowledge about what outcome will
follow from what choice. Economists and neuroscientists commonly considering the
risk referred to situations with a known distribution of possible outcome [97].
Traditional economic models of decision making found their roots through in
the concept of utility referred to as the option leading to the highest outcome that
will be chosen by “rational agents” when individuals have the opportunity to choose
between different options. Daniel Bernoulli’s St Petersburg Paradox demonstrates
utility in a tail or head game, where a coin is tossed until the first head appears;
the payoff increases at each trial, whereas the probability decreases exponentially,
leading to a concave utility function. Hence, individuals are considered as rational
agents, referred to as Homo Economicus, who are expected to maximize the utility
to play a game with a highly skewed payoff distribution [9].
The concept of “maximization” refers to the agents’ ability to evaluate each option
and its possible outcome. By taking into account the preferences of an agent over
different kinds of choices, four axioms of the Expected Utility Theory were defined by
assuming the properties of completeness, transitivity, convexity and independence of
lotteries [120]. The addition of a psychological dimension to risky behaviors defined
the ground of an updated theory referred to as the Prospect Theory [70, 117]. This
latter theory allowed to explain how individuals behave when they are faced with
probabilistic risky options, namely, to underestimate risks leading to a loss (risk
seeking), and to overestimate risky behaviors towards gains (risk aversion).
The attempt to understand individual differences and similarities towards risk trig-
gered many studies and the development of specific questionnaires and experimental
tasks aimed at measuring risky behaviors. General risk taking or sensation seeking is
commonly assumed to be motivated to a large extent by the intrinsic value of adven-
ture or sensory experience derived from the risky behavior itself [4]. An example of
a simple task aimed at rating risk taking behavior is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART ) [77]. In this game, individuals have the opportunity to make a balloon grow
by introducing air with a pump. Rules are simple, each puff allows the participant
to earn money, but in the case of an explosion of the balloon, the participant would
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loose all money earned so far. Therefore, at each trial a decision has to be taken,
either to stop pumping the air and collect the money or to pump more air in the
balloon. Referring to individuals’ characteristics within usual pattern of behaviors,
“Personality is the more or less stable and enduring organization of a person’s
character, temperament, intellect, and physique, which determines his unique adjust-
ment to the environment” [44].
In the Ultimatum Game (UG), where the participants play a role of proposer and
responder sharing a virtual amount of money [59], it is rationale to expect that the
proposer offers the smallest possible amount and the responder accepts any amount.
On the contrary, a consistent number of UG studies revealed that responders showed
a tendency to reject unfair offer, especially for offers below 30 % of the total amount
[20, 26, 59]. Social interaction like friendship [21] and moral characteristic of the
people [50] influence the maximization target in UG. We showed that perceived
emotions associated to background pictures and individual differences associated to
the role of proposer and responder significantly affected the amount of money players
were keen to share [46]. When individuals were playing the role of proposers, they
tended to share a higher amount of money when their choice was made in association
with negative emotions, in particular sadness and disgust. When participants were
playing the role of responders, they were more likely to accept an offer when their
decision was made in association with positive emotions, such as joy and surprise.
Positive emotions predicted higher acceptance rate, and negative emotions higher
amount of money offered. Furthermore, the participants were more likely to accept
an unfair offer when they were introverted, conscientious, and honest [46]. This
result is aligned with studies demonstrating that a positive emotional state signals a
beneficial outcome and leads individuals to use simple heuristics and not to raise too
many questions about the decision to be taken [110].
Offers in bargaining are likely to be guided by the emotions that proposers antici-
pate when contemplating their offers [83]. Positive offers may be driven by fear and
guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived consequences of having one’s offer
rejected, and guilt is more related to concerns for the opponents’ outcomes [83]. All
together these observations show that indeed, risky behaviors can be modified as a
function of the task [62], and are modulated by emotions and personality traits [126].
Hence, the participant should not be considered any more as a Homo Economicus
but rather as a Homo Sociologicus [88].
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 6.2 we review the background of
the personality traits that have been identified in the past decades, in particular the
HEXACO model. The main brain areas involved in decision making and risk taking
are listed in Sect. 6.3 following the brain imaging studies explained in Sect. 6.4. The
electrophysiological techniques used in our studies are explained in Sect. 6.5. The
experiment aimed at studying the effect of personality in the Ultimatum Game para-
digm is described in Sect. 6.6, while in Sect. 6.7 we present the Investment Game para-
digm derived from the Gneezy Potters’ task. In the discussion Sect. 6.8 we present the
main results for each study and the chapter ends with a general conclusion (Sect. 6.9).
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6.2 Personality
Determinants of personality have been studied from different points of view in
psychology. One of them important for the referred research has examined the con-
cept of taxonomy, which refers to individuals’ characteristics within usual pattern of
behaviors, usually called traits or factors. A hierarchical structure based on 16 fac-
tors or traits extracted from the English language was presented by Raymond Cattell
(1905–1998) [24]. This model included primary traits associated with individual dif-
ferences, second-order (or global factors) associated with a more theoretical level
and third-order factors (also called super factors) representing the most abstract level
of personality. Eysenck’s (1916–1997) approach of personality defined at first two
general traits, called Extraversion and Neuroticism, which are bipolar and indepen-
dent [43]. Each factor represents a direction allowing secondary factors to have a
value on the scale. In latter years Eysenck added another trait, Psychoticism, and
settled a revised version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-R) of per-
sonality [45].
Eysenck’s model appeared too limited and in the 1990s the Five Factor Model,
known under the name of OCEAN or Big Five, has considerably contributed to study
basic personality traits along the dimensions characterized by Openness (O), Consci-
entiousness (C), Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A) and Neuroticism (OCEAN) [31,
55]. An alternative model of personality, named HEXACO, has been developed from
lexical studies of personality structure, namely Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality
(E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C) and Openness to
experience (O) [3]. Actually, both models appear to have similarities among certain
factors, notably with regard to the dimensions of eXtraversion, Conscientiousness
and Openness to experience, whereas Big Five Neuroticism and Agreeableness’ rota-
tion variations have been found to represent Emotionality and Agreeableness factor
within the HEXACO [1]. The sixth factor, Honesty-Humility, has been found to be
sparsely linked to the Big Five factors, whilst the Agreeableness facet of the Five
Factor Model was strongly correlated to this additional dimension.
The HEXACO dimensions can described as follows [1, 2, 76, 126]:
• Honesty-Humility: This factor includes sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance and
modesty. Individuals with low scores on this dimension are perceived as using
advantages such as praise or compliments to obtain profits, to care about mate-
rial benefit and with a strong sentiment of pomposity, characterized by descrip-
tive adjectives such as sly, deceitful, greedy, pretentious, hypocritical, boastful,
pompous. High score individuals appear to avoid manipulation to obtain prof-
its and are not attracted by material commodities and do not have feelings such
as self-importance, in other words, they are sincere, honest, faithful, loyal, mod-
est/unassuming.
• Emotionality: This factor includes fearfulness, anxiety, dependence and sentimen-
tality. Stressful situations are not experienced as a hindrance in persons with low
score of emotionality who seem not to be worried by physical damages and do
not need to share feelings, i.e. exhibiting brave, tough, independent, self-assured
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and stable behaviors. High scores individuals are worried about dangers, feel more
anxiety in stressful situations and are commonly characterized by emotional, over-
sensitive, sentimental, fearful, and vulnerable behaviors.
• Extraversion: Social self-esteem, social boldness, sociably and liveliness (engage-
ment in social endeavors) are sub-dimensions of this factor. Individuals with low
score of extraversion are shy, passive, withdrawn, introverted, quiet, reserved and
thinking that they are unpopular and indifferent to social activities. On the opposite,
individuals with high score of extraversion feel confident, have a good self-image,
appreciate social interactions and are outgoing, lively, extraverted, talkative and
cheerful.
• Agreeableness: This factor includes forgiveness, gentleness, flexibility and
patience. Individuals with low score of agreeableness are ill-tempered, quarrel-
some, stubborn, choleric, resentful, obstinate persons who do not accept other’s
shortcoming and have difficulties to control themselves. Conversely, individuals
with high score of agreeableness tend to show tolerant, peaceful, mild, agreeable,
lenient, gentle indulgent, cooperative and patient behaviors.
• Conscientiousness: This factor includes organization, diligence, perfectionism and
prudence (engagement in task-related endeavors). Individuals with low score of
conscientiousness tend to be sloppy, negligent, reckless, lazy, irresponsible, absent-
minded, impulsive, disrupted and have a tendency to abandon in front of troubles.
Individuals with high scores tend to select safe decisions and show organized,
disciplined, diligent, careful, thorough, precise and accurate behaviors.
• Openness to experience: This factor includes aesthetic appreciation, inquisitive-
ness, creativity and unconventionality (engagement in idea-related endeavors).
Individuals with low score on this scale tend to be shallow, unimaginative, unin-
terested about art, innovation or creativity and to avoid extreme ideas to remain
rather conventional. Individuals with high score of openness to experience are
attracted by art and by various domain of knowledge, being associated with intel-
lectual, creative, unconventional, innovative and ironic behaviors.
The links between personality and risk have been revealed in several studies. In
front of a choice between a sure gain or a an uncertain greater gain, or between a sure
loss or an uncertain greater loss, results showed that Honesty-Humility was nega-
tively associated to risk in both cases, just like Emotionality [125]. In a study based
on a new self-report scale assessing “the tendency to seek and accept great risks,
particularly physical risks”, called Status-Driven Risk Taking (SDRT) [4], Consci-
entiousness was also associated to risky behaviors, but only in the gain domain. The
nature of the risk appears as an essential factor to determine the decision making. In
one case the risky decision task was based on a potential financial loss or gain, and in
the other case the risk was conceptualized mainly on a physical basis, measured by
a self-report questionnaire. A domain-specific risk-taking scale [123] measures five
different dimensions of risk, namely financial (such as Investment and gambling),
health/safety (for instance, buying illegal drug for personal use), recreational (rela-
tive to the practice of extreme sports), ethical (for example, cheating or stealing) and
social (such as approaching one’s boss to ask for a salary increase) risky behaviors.
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In an attempt to look for the association between the dimensions of the HEXACO
personality inventory and the risk taking domains, it appeared that “Emotionality”
and “Conscientiousness” were linked to all risk domains, whereas “Openness to expe-
rience” was closely related to social and recreational risks and “Honesty/Humility”
was negatively correlated to health/safety and ethical risk taking [126].
6.3 Neurobiological Background
Decision making and risk taking reflect one’s ability to engage successfully in inde-
pendent and purposive behaviors associated with the integrity of executive functions.
Studies of patients with impaired decision making in risky situations have contributed
to a better understanding of the neural circuits involved in these behaviors. Follow-
ing the discovery of behavioral changes of the notorious Phineas Gage, the study
of patients with frontal lesions have been the starting point of Damasio’s somatic
marker hypothesis [36].
Somatic markers involve different brain areas, most of them illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a structure located on the medial surface of the
frontal lobes. The dorsal regions of the ACC is considered to correspond to its “cogni-
tive” subdivision, being crucial for error processing [22] and for mediating processes
such as response inhibition [19]. Caudo-dorsal regions of ACC share further connec-
tions with other neural systems involved in reward processing and decision-making,
such as the mesencephalic dopamine system [33] and the orbitofrontal cortex [118].
The rostro-ventral ACC corresponds to its “affective” subdivision, and is connected
to the amygdala, periaqueductal gray, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, hippocam-
pus, anterior insula and orbitofrontal cortex [38].
Regarding subjects with brain damages, patients with lesions of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, insular cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex tend to increase their betting
compared to controls and to patients with dorsolateral and ventrolateral lesion within
the prefrontal cortex [27]. These patients have impaired betting behaviors compared
to control individuals in a Gamble Task [81], more specifically, they tend to bet much
more than controls, on the contrary to patient with dorsal prefrontal lesions, which
are more likely to choose safe options like control participants [28].
Expounding patients’ behaviors of inattention were reported since the 17th century
[32]. Disorders of the cognitive control are well characterized by attention deficit [7,
114, 127] and hyperactive-impulsive behavior [7, 84, 87] that have been recognized
to be part of the core symptoms of children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) [7]. Links between ADHD and executive functions associated with
response inhibition, vigilance, working memory and planning have been established
in children [10, 92, 95, 108, 127] and have been found to be stable into young adult
age [11, 63]. Adults with ADHD are well characterized also by taking more risks in
the everyday life conduct, for instance in risky driving [116], risky sexual behaviors
[48], alcohol consumption [122], as well as in experimental conditions such as in the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task [82].
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Fig. 6.1 Human brain illustration of medial surface of the left cerebral hemisphere (modified from
[46]). The principal areas involved in decision-making are labeled in turquoise. The blue arrows
show the main modulatory projections of the nuclei using the serotonin transmitter to cortical areas.
The major dopaminergic pathways are indicated by the red arrows
Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between personality and
the major monoamine neurotransmitters particularly serotonin and dopamine [18]
(Fig. 6.1). Pathological gamblers [16] as well as subjects identified as stimulant users
are more likely to take risk than non-stimulant users [78]. It has been demonstrated
that methamphetamine consumers displayed an increased activation of the right
insula, rise which is growing according to the risk, whereas activation of ACC was
decreased compared to control participants [56]. Furthermore, activation of the ven-
tromedial part of the caudate nucleus has been found to be reduced in pathological
gamblers during the process of anticipation of gains and losses in a gambling task,
while anticipation of losses was only characterized by a reduced activation of the
anterior insula in the same population [25].
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6.4 Brain Imaging Studies
Until the 18th Century the correlation between specific brain areas and their functions
was a matter of study by neuroanatomists who described post-mortem anatomical
inspection of the brain. Since the 19th Century the progress in microscopy led the
investigators to consider cellular features by means of histological analysis. With
the progress of electronics and nuclear physics, five major imaging methods are cur-
rently employed for studying the neural mechanisms underpinning risky decision
making, more specifically, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron
emission topography (PET ), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and electroen-
cephalography (EEG). Each device has its own advantages and disadvantages, and
sometimes the combination of several methods allows to investigate different stages
within the decision making process under risk, for instance, sensory processing of
the environment, state evaluation, rule identification and outcome evaluation [6]. We
do not consider here the studies based on genomic analysis and molecular biology.
The fMRI is a technique for measuring and mapping brain activity based on the
fact that the nucleus of a hydrogen atom behaves like a small magnet [90]. The
application of a radio frequency magnetic pulse at a certain frequency provokes
the generation of a faint signal by the hydrogen nuclei detected by the magnetic
coils of the device. The topographic distribution of the excitable hydrogen nuclei
generate an image and the changes in their distribution as a function of an external
event generates a functional image. Changes in neural activity are associated with
changes in oxygen consumption and blood flow. Hemoglobin binds oxygen in blood
and oxygen-rich blood and oxygen-poor blood have different magnetic properties
related to hydrogen nuclei in water and their surroundings. An activated brain area
consumes more oxygen and blood flow to the active area must be increased to meet
this demand. Hence, during a specific mental process fMRI can be used to produce
activation maps showing the areas of the brain that are involved [90].
The insula (part of the brain illustrated in Fig. 6.1) was associated with the selection
of risky options [94]. The activation of its anterior part appeared prior to the selection
of riskless choices following the selection of a risky option and to “risk-aversion
mistakes”, that are mistakes describing errors of judgment when individuals should
in theory take risk [74]. The insular cortex and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
were found to play a role in response to prior risk experience trials and the insular
activation was emphasized after those trials when participants had decided not to
gamble and in association with the personality trait of urgency [132]. The perception
of unfairness evoked also specific patterns of activation. In the Ultimatum Game, the
bilateral anterior insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) were involved in processing unfair offers from human proposers [106].
Patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage showed prominent sensitivity to the
fair condition in the UG and were much more likely to reject unfair offers if the
proposer could have proposed an equitable offer [111].
The existence of different circuits within the brain was found by assessing tasks
with various types of risk. For instance, in a study by Knutson and Kuhnen, the
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nucleus accumbens was found to be activated prior to risky choices following two
types of situations, the selection of a safe option, and trials where individuals took
risks despite the fact that this is not the best strategy [74]. The activation of the
nucleus accumbens has been linked to the prediction of individuals’ intention to
shift toward a high-risk option [73]. The existence of an evaluating system related
to uncertainty was supported by finding activated areas associated to risk which
included the dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus) peaking significantly later than regions
associated to ambiguity (differing from uncertainty in so far as the probabilities
remain unknown), independently of individuals’ choices [67].
Altogether these results are thought to be consistent with the hypothesis of a
reward-anticipation system within the striatum which is “further downstream”, com-
pared to rapid vigilance/evaluation system in the amygdala.
Brain activity can also be measured with the PET technique. This technique uses
trace amounts of short-lived positron-emitting radionuclides (tracers) injected into
the body on a biologically active molecule. The physical principle is that as the tracer
undergoes positron emission decay (also known as positive beta decay), it emits a
positron. The encounters of the positrons and the electrons belonging to the local tis-
sue annihilate both particles and produce pairs of gamma rays going approximately
into opposite directions. Gamma rays arriving in temporal pairs from opposite direc-
tions are detected by specific devices and a map of radioactivities can be constructed
showing the locations in which the molecular tracer was concentrated. Based on a
principle similar to fMRI, the tracer Oxygen-15 is used to measure indirectly the
blood flow to different parts of the brain. The localization of energy intake in a given
region being associated with glucose consumption and cerebral activity can be mea-
sured by the injection of a tracer such as Fluorine-18. This radionuclide is generally
used to label fluorodeoxyglucose (also called FDG or fludeoxyglucose) that is a
glucose analogue that produces intense radio-labeling of tissues with high glucose
uptake. Carbon-11 is a radionuclide generally used to label ligands for specific neu-
roreceptors thus allowing the visualization of neuroreceptor pools associated with
psychological processes or disorders and brain activity.
During the risky decision making task, PET neuroimaging was used to show the
activation of several brain regions, corresponding to bilateral orbitofrontal cortices
followed by the right side of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate
cortex and the inferior parietal cortex and the last regions being the thalamus, the
anterior insula and the lateral cerebellum, all activated bilaterally [42]. However,
PET neuroimaging requires a tracer injection and its application remains limited
compared with fMRI.
Yet, another tool has proven itself in the research field, the transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS). By applying a featured magnetic stimulus to a specific part
of the cortex, TMS has become an attractive instrument, eliciting a reversible and
controlled perturbation within the brain [35]. The principle of this technique is to
use electromagnetic induction to induce weak electric currents in the brain using a
rapidly changing magnetic field [101]. A magnetic coil placed near a selected cortical
area generates short electromagnetic pulses that pass through the skull and provoke
electrical currents that cause depolarization or hyperpolarization in the neurons of
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the targeted area. Single or paired pulses or repetitive pulses at specific frequen-
cies may provoke very different effects when applied to the same cortical area [47].
This technique was applied in studying a risk taking task. The results suggested that
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was not involved in changing the probability of
selecting risky options on the opposite of the role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex in the suppression of superficially seductive options and exhibiting riskier
prospects [72].
Despite the remarkable advances brought by the advent of imaging techniques
related to nuclear medicine, EEG recording remains the most widely used method
to record human brain activity with high temporal resolution (1 ms time scale) in a
non-invasive way from the human scalp by means of external electrodes placed over
many standard locations determined by skull landmarks. Transient electric potentials
associated in time with a response to internal or external events are termed event-
related potentials (ERPs) [96]. The ERP is extracted from the ongoing EEG by means
of signal filtering and averaged over many responses to a triggering event associated
with cognitive activity involved in stimulus processing and/or action preparation.
Although ERPs can be evaluated in both frequency and time domains, we focus the
interest of this study on ERPs recorded in the time domain, i.e. the curves obtained
by averaging electric potential shifts as a function of time over several trials and
across participants. In the temporal domain “early” and “late” components of ERPs
have been extensively studied and recognized in the vast majority of experimental
paradigms, with each “peak” or component named after its lag from the triggering
event, for instance P200 meaning a waveform with a positive deflection near 200 ms.
Three main stages of processing,defined as choice evaluation, response selection
and evaluation of feedback, have been suggested for the analysis of decision making
behavior [34]. A component associated with feedback processing, the third stage, is
called Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN) or Feedback Related Negativity (FRN). This
wave is associated with the activity in the medial frontal cortex and, more specifically,
in the anterior cingulate cortex, at around 250–350 ms post stimulus presentation
[52, 99, 130]. In a risk taking task, FRN was affected by the nature of the outcome
with a weak, if any, effect of the reward magnitude and a stronger effect for losses
[13, 34, 52, 61, 99]. In addition, the FRN was found to be sensitive to unexpected
rewards [130] and affected by probabilities, only for gains not for losses [29]. The
amplitude of FRN and ACC activation were more pronounced upon receiving unfair
low offers in the Ultimatum Game, i.e. the occurrence of outcomes that are not as
good as expected, and this was accentuated for participants with high concern of
fairness [14, 65]. In UG, advantageous unequal offers elicited MFN responses with
larger amplitudes than responses elicited by equal or disadvantageous unequal offers
[103, 129].
At latencies similar to MFN another component characterized by a positive deflec-
tion along the midline, referred to as P300 or P3, showed larger positive deflection
in response to feedback for larger actual and expected outcomes [104, 105]. It is
interesting to notice that larger P300 were also elicited by fair offers in the UG [103].
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Another ERP component associated with the outcome evaluation in decision making
under risk is measured within 500–600 ms from the triggering event. In a blackjack
game N500 was measured following the appearance of the two initial cards, hence
with the option to ask for another card or not. This N500 wave is characterized with
a larger amplitude over the frontal areas for losses compared to gains [99]. Trials
with a high conflict versus trials with a low conflict, that is risky decisions versus
“conservative” responses, elicited also larger negative amplitudes for N500 [133]. In
UG task a late ERP component called the late positive potential (LPP) was observed
at a latency of 450–650 ms [131]. The amplitude of LPP was larger for moderately
unequal offers than for highly unequal offers in an upward social comparison. The
large amplitude of LPP is generally obtained for high reports of affective experience
like emotional compared to neutral pictures [109].
6.5 Methods: Electrophysiological Recordings
Continuous EEG was recorded using 64 scalp Ag/AgCl active electrodes (ActiveTwo
MARK II Biosemi EEG System, BioSemi B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
mounted on a headcap (10/20 layout, NeuroSpec Quick Cap) and referenced to the
linked earlobes. Electrophysiological signals were sampled at 1024 Hz with lower
cutoff at 0.05 Hz and upper cut-off at 200 Hz, 24 bit resolution (DC amplifiers and
software by Biosemi, USA). Electrode impedances were kept below 5 KΩ for all
recordings. Vertical and horizontal ocular movements were also recorded using two
pairs of bipolar electrodes. Event-Related Potentials were analyzed with BrainVision
Analyzer 2.0.4 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). Raw data were preprocessed,
ocular artifacts were corrected using Infomax Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) [80]. Blink, saccade and eyelid artifact components were set to zero, based on
their respective shape and topography [98]. Markers were used off-line to segment
the continuous EEG data into epochs time-locked to events. The epochs were fur-
ther scanned for contamination by muscular or electrode artifacts and the remaining
trials were inspected visually to control for residual minor artifacts. ERP analyses
were performed on the artifact-free trials, band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 30 Hz
(−12 dB/octave). Trials were then corrected to baseline 500 ms prior to event onset
and ERPs were obtained by averaging the EEG signal on an analysis window cor-
responding to time intervals lasting 2000 ms. All free-artifact epochs were kept and
averaged in order to analyze ERPs on AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz and POz electrodes.
At the begin of an experimental session we always recorded two minutes of EEG
with the participants seating quietly with closed eyes and two minutes with open eyes
maintaining their gaze on a central fixation cross on the computer monitor. Partici-
pants were asked to restrain their movements, especially concerning eye movements
and blinks during the entire duration of the recording.
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6.6 STUDY 1: Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game task [58] has been widely used to investigate human “irrational”
behavior against the “rational” model of game theory, but very few studies have
looked at the effect of emotions and personality on players’s economic behavior
[106]. All participants were administered a 60 item personality questionnaire, the
French version of the HEXACO-60 personality questionnaire derived from lexical
studies [2, 76]. In the current study, participants played the UG using a computer
interface while abstract images were displayed in the background of the computer
monitor. We investigated whether the willingness-to-share was affected by specific
personality traits and associated with neurobiological correlates of the decision-
making process, extending our previous study [121].
6.6.1 Participants Task 1
Twenty-eight neurological healthy, right-handed participants (N = 28 of either sex,
age range 18–45, M = 24.6 ± 1.11 yrs.1) volunteered to participate in the study
and played with virtual money. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, none
reported a history of sustained head injury, and all were naive to the Ultimate Game.
They were informed about the UG test at the beginning of the study and provided
written consent for their participation in line with the Declaration of Helsinki [128].
The participants were comfortably seated in a sound- and light-attenuated room,
watched a computer-controlled monitor at a distance of 60 cm, and were instructed
to maintain their gaze on the center of the monitor throughout the experiment. Con-
trasting results were reported on the association of performance with a real payoff
[54] and in this task participants were only motivated by the challenge to get the best
score and contribute to scientific investigation.
6.6.2 Behavioral Task 1
In the original version [58] the Ultimatum Game is an anonymous, single-shot two-
player game, in which a “proposer” offers to share a certain sum of money to a
“responder”. If the responder accepts the proposal, the share is done accordingly, but
if the responder rejects the offer, both players end up with nothing. In the current
implementation of the task (with E-Prime software by Psychology Software Tools,
Inc., Sharpsburg, PA 15215-2821, USA), each participant played the role of proposer
and responder in 3 alternated blocks of 30 trials each. Participants were told to play
the UG trying to maximize their gain as much as possible. Each UG trial involved
1 M± SEM, Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean.
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Fig. 6.2 Illustration of the Ultimatum Game task with the participants acting as responders. Event
(S) indicate the stimulus onset
a take-it-or-leave-it integer split of a virtual sum of 10 Swiss francs. Participants
performed all UG trials while EEG data were recorded.
Each “responder” trial started with the pressure of the spacebar of the computer
keyboard (event at time 0, Fig. 6.2). The proposer is a virtual player, a computer
program implementing a strategy such that offers occurred randomly with an equal
frequency of 14.28 % each for values in the range 3–7 and with an equal frequency
of 7.15 % each for values 1, 2, 8, or 9.
After maintaining the gaze on the central fixation cross for 3,000 ms the mes-
sage “You are offered x . Do you accept ?”, corresponding to event S, appeared
on the center of the monitor. The responder’s decision (event HR, human player
response, Fig. 6.2) was conveyed by pressing the bottom left key (YES), labeled with
a smiled face smiley, of the numerical keypad in case of acceptance and by pressing
the bottom right key (NO), labeled with a frowned face smiley, in case of rejection of
the offer. An additional 1,000 ms interval followed until the message “Please press
the spacebar to continue” appeared on the center of the monitor. By pressing the
spacebar a new responder trial started. All the results presented here are related with
the responder condition (see Fig. 6.2). If the participants asked whether the experi-
menter was playing the opponent party, the experimenter replied that the other party
was a virtual player programmed to play according to observed human strategies.
The overall experiment lasted about 30 min.
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6.6.3 Results Task 1
6.6.3.1 Subjects’ Strategy
In order to investigate the effect of personality traits on responder’s decision-making
in the UG, we calculated all correlations between the personality traits and the par-
ticipant’s gain, the opponent’s gain (i.e., here is the virtual proposer’s gain) and the
average value of the accepted offer. Concerning the correlations between personality
traits, Table 6.1 shows that Honesty and Conscientiousness are positively correlated
(r = 0.413).
About the gains (variables 7, 8, and 9 of Table 6.1), it was not surprising to observe
a negative correlation (r = −0.912) between the (virtual) proposer’s gain and the
average value of the offer accepted by the responder. The higher the value accepted
by the responder the lower the gain made by the proposer. Offers in the ranges of
values 1–3, 4–6, and 7–9 were termed wretched, fair, and prodigal, respectively.
Following a rational decision-maker it appears that it is always convenient to
accept wretched offers rather than rejecting. This was confirmed by observing a
negative correlation (r = −0.560) between the responder’s gain and the average
value of the offer accepted by the responder. The lower the value accepted by the
responder the higher the gain made by the same responder. To explore this further,
we considered the range of the offer as an independent variable and the acceptance
rate as a dependent measure. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed
with N = 28 participants, with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons
[41]. Indeed, the acceptance rate was significantly dependent on the offer range
proposed by the virtual player, F(1.60, 44.91) = 78.62, p < 0.001 (after Huynh-
Feldt correction for violation of sphericity [68], χ2 = 9.82, p < 0.01, ε = 0.80). All
paired comparisons showed significant differences (p < 0.05) between acceptance
rate for prodigal (95.6 ± 2.0%) compared to fair (83.1 ± 3.7% ) and wretched
(31.6 ± 5.8%) offers.
However, an interesting ’irrational’ result was revealed by a high and positive cor-
relation (r = 0.810) between the gains made by the responder and by the proposer.
This indicates a strong tendency towards willingness to share expressed by the respon-
ders. Hence, we investigated further this aspect and studied whether differences in
brain activity could be observed between participants expressing more or less fairness
in their strategy.
6.6.3.2 Event-Related Potentials
The brain activity associated to the response made following the fairness of the
offer was studied by means of the grand averages from central electrode positions
(Fig. 6.3). The limited number of prodigal offers that were rejected did not allow us
to include grand averaged ERPs in this set of results. During the trials characterized
by the acceptance of wretched offers (Fig. 6.3, left panel) we noticed larger positive
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Fig. 6.3 Event related potentials during the Ultimatum Game. Grand-average ERPs at electrode
sites AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz following the acceptance (green lines) or rejection (red lines) of
an offer. Dashed lines refer to the decision following wretched offers (123) and solid lines following
fair offers (456). The arrow at latency near 300 ms refers to the Feedback-Related Negativity (‘FRN’)
and the arrow at latency near 550 ms to the late positive component (‘LPP’)
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deflections at the central sites at latencies corresponding to FRN. It is interesting
that acceptance of fair offers (Fig. 6.3, left panel solid line) and rejection of wretched
offers (Fig. 6.3, right panel dashed line) were characterized by larger late positive
component (LPP).
As mentioned above (Sect. 6.6.3.1, Table 6.1) the personality trait “Conscien-
tiousness” was strongly associated with the participant’s gain. We selected two sub-
groups following their conscientiousness score (10–minimum; 50–maximum) to the
HEXACO questionnaire: highest rated participants (sample size N = 6) with a score
in the range 39–48 and lowest rate participants (N = 6) with a score in the range
16–29. Figure 6.4 shows that for the FRN component the largest differences between
the two groups were observed after rejecting the offer. Notice that here the responses
to all kinds of offers (wretched, fair and prodigal) were pooled together. Lowest rated
conscientiousness participants were characterized by larger negative deflections for
the FRN, in particular in the fronto-central sites (FCz to AFz). In both cases, either
after acceptance or rejection of the offer, the LPP component was larger for the high-
est rated participants. Interestingly, the difference in LPP tended to be located more
posteriorly after response acceptance (Fig. 6.4, left panel) and more frontally after
response rejection (Fig. 6.4, right panel).
6.7 STUDY 2: Investment Game
The Gneezy Potters’ Game is a gambling task developed in order to test whether
gambles could be influenced by the incidence of the outcomes’ presentation [53]. Two
distinct theories, namely the “Myopic Loss Aversion” (MLA [8]) and the “Subjective
Expected Utility” (SEU [107]) have been called to explain this specific decision
making process. The MLA theory relies on the fact that the individuals have the
tendency to be more sensitive to losses than to gains (called Loss Aversion [70]) and
on the methods used by the individuals when they take financial decisions (called
Mental Accounting [115]). According to MLA, individuals would tend to evaluate
each gamble in combination, and hence, bet higher stakes when the incidence of the
outcomes is low. Conversely, according to SEU, individuals would tend to evaluate
each gamble separately, and consequently, outcomes’ incidence would not influence
the amount of stakes.
Gneezy and Potters’ set an experiment where, in the first part, the feedback infor-
mation was given immediately after each trial (named High frequency feedback),
and, in the second part, feedback was presented after a block of several (three) tri-
als (named Low frequency feedback). Throughout the first part of the experiment, a
fixed endowment was given to the subjects at the beginning of each trial, while bets
within the second part were constituted of previous earnings at the time of the first
part. The probability to win the lottery was set to 1/3, while the probability to loose
the investment was 2/3. During the game, participants had the opportunity to adjust
the sum of money they were willing to bet at each trial within the high frequency
condition, whereas choices were unchangeable during the whole block in the low
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Fig. 6.4 Event Related Potentials during the Ultimatum Game. Grand-average ERPs at electrode
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of any kind of offer (wretched, fair and prodigal pooled together). Participants are subdivided in
two groups on the basis of their HEXACO score on conscientiousness (lowest rated—orange and
solid line; highest rated—blue and solid line) The dotted boxes emphasize the waves close to the
main negative component (‘FRN’) and to the late positive component (‘LPP’)
6 Imperfect Decision Making and Risk Taking Are Affected by Personality 163
frequency condition. The original results indicated that gambles were influenced by
the incidence of the outcomes’ presentations [53]; in particular, subjects’ bets were
significantly larger in the trials belonging to the low frequency feedback condition,
thus supporting the MLA theory.
6.7.1 Participants Task 2
Eighty-eight participants (N = 88 young adult subjects of either sex age range 18–
30) were included in this study, as part of the sample of the participants enrolled in
the research project supported the Swiss National Science Foundation grant CR13I1-
138032. The sample included ADHD patients (NADH D = 38) and control subjects
(NCT RL = 50) (Table 6.2). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, none
reported a history of sustained head injury. They were informed about the Investment
Game at the beginning of the study and provided written consent for their participation
in line with the Declaration of Helsinki [128]. The participants were comfortably
seated in a sound- and light-attenuated room, watched a computer-controlled monitor
at a distance of 60 cm, and were instructed to maintain their gaze on the center of the
monitor throughout the experiment.
The pool of ADHD patients (M = 22 ± 0.48 years old) was recruited after an
initial screening appointment to ensure that patients were fulfilling the fourth edition’s
text revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders fourth
edition (DSM-IV-TR) for inattentive, hyperactive/impulsive or mixed subtypes [5].
We excluded ADHD patients with neuropsychiatric disorders such as mood disorder,
bipolar disorder, psychosis, autism or Asperger’s syndrome, antecedent of Tourette’s
syndrome, presence of motor tics, suicidal behavior, chronic medical conditions,
and drug or alcohol abuse. The pool of control participants (M = 22± = 0.42
years old) was recruited through the student database of the University of Lausanne
(Switzerland). Student from Economics and Psychology faculties did not took part in
the experiment. One subject was excluded from the study, due to psychiatric history.
Two weeks before the appointment, all subjects were requested to answer the fol-
lowing online questionnaires: the HEXACO Personality Inventory [76], the Current
Table 6.2 Demographic characteristics of ADHD (left side) and control (right side) participants
ADHD Control
Total participants recruited 38 50
Gender (M/F) 31/7 33/16
Mean age (Y. old ± SEM) 22 (±0.48) 22 (±0.42)
Handedness preference (L/R/both) 5/32/1 2/47/0
Exclusions 0 1
Total included 38 49
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Fig. 6.5 Experimental protocol of the Investment Game. Participants started the task by pressing the
spacebar (S) and then were asked to invest a certain amount of points in a risky project. The decision
making process was not limited in time. Once the investment option selected (I), participants could
modify their choice during 4 s before having the outcome (I + 4s)
Behavior Scale (CBS), developed to examine executive function deficits in adults
with ADHD [12], the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS-S SV ) [30], and
the adult ADHD Self-Report Scale (ASRS) symptom checklist [71]. On the experi-
mental day the participants were welcomed and requested to complete a handedness
inventory [91] and underwent a short structured diagnostic interview for psychiatric
disorders known as Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I) [113].
6.7.2 Behavioral Task 2
The purpose of this study is to investigate risk-taking in the context of the occurrence’s
frequency of the feedback information in an Investment Game that is a modified
version of the Gneezy Potters’ task [53]. Subjects were endowed with 20 points at
the beginning of each trial and were asked to choose the amount of points (out of the
possible choices 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 points) to invest in a risky project. The probability
to win 3 times the amount invested was 1/3, whereas the probability to loose the
entire investment was 2/3. The whole session was composed of 10 games × 4 blocks
× 4 trials, overall 160 trials. Outcomes were presented immediately after half of
the trials (condition “high frequency feedback”, HFFB), while the other half were
presented at the end of each block (condition “low frequency feedback”, LFFB).
Conditions were alternated at each block. The procedure of the Investment Game is
summarized in the Fig. 6.5.
Each trial started with the pressure of the spacebar of the computer keyboard
leading to the forthwith appearance of the investment option screen (event S). The
participants selected an amount to be invested, in accordance to their desire without
any time limit, by pressing a mouse key (event I). After the decision was made, an
additional interval of 4000 ms was provided to the participant to modify the initial
choice. Immediately thereafter the result screen appeared, revealing the end of the
trial. The investment options were characterized by six circles of 1.4 cm diameter,
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with a total length of 11.6 cm. They were aligned next to each other and did not
exceed 5◦ from the left or right of the monitor’s center. Numerical labels were set at
1.8 cm above each option center.
The EEG was recorded throughout the duration of the Investment Game task.
Markers corresponding to the events were inserted in the data files for off-line analy-
sis. Data were segmented using time window from 500 ms prior to marker to 1500 ms
post-marker presentation.
The participants belonging to each group and sample were determined according
to their reaction time. For instance, trials characterized by an interval larger than 4
seconds to select the amount to be invested were discarded and the individuals whose
behavior included a majority of such trials were left for other analyses. In addition,
after rejecting segments with major artifacts, participants with less than 50 % of valid
data segments were excluded from the ERPs analysis.
6.7.3 Results Task 2
6.7.3.1 Risk Taking
The count of times a participant selected a low investment risk (i.e., 0, 4, or 8 points),
termed L I R, and the count of times a participant selected a high investment risk
(i.e., 12, 16, or 20 points), termed H I R, were used to compute an investment risk
index I Ri = H I R−L I RH I R+L I R . Thus, the value of I Ri is centralized within the range [−1
– +1]; an index closer to −1 characterizes a participant with risk averse strategy, an
index closer to +1 characterizes a risk seeking participant, and an index near zero
being associated with a risk neutral attitude. Each individual was defined on a scatter
plot with I Ri calculated for (HFFB) trials on the abscissa and I Ri for (LFFB) trials
on the ordinate (Fig. 6.6). The distribution of I Ri was rather flat for the pool of
control participants with negative values of kurtosis (−0.81 and −0.95 for HFFB
and LFFB conditions, respectively; Fig. 6.6a). On the opposite, the pool of ADHD
patients showed a tendency to higher degree of peakedness with positive values of
kurtosis (0.23 and 0.09 for HFFB and LFFB conditions, respectively; Fig. 6.6b). We
can interpret this result as a clear tendency of ADHD patients to seek an investment
strategy with neutral risk, neither too low neither too high.
In the same figure it is possible to evaluate the tendency of the participants to
keep the same strategy with and without the feedback. A striking result allows to
differentiate the control group and the pool of ADHD patients. If a participant keeps
the same strategy, then the corresponding dot in the scatterplot would be lying along
the diagonal line with unity slope. In the control group we observed 6/49 (12 %)
participants who expressed a modified strategy assessed by a change in the I Ri of
more than 2 times the standard error of the mean (SEM) (Fig. 6.6a). Conversely, in
the ADHD group we observed more than the double of participants (11/38, 29 %)
characterized by a change in the I Ri of more than 2 SEM between HFFB and LFFB
conditions (Fig. 6.6b).
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Fig. 6.6 Scatter plot of the
investment risk index I Ri
during ‘high frequency
feedback’ (HFFB) and ‘low
frequency feedback’ (LFFB)
conditions for control
(panel a) and ADHD
(panel b) participants. Each
dot represents the data from
one participant. Dashed lines
represent the 95 %
confidence interval.
Histograms represents the
marginal relative
distributions of risk index
I Ri for each condition and
group of participants
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Linear regressions of the scatter plots in Fig. 6.6 allow to further assess the risky
behaviors of the two groups of individuals in the high and low feedback conditions.
With no change in strategy between the two conditions the slope of the regression
would be equal to 1, thus indicating that participants did not take more risk in a
condition rather than in the other. A regression line with a slope greater than 1
would mean that the participants of a group would consistently tend to take more
risk in the LFFB condition compared to the HFFB trials. On the opposite, a slope
less than 1 would characterize a group whose individuals would take more risk in
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Fig. 6.7 Event related potentials during the Investment Game. Grand average at Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz,
Pz and POz sites for all participants and all conditions pooled together. Left side: ERPs triggered
by event S corresponding to the self-paced start of trial. Right side: ERPs triggered by event I
corresponding to the choice of the investment amount
the HFFB condition. The regression equations for the two groups of participants
were y = −0.005 + 1.039x and y = 0.045 + 0.813x for controls and ADHD
patients, respectively (with x standing for I RiH F F B and y for I RiL F F B). We tested
the difference between the two slopes after bootstrapping 1000 times with the null
hypothesis that the slopes were the same. The difference was significant (t(1998) =
2.2156, p < 0.05), thus suggesting that ADHD tended to show higher risk taking
attitude during the HFFB trials.
6.7.3.2 Evoked Potentials
The brain activity associated to the risk taking behavior during the Investment Game is
illustrated by the grand averages of the event related potentials from central electrode
positions (Fig. 6.7). The trigger events were the self-paced start of trial (event S), when
the participant pressed the spacebar, and the investment selection (event I, Fig. 6.5).
Self-paced Trial Onset
The decision to start a trial is clearly associated to a negative wave (here labeled
“M”) in the fronto-central sites beginning to appear 150–200 ms before pressing the
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spacebar (Fig. 6.7, left side). The trial onset S triggered also a negative deflection
N200 spreading from frontal to occipital sites. Then, a mental activity related to the
build-up of risk taking decision making appeared with main parieto-central distrib-
ution and expressed by a large positive deflection (P300) immediately followed by
the contingent negative variation.
In order to assess the time course of the feedback frequency effect we calculated
at first for each participant the ERPs for HFFB and LFFB trials separately. Hence,
we calculated the feedback-related differential activities (in microvolts) for controls
(subset of n = 9 participants, Fig. 6.8a blue lines) and ADHD participants (subset
of n = 14 participants, Fig. 6.8a red lines) (see Sect. 6.7.2 for details on included
participants) computed by subtracting the ERP associated with HFFB from the ERP
associated with LFFB.
Differences between controls and ADHD participants were detected in time and
space by computing the absolute value of the difference between the feedback-
related differential brain waves for controls and ADHD participants. In Fig. 6.8b,
these absolute differences are plotted for three intervals corresponding to the most
significant differences (i.e., intervals characterized by the largest separations between
the red and blue shaded areas). The first event occurred near 350 ms before the trigger
onset. The absolute differential value was small and no specific distribution along
the midline was observed. On the opposite, at lags near 1190 and 1450 ms after
the trigger onset we observed a difference between the groups located mainly in the
frontal areas. These latencies correspond to the contingent negative variation (CNV).
For the ADHD patients the red curves were overlapping the zero line at CNV lag
(after 1000 ms), thus indicating no feedback-related difference (Fig. 6.8b). For the
controls, the feedback-related differential activities (blue lines) were significantly
(p < 0.05) above the zero line, thus indicating that CNV for low frequency feedback
was characterized by greater amplitude than CNV for high frequency feedback, at
most at the level of the frontal sites.
Investment Choice
The investment choice (I) triggered a positive deflection near 250 ms (Fig. 6.7, right
side), termed P250, that was larger in the frontal sites and propagated to the pos-
terior regions. In the same way we have previously analyzed the activity after the
self-paced trial onset, we assessed here the time course of the feedback frequency
effect for HFFB and LFFB trials separately for each participant and calculated the
grand averages of the differences for a subset of participants (sample si ze N = 12
and N = 15 for controls and ADHD, respectively, see Sect. 6.7.2 for details on
included participants). Figure 6.9a shows feedback-related differential activities (in
microvolts) for controls (blue lines) and ADHD participants (red lines) computed
by subtracting the ERP associated with “high frequency feedback” (HFFB) from
the ERP associated with “low frequency feedback” (LFFB). Time intervals of the
most significant differences (i.e., intervals characterized by the largest separations
between the red and blue shaded areas) were detected near 240 ms before the invest-
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Fig. 6.8 Investment Game: brain activity triggered by self-paced trial onset (event S, Fig. 6.5).
a Feedback-related differential activities showing the effects of feedback frequency for controls
(blue lines) and ADHD participants (red lines). These feedback-related differential activities were
computed by subtracting the ERP associated with ‘high frequency feedback’ (HFFB) from the ERP
associated with ‘low frequency feedback’ (LFFB). The confidence interval (mean curve ±SEM)
of the difference between the two conditions is shown for each differential activity by the shaded
areas. b The absolute value of the difference between the feedback-related differential curves for
controls and ADHD participants is presented as colour curves for electrodes Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz
and POz at three time intervals, represented by the ticks along the time axis (Lag)
ment choice and 20 and 520 ms after the trigger (Fig. 6.9b). It is interesting to notice
that the location of the differences between the two groups of participants tended to
be located at the frontal sites for the first two intervals and at the parieto-central sites
for the interval near 520 ms after the investment choice.
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Fig. 6.9 Investment Game: brain activity triggered by the investment choice (event I, Fig. 6.5).
a Feedback-related differential activities showing the effects of feedback frequency for controls
(blue lines) and ADHD participants (red lines). These feedback-related differential activities were
computed by subtracting the ERP associated with ‘high frequency feedback’ (HFFB) from the ERP
associated with ‘low frequency feedback’ (LFFB). The confidence interval (mean curve ±SEM)
of the difference between the two conditions is shown for each differential activity by the shaded
areas. b The absolute value of the difference between the feedback-related differential curves for
controls and ADHD participants is presented as colour curves for electrodes Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz
and POz at three time intervals, represented by the ticks along the time axis (Lag)
Latencies and Personality
We analyzed the distributions of the scores for the the dimensions and sub-dimensions
of the personality traits determined by the HEXACO-Personality Inventory. In the
results presented in this chapter, we subdivided the groups of participants according
to lower (below 31) and higher (above 31) score to Conscientiousness and Agreeable-
ness dimensions and to lower (below 10) and higher (above 10) score to Sincerity, a
sub-dimension of Honesty-Humility dimension. In order to determine whether brain
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activity during the Investment Game was associated with the selected personality
traits determined by the HEXACO-Personality Inventory, we focused our analysis
on the latencies of the peaks of two important ERP components observed during
this task, to wit, N200 after the self-paced trial onset (Table 6.3) and P250 after the
investment choice (Table 6.4).
We observed that in the ADHD group the frequency of feedback information
affected overall the N200 peak latency across all sites (180 and 172 ms for HFFB
and LFFB trials, respectively; the difference is significant p < 0.05), without any
specific association with a personality trait considered here. It is interesting that
during the HFFB condition the control participants with a high Conscientiousness
score were characterized by a significantly shorter latency (approximately 30 ms,
p < 0.05) of the N200 peak (Table 6.3). According to the Sincerity trait we observed
at parietal sites that control participants with low scores were characterized by shorter
N200 latencies (approximately 16 ms longer, p < 0.05), irrespective of the feedback
frequency. On the opposite, for ADHD participants, only during HFFB and only at
fronto-central sites, N200 peaked earlier for participants with higher scores. We did
not observe any relevant change of N200 peak latency with respect to Agreeableness.
The analysis of P250, occurring after the investment choice (Table 6.4), for the
ADHD group showed that the latency of the peak occurred 7 ms on average earlier in
the LFFB than in the HFFB (248 ms versus 255 ms, p < 0.05). This difference was
measured by pooling together all recording sites. Moreover, this analysis revealed
some interesting effect of the ADHD participants personality traits. In the ADHD
group the individuals exhibiting higher scores in Agreeableness showed a shorter
P250 latency along all midline recording sites (approximately 18 ms faster, p < 0.01)
in the low frequency feedback condition (Table 6.4). During high frequency feedback,
the difference in latencies for the ADHD participants was limited to posterior sites
POz and Pz. On the opposite, high scored Conscientiousness ADHD participants
tended to show a shorter P250 latency only at fronto-central sites (approximately
9 ms faster, p < 0.05), irrespective of the feedback frequency. No effect of Sincerity
was observed in the ADHD group.
In the control group, the latency of P250 was about the same (251 ms, on aver-
age) during both LFFB and HFFB conditions. Hence, it was very interesting to
observe a major effect of the personality traits. High scored Conscientiousness control
participants showed a P250 latency shorter by 22 ms (p < 0.01) compared to
low scored Conscientiousness, irrespective of the feedback frequency. The effect
of Agreeableness on controls was even larger, P250 latency was 25 ms shorter
(p < 0.01) in low versus high scored Agreeableness participants, evenly distributed
along the midline recording sites. The effect of Sincerity was similar to Agreeable-
ness with P250 latency shorter in low scored participants, by 14 and 9 ms during low
and high frequency feedback, respectively.
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6.8 Discussion
Study 1
In Study 1 we demonstrated the association of fairness and personality traits with
specific components of the ERPs in the UG task. The behavioral results showed
that Conscientiousness was the personality trait most related to the responder’s gain
(Table 6.1). Moreover, responders were more likely to accept an unfair offer when
they were conscientious. The electrophysiological results showed larger FRN and
smaller LPP components when the responders rejected fair versus wretched offers.
In the accepting condition the LPP (especially in the posterior electrodes) showed
different trends for participants characterized by lower versus higher score of Con-
scientiousness. This difference was bigger when the responders rejected the offer.
Behavioral results were in line with recent UG studies where both fairness [64,
119, 131] and emotional statement [21] strongly affected the acceptance rate of UG
responders. In our previous study we found that offers made by proposers in the UG
tended to fair split rather than unequal amount, with positive emotions predicting
higher acceptance rate, and negative emotions higher amount of money offered [46].
Responders were more likely to accept an unfair offer when they were introverted,
conscientious, and honest.
Integrity of the ventromedial prefrontal area was reported to be associated with
the perception of fairness in the UG [111]. Patients with damages of this area were
much more likely to reject unfair offers if the proposer could have made fair offers.
Unfair offers in the UG evoked more negative emotional ratings and elicited larger
FRN than fair offers [64].
The expectation of the value received by a responder plays an important role in
the activity of frontal areas, as revealed by smaller amplitudes of FRN components
when an outcome was better than expected and larger FRN amplitude when the
outcome was worse than expected [66]. The increase of high feedback outcome
volatility was associated with FRN [13], thus supporting the hypothesis that the FRN
complex might be associated with the presence of contrasting cognitive responses
and emotional motivations following changes in the outcome rule [15, 69, 134].
The FRN was suggested to reflect the impact of the midbrain dopaminergic signals
on the ACC [65, 86]. The phasic decrease in dopamine input, elicited by negative
prediction errors, would give rise to an increased ACC activity, associated with larger
FRN amplitude. On the opposite, the phasic increase in dopamine signals, elicited
by positive prediction errors, would decrease ACC activity, thus showing a smaller
FRN amplitude. The relation of dopamine to personality traits [39] and the positive
reward signal generated by the dopaminergic system contrasting the unfairness of
the offers in the UG [21] support the hypothesis that dopamine plays a key role in
modulating the decision making circuit.
Study 2
In the original version of the Gneezy Potters’ task [53] the participants had to choose
in advance the amount to invest for a set of three consecutive trials in the low fre-
quency feedback condition only. In the Investment Game used in our study, the
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participants were given at each trial the possibility to select the amount to gamble
regardless of the condition. In the original study, the frequency of feedback presen-
tation had an impact on the amount invested, that is, the participants gambled larger
amounts when the outcomes were presented less frequently, compared to blocks
when the outcomes were shown at the end of each trial, in accordance with the
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) [8]. In the present study, the behavioral results show
that control participants exhibited a broad range of strategies, from poor to high risk
taking, but their strategy tended to be unaffected by the feedback frequency of the
outcome. These results suggest that control participants were more likely to evaluate
each trial separately in agreement with the Subjective Utility Theory (SEU) [107].
Therefore, the results of the original task have not been replicated in the present
study. However, the modification of the experimental manipulations may explain the
difference between the original and the current studies; the discount of an endowment
at the beginning of each trial in both conditions is likely to have left unaffected the
participants’ risk perception in our Investment Game.
Individuals suffering from ADHD generally exhibit hyperactivity, inattention and
impulsivity since their childhood and are associated with cognitive impairments in
inhibitory control and executive function, problems in social interaction, increased
risk of depression and substance abuse. Medications used to treat ADHD suggest
that a deficit in dopamine and norepinephrine regulation may constitute the primary
neurochemical basis leading to ADHD symptoms, with anomalous interaction of
the dopaminergic and serotoninergic neuronal systems [89, 112]. Despite signifi-
cantly differing from controls in group comparisons, ADHD individuals also show
considerable inter- and intra-individual variability [102]. The majority of the partici-
pants belonging to the ADHD group were characterized by a risk index close to zero
inour Investment Game, thus suggesting a behavior generally oriented towards risk
neutral attitude. The ADHD participants showed a tendency to take more risk dur-
ing the high frequency feedback condition, somehow the opposite strategy observed
during the original Gneezy Potters’ task [53]. The attentional deficits combined to
impulsivity in ADHD participant are factors likely to limit inferences in the low
frequency feedback condition (LFFB). This may have encouraged them to express
a greater risk-taking behavior in the condition where the feedback was immediately
displayed, thus allowing them to adjust their investment in order to maximize their
earnings.
N200 is a negative component that has been observed to peak between 180 and
325 ms after stimulus onset [93] in several tasks, such as Oddball, Stroop, Go No-Go
and Flanker tasks [49]. Specific subcomponents of N200 have been associated with
changes in the frequency of stimulus presentation and to the difference of target and
non target items [49, 51]. In our Investment Game task N200 was triggered by the
self-paced start of trial (event S). At the end of the game, the participants reported to
decide the sum to invest just before clicking on the spacebar that starts the actual trial.
Hence, the presentation of the amount to gamble (one among six possibilities) appears
as a target amount surrounded by flankers, a condition well known to evoke N200.
The latency of this component was generally shorter for ADHD participants during
LFFB, compared to HFFB and to controls. It is interesting to notice that shorter N200
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latencies were also observed in the control group but only for high Conscientiousness
participants (in both frequency feedback conditions, although the effect was stronger
in HFFB than LFFB). In the control group and during LFFB condition, we observed
larger amplitudes for the contingent negative variations mainly at the level of the
frontal sites.
The time when the participants selected the amount they wanted to gamble in the
risky project (event I, the investment choice) triggered mainly a positive component
P250 followed by a negative wave N500 in the ERPs. The P250 could be interpreted
in terms of a P300-like, with an apparent maximum over frontal and fronto-central
areas associated with the evaluation of the decision which has been taken.
The P300 component in decision making tasks is a positive deflection peaking near
300 ms after the trigger onset in relation with the response of the outcome after taking
a decision [85, 100]. This wave is likely to be generated by the cognitive processing
following the feeling of “dissonance”, i.e. the possibility of being wrong after taking
a decision [17]. It is interesting the fact that up to P250 the differences between
ADHD and controls in feedback-related differential waves were located at fronto-
central sites. In Study 2, larger differences in feedback-related differentials between
the groups appeared at parieto-occipital sites for the N500. This ERP component was
larger over the frontal areas but feedback-related effects were more relevant along
the posterior sites of the midline. N500 is associated with the outcome evaluation in
decision making under risk [99, 133] and the fact that differences appeared between
the two groups for this wave support the hypothesis that ADHD participants processed
the outcome of a risky investment following circuits and dynamics that are different
from controls.
Personality
It is known that risky decision making is associated with personality traits [125,
126] and that dopamine and serotonin are essential modulators of the expression of
personality traits and decision making brain circuits [23, 39]. In the present chapter
we analyzed all main personality traits determined by the HEXACO dimensions
[1, 2, 76, 126] for the Ultimatum Game. For the Investment Game we limited our
analysis to personality traits identified on the basis of a non unimodal distribution
among the control and ADHD participants, to wit, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness
and Sincerity. For each personality trait we subdivided the participants to Study 2 in
two subgroups, those with lower and those with higher score. Hence, the discussion
is limited here to these three personality traits.
Conscientiousness has been defined by four facets, organization, diligence, per-
fectionism and prudence [76]. A structural MRI study found that Conscientiousness
was associated with greater volume of the middle frontal gyrus in lateral prefrontal
cortex, a region involved in planning and in voluntary control of behavior [40] and
may reflect the function of the dorsal premotor cortex in executive function [75]. Con-
scientiousness was positively associated with the responder’s gain in the Ultimatum
Game. After rejecting the offer the participants with the lowest score of Conscien-
tiousness were characterized by larger negative deflections for the FRN, in particular
in the fronto-central sites. This result appears in agreement with the hypothesis that
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the FRN complex might be associated with the presence of contrasting cognitive
responses and emotional motivations following changes in the outcome rule [15, 69,
134]. In the UG, after either acceptance or rejection of the offer, the participants
with the highest score of Conscientiousness exhibited larger LPP component, ut the
difference in LPP tended to be located more posteriorly after response acceptance.
This late positive potential is an ERP component reflecting facilitated attention to
emotional stimuli. In adults, the LPP is reduced following use of cognitive emo-
tion regulation strategies such as reappraisal [37]. After presenting pleasant pictures
fMRI studies [79] revealed that the LPP amplitude was correlated with the activa-
tion of the medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and precuneus (Fig. 6.1), whereas
for unpleasant pictures the LPP amplitude was correlated with the activation of the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, insula, and posterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 6.1).
Control participants with a high score of Conscientiousness were characterized by
shorter N200 latency in our Investment Game. The lateral prefrontal cortex is likely
to be associated with behavioral inhibition, which can suggest that individuals with a
high score are likely to inhibit response to flankers faster than low score individuals.
The effect of Conscientiousness on the latency of P250 was visible mainly in the
control group and, to a lesser extent, only at fronto-central sites for the ADHD
participants. The amplitude of P250 is likely to be larger over frontal and fronto-
central areas associated with the evaluation of the decision which has been taken.
P250 peaked earlier for individuals with higher score than in the low score subgroup.
A possible interpretation is that individuals with high levels of Conscientiousness
reach the evaluation of their decision prior to the least conscientious subjects. In
control groups this processing appears to involve also posterior regions that are
likely to be less activated in the ADHD.
Agreeableness has been defined by four facets, forgiveness, gentleness, flexibility
and patience [76] and its social and emotional aspect can reflect the fact that individu-
als react to their own choice. Agreeableness has been linked to interpersonal conflict
[57] and to susceptibility to framing [124]. The volume of brain regions involved in
social interaction, including superior temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex, and
fusiform gyrus were associated with Agreeableness [40]. In a fMRI study Agreeable-
ness predicted the activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex associated with
emotion regulation [60]. In our Investment Game, P250 peaked earlier for controls
with lower score of Agreeableness, but with ADHD participants P250 peaked earlier
in higher ranked individuals. These results lead us to suggest that the difference
between the subgroups is that controls and ADHD individuals use different circuits
to implement emotion regulation and evaluate interpersonal conflicts in a different
way.
Sincerity is one of the Honesty-Humility’s facet within the HEXACO and has been
associated to ethical and to the health and safety domains [126]. In control participants
performing our Investment Game, N200 peaked earlier for individuals with lower
scores of Sincerity only at the parietal sites. In the Investment Game the amount to
gamble appears as a target amount surrounded by flankers. In ADHD participants,
N200 tended to peak earlier for individuals with higher scores of Sincerity only at
the fronto-central sites and only during high frequency feedback. This latter finding,
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along the same line of interpretation of N200 mentioned above, suggests that in these
ADHD participants, the activity of the lateral prefrontal cortex was likely to inhibit
the responses to flankers. The data regarding P250 show that the effect of Sincerity
was similar to Agreeableness with P250 peaking earlier in low scored participants.
Sincerity is related to the ethical risk taking and the interpretation could be that less
sincere individuals reach the evaluation of their decision prior to the most sincere.
Hence, the P300-like wave could represent a good marker sensitive to the ethical
aspect of gambling.
6.9 General Conclusions
The aim of the present chapter was to highlight how the determinants of personal-
ity, assessed by the HEXACO (see Sect. 6.2) personality inventory, interacted with
decision making, especially, with regard to fairness and risk taking. In this respect,
we conducted 2 separate studies in which EEG signals were recorded while par-
ticipants were performing either an Ultimatum Game or an Investment Game. In
the Ultimatum Game, event-related potentials (ERPs) analysis revealed a greater
feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitude after the rejection of the offer among
responders with lower score of Conscientiousness, whereas highly conscientious
responders showed a larger late positive component (LPP) regardless their decision
to reject or accept the offer. Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Sincerity were
associated with risky decision making. Indeed, latencies of the negative wave occur-
ring at around 200 ms (N200) and of the positive deflection peaking at around 250 ms
(P250) components dependent on how individuals process responses to a selected
gamble and evaluate the outcome in the Investment task, in association with specific
personality subgroups to which they belonged. In particular, N200 peaked earlier in
individuals with high levels of conscientiousness, controls with low score of sincer-
ity and highly sincere patients with attention deficit/hyperactive disorder (ADHD).
Furthermore, P250 peaked earlier in highly conscientious individuals, controls with
low levels of agreeableness and ADHD patients with high levels of agreeableness,
and likewise for sincerity. These results clearly show that imperfect decision making
and risk taking are affected by personality traits and can not be accounted by models
based on rational computations.
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Abstract
BACKGROUND:. Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterized by deficits of exec-
utive functions and decision making during childhood and adolescence. Contradictory results exist
whether altered event-related potentials (ERPs) in adults are associated with the tendency of ADHD
patients towards risky behavior.
METHODS:. Clinically diagnosed ADHD patients (n = 18) and healthy controls (n = 18), aged less
than 30 years, were screened with the Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating Scales and assessed by the Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview, adult ADHD Self-Report Scale, and by the 60-item HEXACO
Personality Inventory. All participants performed a probability gambling task (PGT) with two frequencies
of the feedback information of the outcome. For each trial ERPs were triggered by the self-paced trial
start and by the gamble selection.
RESULTS:. ADHD patients tended to express impulsiveness associated with lower values of the agree-
ableness personality dimension. The latency of the first N2-P3a ERP component, associated with the
attentional load, was shorter in the ADHD group. In the ADHD, a N500 component after trial start re-
lated to the feedback frequency condition suggested a large affective stake of the decision making and
a N400-like component after gamble selection suggested an emphasized postdecisional evaluation of
the choice made. ERP markers showed the build-up of a frontoparietal activity related to the emotional
percept accompanying the motor response.
CONCLUSIONS:. Our results indicate that in young adult ADHD patients ERP analyses provide a more
sensitive tool than classical behavioral markers to assess the neural dynamics involved in decision
making processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision making is the most essential phase in volitional act, that follows problem analysis, de-
liberation and evokes execution. The operations involved in the cognitive control of this process must
necessarily require the ability to evaluate external demands and internal goals, to perform a value-based
action selection among several alternatives depending on the perceived or estimated costs and benefits5
of each choice translated into an expected reward to the final choice (1, 2). These cognitive abilities
are generally referred to as executive functions (3). The integrity of a monitoring system capable, on
the short-term, to compare the actual and expected outcomes and, on the long-term, to build-up and
maintain the repertoire of response alternatives is necessary to achieve a correct decision making pro-
cess (4). Behavioral determinants such as vigilance, motivation and emotions exert a powerful influence10
on the overall cognitive framework of decision making (5, 6). Impaired decision making is among the
characteristic symptoms of patients affected by Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). This
behavioral disorder of childhood and adolescence is characterized by primary deficits of executive func-
tions and clinical symptoms including excessive inattention, hyperactivity and impulsiveness that persist
into adulthood in a vast proportion of the diagnosed adolescents (7–11). Adult ADHD patients tend to15
shift their actions towards oppositional conducts affecting their social lives (12–14) including alcohol or
drugs abuse (15, 16). Their difficulties in making decisions lead ADHD patients to choose riskier op-
tions with unfavorable outcomes in economic and financial settings (14, 17, 18). In addition to cognitive
impairments these patients exhibit affective and motivational deficits with an independent effect on their
social problems (19, 20). ADHD patients were characterized by specific personality traits based on the20
‘Big Five’ model (BF) with lower scores on conscientiousness, emotionality and agreeableness (21, 22).
Failure to learn from emotionally negative feedback is one of the characteristics of impulsive individuals,
thus leading to choices in favor of immediate gains and problem gambling in ADHD adults (23, 24).
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are transient electric signals obtained as averaged brain activity
triggered in time by a repeating physical or mental stimulus (25). Controversial results were reported for25
ERP differences between healthy individuals and ADHD patients, partly due to differences in protocols
and to patients’ selection with respect to comorbid disorders (26–28). Despite these differences in the
experimental studies, early sensory processing is likely to be altered in ADHD patients, as suggested
by reduced P1 and N2 and enhanced P2 components evoked by non-target stimuli, accompanied by
changes in response inhibition associated with altered N2-P3 components (27, 29–32).30
The aim of the current study is to investigate which are the behavioral and neural correlates of
decision making in young adults affected by ADHD during completion of a Probabilistic Gambling Task
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(PGT). For this purpose, we recorded behavioral and ERP data with a strict control of the age-range
and clinical and personality assessment of the participants. We used a modified version of the Gneezy-
Potters’ task (33) with a manipulation of the feedback information frequency aiming at assessing the35
ERP components associated with the anticipatory processing of the target stimulus, attentional priming,
cognitive workload, and response selection.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants’ demography and assessment
Ninetysix clinically referred young adult ADHD patients were recruited either in the Psychiatric De-40
partment of the University Hospital of Lausanne or at a psychiatrist’s practice in collaboration with the
University Hospital after an initial screening appointment to ensure that they were fulfilling the criteria
defined by the DSM-IV-TR for inattentive, hyperactive/impulsive or mixed subtypes (34). Subjects with
presence of motor tics, suicidal behavior, chronic medical conditions, and drug or alcohol abuse or co-
morbidity of psychiatric disorders, i.e. acute mood/anxious disorder, bipolar disorder, psychosis, autism45
or Asperger’s syndrome, antecedent of Tourette’s syndrome, were excluded from this study. Subjects
taking psychostimulants were required to stop medication 24 hours prior to testing. All subjects taking
any other psychotropic agents such as anti-depressants, mood stabilizers, non-stimulant medications
for ADHD, or dopamine receptor-blocking agents were also excluded from this study. Control subjects
were screened prior to the experimental session to ensure that they would not report any neuropsychi-50
atric disorders or any other exclusion criteria and none were taking any psychoactive medications.
Two weeks prior the experimental session, all participants were requested to fill the Conners’ Adult
ADHD Rating Scales-Self Report (Screening Version, CAARS-S:SV) (35) and the adult ADHD Self-
Report Scale (ASRS) (36). The CAARS-S:SV include the ADHD Index, referred to as CAARS in the text,
the DSM-IV Inattentive Symptoms Subscale (CAARS-A), the DSM-IV Hyperactive-Impulsive Symptoms55
Subscale (CAARS-B) and the DSM-IV Total ADHD Symptoms Subscale (CAARS-C). CAARS was used
because of its robust psychometric statistics and content validity in comparison to other scales (37). A
normalized T -score of CAARS> 60 for the ADHD group and a T -score of CAARS< 56 for the control
group were set as inclusion criteria. All participants completed the 60-item HEXACO Personality Inven-
tory (38). On the day of the experimental session, the participants were welcomed, then requested to60
complete the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) (39) and underwent the Mini-International Neu-
ropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (40) under the supervision of a trained clinical psychologist. Table 1
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shows the main descriptive statistics of patients’ demographics and behavioral assessment. Further
information on statistical analyses is provided in Supplement 1.
Probabilistic Gambling Task and Behavior65
In the Probabilistic Gambling Task (PGT), each participant was endowed with an amount of 20 points
at the beginning of each trial. The participants had to select the amount of points (among the values
of 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 points) to gamble in a trial (as illustrated by Figure 1). Two events, trial start (S)
and gambling choice (I), delimited a time interval, the termination of which corresponds to a voluntary
action, i.e. the choice of a selected amount to gamble. The outcome of the gambling was either to70
win four times the selected value, with a probability Pwin = 1/3, or to loose the entire amount with a
probability Ploose = 2/3 with a uniformly distributed probability (e.g., if the participant selected 8 points,
the outcome would be 12 = (20   8) in case of loss, or 44 = (20   8) + (8 ⇥ 4) in case of win). For
each trial in the “high frequency feedback” condition (HF ) the participant was informed, 4 seconds after
the choice, about the amount of points held after gambling. In the “low frequency feedback” condition75
(LF ) the participant was just informed that the outcome of the gambling was determined. Participants’
performance was assessed by the total gains earned after the end of playing the whole task (TotG),
by a risk index (RI) and by reaction times (RT ). Detailed information on the behavioral task and risk
indexes is provided in Supplement 1.
EEG recording and analyses80
Upon completion of the MINI all participants included in the study were guided to a sound and
light-attenuated room for the preparation of the EEG recordings. Detailed information is provided in
Supplement 1.
RESULTS
Personality traits and behavioral performance85
HEXACO scores within each dimension of personality were determined for each subject and robust
correlations were computed for each group (Supplemental Table S1). The robust mixed effects model
with one factor within-subject (personality : H, E, X, A, C, O) and one factor between-subject (groups:
controls and ADHD) revealed a significant interaction between the factors for openness (t(34) = 5.96,
p< .001, r = .71), conscientiousness (t(34) = 3.89, p< .001, r = .55), extraversion (t(34) = 3.27, p< .01,90
r = .49) and emotionality (t(34) = 2.10, p< .05, r = .34). The agreeableness factor in the ADHD was
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lower than in controls (Table 1) and was correlated with higher risk indexes irrespective of the feedback
frequency of the outcome (Supplemental Table S2). We observed also significant lower scores in ADHD
for conscientiousness and extraversion (Table 1).
The amount of points gained by the ADHD participants at the end of PGT was not different from95
controls (Table 2), but CAARS was positively correlated in ADHD, and negatively correlated in controls,
with the cumulated amount of points gained during both conditions (Figure 2). In particular, in ADHD
the risk index was positively correlated with CAARS-B, the hyperactive-impulsive symptoms subscale
(Supplemental Table S2). The participants of either group tended to keep the same risk-taking attitude
in both feedback conditions (Supplemental Figure S1). The ADHD group was characterized by faster100
reaction times during LF than during HF (Table 2) and reaction times of ADHD tended to be generally
slower than controls. Further results are presented in the Supplement S1.
Event Related Potentials
Four ADHD patients were discarded from the electrophysiological analyses because of excessive
movements artifacts. The build-up of a premotor related brain activity (M) appeared about 150 ms105
before pressing the spacebar (the trigger event S), with largest amplitude on FCz and Cz electrode sites
(Figure 3). An early visual event-related component C1, reflecting the initial response of the primary
visual cortex, peaked near 70 ms after event S on POz and Pz. Both S and I triggering events evoked a
negative-positive complex of peaks (N2-P3a) at approximately 175 and 250 ms. Immediately following
P3a there was a second positive component (P3b), usually associated with a cognitive workload, at a110
latency near 340 ms. During the time interval between the events S and I a slow negative deflection
(CNV, contingent negative variation) was evoked after P3b. The CNV component is usually elicited by
situations in which two events delimit a time interval, the termination of which reflects preparation for a
voluntary action.
After the trial start, the latencies of P3a at frontocentral locations (Fz, FCz and Cz pooled together)115
during the LF condition were shorter in the ADHD group than in controls (Table 3). A significant effect of
frequency feedback on P3a latency was observed in both groups at frontocentral and at centroparietal
locations as well, thus suggesting that this ERP component is generated by a neural circuit associ-
ated with processing the frequency feedback outcome. In the ADHD group exclusively we observed
a between condition effect at centroparietal sites for N2 and at frontocentral sites for P3b components120
(Table 3). These results show that the neural activity in the ADHD is affected by the frequency feedback
condition of the protocol since the trial start (S), when the participant elaborates the gambling strategy.
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No within groups effect of the frequency feedback outcome was observed after the gambling choice
for N2 and P3a in either group (Table 3). After pooling together the latencies from all six midline sites and
for both HF and LF conditions, the latencies of N2 (U =22557, 2p< .001, r = .21) and P3a (U =20624,125
2p< .05, r = .12) were larger in the ADHD compared to controls. After the gambling choice, P3b la-
tencies were shorter in ADHD (after pooling all electrodes and both conditions: U =14374, 2p< .001,
r = .18), in particular during the HF condition (Table 3). Further analyses are in the Supplement S1
and supplemental Table S3 reports the latencies for the N2, P3a and P3b peaks pooled across the two
feedback conditions.130
Differential waveform analysis
For each participant we calculated separately the ERPs for HF and LF trials. The feedback related
differential ERPs were obtained by subtracting the ERP recorded during LF from the ERP recorded
during HF condition, as illustrated by the dark grey lines in Figure 4. In order to assess the group
factor we compared the feedback related differential ERPs for controls and ADHD participants triggered135
by the trial start (Figure 5) and by the gambling choice (Figure 6). After the trial start, the differences
between groups appeared for an interval centered at a latency of 80 ms lasting 45 ms, corresponding
to the C1 wave, and for an interval centered on 260 ms lasting 120 ms, corresponding to the N2-
P3 complex (Figure 5A). For such N2-P3 component we observed that controls were characterized
by greater amplitude of N2 wave in LF versus HF, whereas the opposite effect occurred in ADHD140
participants. Notice that the difference between ADHD and controls became increasingly significant
towards the frontal locations, peaking at site Fz (Figure 5B, red relative density curve). A third significant
feedback related differential interval was observed at a latency of 500 ms lasting 70 ms following a
spatial pattern similar to N2-P3 (Figure 5B, orange curve).
Further significant between groups difference in feedback frequency related activities appeared cen-145
tered at 440 ms before making the gambling choice (trigger I) along the frontocentral sites (Figure 6B,
yellow curve). In ADHD this component was characterized by greater amplitude of ERP during HF
trials, likely to be associated with the motivation and selection of a risky goal-directed behavior. The
differences between groups in movement initiation, towards the button associated with the selected
gamble, was revealed in the ADHD by larger feedback frequency related activity at the parietal site150
Pz approximately 140 ms before the gambling choice (Figure 6B, brown curve). The differential wave-
form analysis showed two more intervals characterized by a sharp frontocentral scalp distribution and
by greater amplitudes during the LF condition in the ADHD group (Figure 6B, cyan and blue curves).
These components occurred at latencies centered on 490 ms and 850 ms after event I and lasted
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270 ms and 170 ms, respectively. In particular, notice at sites CPz, Cz and FCz the opposite trend155
of the feedback frequency differential ERP curves (Figure 6A) for ADHD (blue lines, mainly towards
positive values) and controls (green lines, mainly towards negative values).
DISCUSSION
The present study was aimed at investigating the behavior and the ERPs elicited by a probability
gambling task in young adults with ADHD and age-matched controls, in the context of personality as-160
sessed by the HEXACO-Personality Inventory. We showed characteristic ERP components triggered
by trial start and by gamble selection. The neural correlates appear as valuable markers to distinguish
ADHD from controls. The manipulation of outcomes’ feedback frequency showed that at trial start the
latency of the N2-P3a components, associated with expectation-association-orienting processing, were
shorter in the ADHD. The reaction times till the gambling choice were larger in the ADHD, as well as the165
latencies of the N2-P3a complex after the choice was made. On the contrary, the P3b component after
gambling occurred earlier in the ADHD .
Personality
We observed lower conscientiousness, agreeableness and extraversion scores in ADHD than in
controls, generally confirming previous studies based on the ‘Big Five’ model (BF). Those studies re-170
ported ADHD patients characterized by low scores of conscientiousness and agreeableness and high
score of neuroticism (41–44). Several studies performed in groups other than ADHD patients have high-
lighted an association between low agreeableness and gambling behavior or risk taking (45–47). Notice
that conscientiousness and extraversion are defined in the same way in both BF and HEXACO models,
but agreeableness is only partially overlapping. Low conscientiousness was reported being strongly175
related with inattention and disorganization (43, 44) and low extraversion with ADHD inattentive sub-
jects (41, 44). In our study the CAARS index of ADHD was correlated with extraversion (Table S1).
These results are coherent with the fact that our ADHD group was strongly characterized by inattentive
symptoms, with an average T -score of 79.6 (Table 1), a high score comparable only with the ADHD
group reported by another study (48). A one-tail test showed that the score to openness-to-experience180
in ADHD was higher than in controls, while most of other studies did not report any significant result
regarding openness, whose definition overlaps in HEXACO and BF models. The association of high
scores of openness with risk taking and sensation seeking behaviors was reported in studies not involv-
ing ADHD patients (47).
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Risk taking and gambling behavior185
The Iowa Gambling Task, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and the Game of Dice Task could not
reveal any salient group effect between ADHD adults and controls (24, 31) and in agreement with
behavioral data reported from ADHD children and adolescents (49). The Probabilistic Gambling Task
(PGT) used in the current study is an explicit task with two conditions of feedback frequency of the
outcome. Overall, and in each condition separately, we could not find any significant difference between190
groups neither in total gains nor in the risk index. However, we observed an interaction of CAARS score
with the total earning: the lower the score the lower the gains in ADHD participants, but the lower the
score the higher the gains in controls.
ADHD patients are characterized by an increased likelihood to take greater risks than age-matched
controls in activities such as extreme driving and substance abuse (12, 14, 16). It is recognized that195
childhood ADHD history has a strong influence on persistent pathological gambling (50). Moreover, re-
cent findings point out that pathological gambling in adulthood is associated with a comparable elevated
level of impulsiveness in ADHD and non-ADHD gamblers (23). In our ADHD group we observed a cor-
relation between CAARS-B score, associated with impulsiveness and hyperactivity, and the risk index
RI. However, our ADHD group was characterized by inattentiveness rather than impulsiveness, which200
may explain why the between groups comparison could not immediately reveal a significant difference
in risk taking behavior between ADHD and controls.
Both risk strategy evaluated by RI in the current study and the total gains were not significantly
affected by feedback frequency in either group of participants. However, the investment of higher stakes
associated with low frequency presentation of the outcomes was observed in the original Gneezy and205
Potters’ (33), and other tasks (51, 52). In the original task (33) the participants had to choose one bet
per block in the LF condition, whereas the participants of the current study were allowed to gamble
independently at each trial. Hence, differences in experimental design and protocol may contribute to
explain our result.
Neural dynamics and Event Related Potentials210
The manipulation of the feedback frequency of the outcome necessarily affects how individuals
tend to evaluate each transaction in combination and not separately to the previous ones. The PGT
is characterized by a free-operant (self-paced) behavior given that the trial onset is associated with
pressing the keyboard spacebar. In this goal-directed task the participants are informed that they play
trials alternatively distributed in blocks of low and high feedback frequency of the outcome. Hence, it215
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is likely that the participants develop their most adapted cognitive strategy at trial start, by balancing
the costs and benefits of making a decision regarding the amount to gamble (53, 54). The interval
between the trial start and the time of choosing the amount to gamble may be interpreted as a cue-
target interval, given that the selected gamble is a target of a self-paced movement. The ADHD group
was characterized by faster reaction times during LF than during HF. We observed only for the ADHD220
group a feedback frequency effect on the reaction times, thus suggesting that the decision making
processes during PGT are likely to be associated with distinct brain network dynamics in ADHD and
controls. These differences might be due to inhibitory control deficits in ADHD, as suggested in the
literature (31, 32, 55, 56).
Most ERP components recorded in the ADHD were affected by the feedback frequency right after225
the trial start. We observed an effect already on the C1 wave, which is known to be related with the initial
response of the primary visual cortex to an attended stimulus modulated by affective perception (57).
The next ERP component, N2, had a shorter latency at centroparietal locations in ADHD during the HF
condition. During HF P3a latency was overall shorter in both groups at all sites. The P3a component
is associated with stimulus-driven attention engagement (58) and its latency is likely to increase with230
an increased demand of an active orienting process associated with a low feedback frequency of the
outcome. Frontal areas and the insula contribute mainly to P3a (59) and during LF we found differences
between groups restricted to the frontocentral sites. Shorter P3a latencies in ADHD are in agreement
with another study (60). During HF the P3b latency was shorter and a later component centered on
490 ms with larger amplitude characterized the ERP at frontocentral sites of ADHD. The topographical235
distribution and latency of such N500 component is in agreement with the wave related to emotional
tension-resolution patterns and response selection in risky decision making in gambling tasks (61–64).
Later in the cue-target interval, during movement initiation towards reaching the target (i.e., clicking on
the selected amount to gamble), the ADHD were characterized during LF by a frontocentral wave at
-440 ms and a centroparietal wave at -140 ms. The neural dynamics responsible of shorter reaction240
times during LF in the ADHD might be associated with the generation of these ERP components, in
particular with the frontostriatal network supporting inhibitory control (65–67) and the centroparietal
processing of memory related emotional cues (68, 69). These observations may suggest that at trial
start an ADHD individual is characterized by the activation of a less extended brain network engaged in
stimulus-driven attention followed by the build-up of larger emotional stake of response conflict.245
Following the gamble selection the N2-P3a component was characterized by peak latencies larger
in ADHD compared to controls, in particular at frontocentral locations. If we assume that this ERP
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complex is associated with the brain network engaged in the stimulus-driven attention it is likely that a
higher emotional percept of the gambling choice in the ADHD (62, 63) may involve an extension of the
processing network resulting in larger N2-P3a latencies. After P3b, a negative deflection centered on250
490 ms with larger amplitude during LF than HF was characteristic of ADHD. This feedback frequency
related activity peaked over Cz and is likely to be associated with a N400-like ERP component related
to a contextual mismatch (70). In the present task this internal event is represented by the conceptual
processing of the gambling outcome expectation, in agreement with other observations of N400-like
waves peaking over central areas (71, 72). The last feedback frequency related event that distinguished255
ADHD and controls occurred at centroparietal sites at latencies in the range 760–930 ms after gambling
selection. This component could be identified with the late positive potential (LPP) detected in various
experimental designs related to the processing of affective content (73, 74). In ADHD participants, the
low feedback frequency of the outcome produced an emotional reaction and a greater conflict towards
the outcome of the choice. The time course of N400-like and LPP might be associated with the difficulty260
for the participants to know the accuracy of their choice until a feedback stimulus occurred at the end of
the trial. This difference with controls appears in agreement with the characteristic posterror behavior
reported in ADHD adolescents (49). By the time feedback occurred, any response conflict had dissi-
pated, which suggests to consider these two ERP components being associated with postdecisional
evaluation of the choice made.265
In conclusion, Event Related Potentials elicited by a probability gambling task are valuable markers
of decision making deficits related to ADHD, more sensitive than classical behavioral markers based
on the total gain, gambling amount and risk taking indexes. We used two conditions characterized by
low and high frequency of feedback information of the outcome. The low feedback frequency condition
generated stronger emotional response in the ADHD. In both groups the risks taking strategies varied270
greatly between individuals and were not affected by the feedback frequency of the gambling outcome.
ERPs analyses provide a sensitive tool to assess the dynamics of the neural circuits involved in the
decision making processes of young adults affected by ADHD.
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Figure legends
Figure 1: Experimental design of the Probabilistic Gambling Task. Each trial began by pressing the
spacebar (S), which was immediately followed by a message on the computer-controlled monitor with
the request to choose a selected amount of points to gamble in a game. The reaction time (RT ) was
determined by the lag until the selection of the amount to gamble (I). After an additional fixed interval of
4 seconds (I+4s) the participant was informed about the outcome of the gamble (HF Loss or HF Win)
in the HF condition or simply informed about the determination of the gamble in the LF condition.
Figure 2: Scatter plot of the total gain TotG, cumulated during both feedback frequency conditions, as
a function of CAARS, the normalized ADHD Index T -score. The robust regression equations for con-
trols and ADHD are equal to y = 4800   24.7x (F(1,16)=6.43, p = .02, R2 = .294) and y = 1541 + 33.2x
(F(1,16)=6.74, p = .02, R2 = .307). All points were included for the robust regression. Each point repre-
sents the data from one participant. Dashed lines represents 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3: Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) during the Probabilistic Gambling Task. Grand average at
Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz and POz sites for all participants (N=34) and at all conditions (HF, LF ) pooled
together. A. ERPs triggered by event S, corresponding to the trial start. B. ERPs triggered by event I,
corresponding to the gambling choice. C1: visual evoked potential component; CNV: Contingent Neg-
ative Variation; M: premotor response; N2-P3a: complex of components associated with expectation-
attention-orienting processing; P3b: positive peak associated with cognitive workload.
Figure 4: Effect of feedback condition on the grand-averaged ERPs. A. ERPs averaged for all participants
(N = 34) at electrodes sites POz, Pz, CPz, Cz, FCz and Fz across conditions HF (red lines) and LF
(blue lines) after the trial start (S). B. ERPs after the gambling choice (I). Dotted lines correspond to the
difference waves, computed by subtracting LF curves from HF curves.
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Figure 5: Feedback related differential activities triggered by the trial start (S). A. The curves were
computed by subtracting ERPs associated with LF from ERPs associated with HF for controls (green
lines, N = 18) and ADHD participants (blue lines, N = 14). The confidence interval (mean curve ±
SEM) is shown by the shaded areas. B. The relative density plot shows the spatial distribution of the
amplitude of the differential curves integrated along three intervals emphasized by the grey stripes,
centered at latencies 80 ms (dark grey), 260 ms (red) and 490 ms (orange).
Figure 6: Feedback related differential activities triggered by the gambling choice (I). A. The curves were
computed in the same way as Figure 5A. B. The relative density plot shows the spatial distribution of
the amplitude of the differential curves integrated along four intervals emphasized by the grey stripes,
centered at latencies 440 ms (yellow) and 140 ms (brown) before the gambling choice and 490 ms
(turquoise) and 850 ms (teal blue) after the gambling choice.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (median, mean and SEM) of participants’ demographics, DSM-IV ADHD Symptom subscales and
personality traits.
Controls ADHD Between groups Effect size
N 18 18
Age 22 22 U =175 r = .07
22.0 (0.8) 22.3 (0.7) 2p = .69
Female / Male 10 / 8 11 / 7  2 = .114  = .06
2p = .74
Laterality quotient 95 100 U =171.5 r = .05
(EHI) 89.0 (5.5) 89.4 (5.5) 2p = .76
Conner’s Adult ADHD Rating Scales-Self Report (Screening Version)
CAARS-S:SV (T-score)
DSM-IV Inattentive Symptoms 52.5 79.5 U =323⇤⇤⇤ r = .85
51.7 (2.2) 79.6 (1.4) 2p< .001
DSM-IV Hyperactive-Impulsive 44.5 63.5 U =304.5⇤⇤⇤ r = .75
Symptoms 43.9 (2.2) 64.8 (2.6) 2p< .001
DSM-IV Total ADHD Symptoms 50.0 77.0 U =323⇤⇤⇤ r = .85
47.9 (2.3) 76.5 (2.0) 2p< .001
ADHD Index 46.0 68.0 U =324⇤⇤⇤ r = .86
44.9 (1.4) 69.3 (1.3) 2p< .001
Adult ADHD Self-Report 48.0 67.0 U =312⇤⇤⇤ r = .79
Scale (ASRS) 45.7 (2.2) 66.3 (1.9) 2p< .001
HEXACO Personality factors
[H] Honesty-Humility 35.5 37.0 U =150.5 r = .07
36.5 (1.5) 35.1 (1.5) 2p = .72
[E] Emotionality 33.5 34.0 U =165 r = .02
32.7 (1.6) 32.3 (2.1) 2p = .93
[X] Extraversion 37.0 30.5 U =87.5⇤ r = .39
36.4 (1.1) 31.2 (1.7) 2p< .05
[A] Agreeableness 30.5 27.5 U =96.5⇤ r = .35
31.8 (1.2) 27.9 (1.5) 2p< .05
[C] Conscientiousness 35.0 28.5 U =65.5⇤⇤ r = .51
35.4 (1.0) 29.6 (1.5) 2p< .01
[O] Openness to Experience 31.0 38.0 U =220.5 r = .31
33.0 (1.6) 37.1 (1.6) 2p = .06
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Median, mean and SEM) of participants’ behavioral performance during the probability gambling
task.
Controls ADHD Between groups
N 18 18
Total Gain (points)
Within condition
• High Frequency Feedback 1852 1914 U =187.5
TG(HF ) 1843 (43) 1899 (60) 2p = .43 r = .13
• Low Frequency Feedback 1840 1938 U =197.5
TG(LF ) 1861 (43) 1935 (46) 2p = .27 r = .19
Within groups Z =0.07 Z =0.74
Between conditions 2p = .96 r = .01 2p = .48 r = .12
Normalized Risk Index
Within condition
• High Frequency Feedback -0.03 0.24 U =186
RI(HF ) 0.06 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10) 2p = .46 r = .13
• Low Frequency Feedback -0.06 0.25 U =196.5
RI(LF ) -0.01 (0.12) 0.11 (0.12) 2p = .28 r = .18
Within groups Z =1.18 Z =0.26
Between conditions 2p = .25 r = .20 2p = .81 r = .04
Reaction Time (ms)
Within condition
• High Frequency Feedback 1083 1544 U =204
RT (HF ) 1245 (146) 1595 (196) 2p = .19 r = .22
• Low Frequency Feedback 1032 1274 U =197
RT (LF ) 1136 (153) 1414 (200) 2p = .28 r = .18
Within groups Z =1.13 Z =2.33⇤
Between conditions 2p = .27 r = .19 2p< .05 r = .39
Between groups comparison is assessed by the unpaired Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test and the
statistics U is reported. Within group (between conditions) comparison is assessed by the paired
Wilcoxon signed rank test and the statistics Z is reported. Two-sided p-value and effect size r are
reported for both tests.
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Table 3: Median and averaged ERPs latencies (ms) ± SEM at the frontocentral (Fz, FCz, CZ) and centroparietal (CPz, Pz, POz) sites during the high frequency feedback (HF )
and low frequency feedback (LF ) conditions after the trial start and after the gambling choice.
Within condition Within condition Within groups
High Frequency Feedback (HF ) Low Frequency Feedback (LF ) Between conditions (HF vs. LF )
Controls ADHD Between groups Controls ADHD Between groups Controls ADHD
Trial start
N2
frontocentral
164.0 173.5 U =1139 171.0 174.0 U =1180 Z =1.22 Z =0.84
170.1 (2.9) 169.5 (2.3) 2p = .97 r = .00 172.2 (2.1) 172.0 (2.5) 2p = .74 r = .03 2p = .23 r = .12 2p = .41 r = .09
centroparietal
190.5 179.0 U =905 189.5 187.0 U =1052 Z =1.04 Z =2.58⇤⇤
185.8 (3.4) 177.7 (3.4) 2p = .09 r = .18 187.5 (2.8) 184.1 (3.4) 2p = .55 r = .06 2p = .30 r = .10 2p< .01 r = .28
P3a
frontocentral
246.5 243.0 U =1116 262.0 247.0 U =862.5⇤ Z =3.48⇤⇤⇤ Z =2.13⇤
247.8 (3.3) 242.1 (3.9) 2p = .90 r = .01 259.9 (3.7) 249.2 (3.2) 2p< .05 r = .20 2p< .001 r = .33 2p< .05 r = .23
centroparietal
251.0 255.5 U =1068.5 264.0 260.0 U =997 Z =3.31⇤⇤⇤ Z =2.85⇤⇤
258.3 (3.4) 248.9 (5.2) 2p = .63 r = .05 266.0 (3.2) 260.0 (3.4) 2p = .31 r = .10 2p< .001 r = .32 2p< .01 r = .31
P3b
frontocentral
351.0 349.0 U =974 356.0 363.5 U =1121 Z =1.78 Z =2.90⇤⇤
352.6 (3.7) 346.7 (3.4) 2p = .46 r = .08 358.2 (2.7) 354.3 (4.3) 2p = .95 r = .01 2p = .08 r = .17 2p< .01 r = .32
centroparietal
353.0 348.0 U =951.5 357.0 354.0 U =1054 Z =0.64 Z =1.86
356.9 (3.8) 348.0 (3.7) 2p = .18 r = .14 360.4 (3.4) 353.3 (4.6) 2p = .56 r = .01 2p = .53 r = .06 2p = .06 r = .20
Gambling choice
N2
frontocentral
167.5 174.0 U =1414.5⇤ 165.0 174.5 U =1542.5⇤⇤ Z =1.40 Z =0.81
168.1 (2.2) 176.2 (2.4) 2p< .05 r = .21 167.5 (1.8) 176.0 (2.0) 2p< .01 r = .31 2p = .16 r = .13 2p = .43 r = .09
centroparietal
178.5 181.0 U =1298.5 178.0 184.0 U =1425.5⇤ Z =1.08 Z =60
177.7 (2.5) 183.3 (2.6) 2p = .23 r = .12 175.8 (2.6) 184.1 (2.6) 2p< .05 r = .22 2p = .28 r = .10 2p = .55 r = .07
P3a
frontocentral
235.0 242.0 U =1366 237.5 245.0 U =1228 Z =1.37 Z =0.51
239.3 (2.0) 245.1 (2.8) 2p = .09 r = .18 241.8 (2.0) 243.6 (2.7) 2p = .49 r = .07 2p = .17 r = .13 2p = .61 r = .06
centroparietal
244.0 245.0 U =1223.5 239.5 251.5 U =1354.5 Z =0.55 Z =0.53
244.1 (2.4) 249.5 (3.3) 2p = .51 r = .07 242.7 (2.5) 247.7 (4.0) 2p = .10 r = .17 2p = .59 r = .05 2p = .61 r = .06
P3b
frontocentral
351.0 342.0 U =815.5⇤ 360.0 350.5 U =892.5 Z =1.42 Z =1.28
354.9 (3.2) 347.7 (3.1) 2p< .05 r = .23 360.5 (3.3) 353.1 (3.6) 2p = .07 r = .18 2p = .16 r = .14 2p = .20 r = .14
centroparietal
360.0 350.5 U =768⇤⇤ 370.5 362.0 U =1100 Z =0.52 Z =2.29⇤
365.1 (2.9) 353.8 (3.1) 2p< .01 r = .28 364.6 (3.2) 363.5 (4.2) 2p = .80 r = .03 2p = .61 r = .05 2p< .05 r = .25
Between groups comparison is assessed by the unpaired Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test and the statistics U is reported. Within group (between conditions) comparison
is assessed by the paired Wilcoxon signed rank test and the statistics Z is reported. Two-sided p-value and effect size r are reported for both tests.
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Supplemental Methods and Materials
Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses were performed with the R language and environment for statistical computing5
(1, 2). For most variables we report the median and the mean±SEM. All statistical hypotheses were
tested with a level of significance of p= .05, unless otherwise reported. For parametric comparisons of
distributions we used Student’s t-test and Cohen’s d effect size. For Chi-squared tests the effect size is
reported by   for 2 x 2 contingency tables, otherwise by Cramer’s V (3). Nonparametric comparisons
of sample distributions (4) were assessed by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test using the Z statistic for10
paired observations and by the Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples with effect size r. We
used robust statistics throughout all the analyses (5–8), including the robust correlation indexes ⇢ˆG, the
robust mixed effects model (9) and otherwise stated the linear mixed-effects models for within-subject
factorial analyses (10).
Participants’ demography and assessment15
The study was carried out in accordance with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki (11)
and approved by the Ethics Committees of the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of
Lausanne, and by the Cantonal Ethics Committee of Canton Vaud on behalf of the Swiss Federal Au-
thorities. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, none reported a history of sustained
head injury. The slight prevalence of females in the gender distribution was in agreement with other20
reports (12). In both groups CAARS and ASRS’s total scores were positively correlated (⇢ˆG(16) = .513,
p = .03 for controls and ⇢ˆG(16) = .464, p = .05 for ADHD participants).
Probabilistic Gambling Task and Behavior
The graphical message with a grid corresponding to the possible choices was displayed on the
computer-controlled monitor and the participant used the computer mouse to click on the selected25
amount of points to gamble. In order to reduce the saccadic eye movements the graphical message
was displayed in a screen area corresponding to a vertical angle of 3 degrees and an horizontal angle of
8 degrees, hence falling within the range of the normal human parafoveal region in reading (13). In both
conditions (i.e., ‘high frequency feedback” HF and “low frequency feedback” LF ) the overall amount of
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points held by the participant was displayed every four trials. Each participant played the PGT in 1030
alternated blocks of HF and LF 16 trials each, hence 80 trials for each condition.
The performance of the participants was assessed by the total gains earned after the end of playing
the whole task (TotG), during low frequency feedback trials (TG(LF )), during high frequency feedback
trials (TG(HF )), and by three risk indexes. The relative number of trials a participant gambled 0, 4, or
8 points defined a low risk index LR. A high risk index HR was defined for gambling amounts of 12,35
16, or 20 points. A risk index RI centralized within the range [-1, +1] was calculated as RI = (HR  
LR)/(HR+ LR). Then, a RI towards -1 is characteristic of a risk-averse strategy, an index towards +1
for a risk-seeking participant, and RI ⇡ 0 being associated with a risk-neutral attitude. Each participant
could be further characterized with the corresponding RIs calculated following the feedback frequency
trials, i.e. RI(LF ) and RI(HF ). The behavior of the participants was also assessed by measuring the40
reaction times (RT ) in ms. The trials with RT < 250 ms and RT > 10 seconds were discarded.
Additional trials detected as outliers on the basis of a robust analysis (14) were also discarded from
further analyses.
EEG recording and analyses
Electrophysiological signals were recorded using 64 scalp Ag/AgCl active electrodes (ActiveTwo45
MARK II Biosemi EEG System, BioSemi B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands), mounted on a headcap
(extended international 10/20 layout, NeuroSpec Quick Cap) and referenced to the linked earlobes.
Vertical and horizontal ocular movements were recorded using two pairs of bipolar electrodes placed
beneath and above each eye next to the lateral canthi. The data acquisition (DC amplifiers and software
by Biosemi, USA) was set with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz at 24 bits resolution and band-passed filtered50
with lower cutoff at 0.05 Hz and upper cut-off at 200 Hz, Electrode impedances were checked and kept
always below 20 k⌦ for all channels before starting the continuous recording of the EEG (15). The
final checkup of the electrophysiological equipment and of the quality of brain signals was completed
in about 30 minutes. The participants were instructed to maintain their gaze on a white fixation cross
at the center of a 19-inch computer screen at a viewing distance of about 70 cm. At the begin of the55
recording session the EEG was recorded during two minutes while the participants kept the eyes closed
and during two minutes while they fixated a cross on the center of the computer screen.
The brain signals were preprocessed and analyzed with BrainVision Analyzer 2.0.4 (Brain Prod-
ucts, Gilching, Germany). Visual inspection of the EEG was performed to remove immediately those
trials containing high amplitude muscle activity related noise, large eye blinks and other easily identifi-60
able artifacts. Saccade-related eye movements were corrected using Infomax Independent Component
Sarah K. Mesrobian et al. Supplemental Information Page 4
Analysis (ICA) (16). Markers were used off-line to segment the continuous EEG data into epochs trig-
gered by pressing the spacebar (event S) and by clicking on the selected amount to gamble (event I),
as illustrated in Figure 1 of the main article. The epochs were further scanned and inspected visually
for contamination by residual minor artifacts. After removing all artifacts the number of usable epochs65
for the event-related potentials (ERPs) analysis had to be more than twenty in order to include the par-
ticipant’s record in the analyses. For ERPs the trials were cut into epochs lasting 1500 ms ranging
from -500 to +1000 ms around the trigger events of interest (i.e., events S and I). ERP analyses were
performed on the artifact-free trials, band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 30 Hz (-12dB/octave). Subse-
quently the trials were baseline corrected to the interval 500 ms prior to trigger onset and averaged for70
both conditions LF and HF.
Supplemental Results
Personality traits and performance to PGT
In controls, openness was negatively correlated with CAARS (Supplemental Table S1) and positively
correlated with the total gains (Supplemental Table S2). Honesty-humility was positively correlated with75
conscientiousness (⇢ˆG(16) = .514, p = .03) (Table S1) and positively correlated with reaction times (Sup-
plemental Table S2). In ADHD, the robust mixed effects model confirmed the effect of agreeableness
on the risk index irrespective of the feedback frequency (t(16)=2.61, p = .02, d = .10). In this group
agreeableness was positively correlated with honesty-humility (⇢ˆG(16) = .512, p = .03). The interaction
between the group factor and the CAARS index on TotG, the cumulated amount of points during both80
feedback frequency conditions, illustrated in the main text by Figure 2, was also confirmed by the facto-
rial analysis ( 2(4)=15.23, p< .001, V = .46).
Event Related Potentials
We considered the linear mixed effects model with two within-subject factors (recording sites: POz,
Pz, CPz, Cz, FCz, and Fz; conditions: HF and LF ) and one between-subject factor (groups: controls85
and ADHD). After the trial start, the model revealed a significant main effect of the electrode factor for N2
( 2(5) = 54.60, p< .001, V = .17) and P3a peak latencies ( 2(5) = 20.26, p< .01, V = .10). A significant
main effect of the feedback condition, without interaction with the electrode factor, was observed only
for P3a peak latencies ( 2(1) = 10.75, p = .001, V = .17). No main effect of the electrode factor was
observed for P3b peak latency after trial start ( 2(5) = 2.33, p = .80, V = .03) and no difference between90
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P3b latencies for ADHD and controls after pooling all electrodes together (354.0 ms, 350.6±2.0 and
354.0 ms, 357.1±1.7, respectively).
After the gambling choice, the model revealed a significant main effect of the electrode factor for N2
( 2(5) = 46.58, p< .001, V = .16), but not for P3a peak latencies ( 2(5) = 6.74, p = .24, V = .06). A main
effect of the electrode factor was observed for P3b peak latency ( 2(5) = 54.79, p< .001, V = .17).95
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Figure S1: Individual strategies during outcome frequency feedback conditions. A. Control participants. Scatter plot of the risk
index during high frequency feedback, RI(HF ), as a function of the risk index during low frequency feedback, RI(LF ). The robust
regression equation is y = 0.075 + 0.728x (F(1,16)=61.18, p< .001, R2 = .796). B. Same scatter plot for ADHD patients. The
robust regression equation is y = 0.035+0.875x (F(1,16)=142.39, p< .001, R2 = .906). Each point represents the data from one
participant. Dashed lines represents 95% confidence interval. Histograms represents the marginal distributions of RI.
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Supplemental Table
Table S1: Robust correlations among personality traits and ADHD assessment scales.
ADHD (N = 18)
H E X A C O CAARS CAARS-A CAARS-B ASRS
C
on
tro
ls
(N
=
1
8)
H . .270  .012 .512⇤ .263  .160  .085 .047 .211 .148
E .124 .  .052 .108 .344 .296 .479⇤ .292  .097 .088
X .024  .321 .  .146  .047 .363  .079  .193 .128 .082
A .333 .257 .057 . .024 .170  .278  .200  .245  .132
C .514⇤ .146 .120 .073 .  .267 .018  .023 .096 .264
O .215  .070 .400 .271  .249 . .256  .021  .325  .031
CAARS  .136 .291  .327 .035  .029  .478⇤ . .195 .052 .464⇤
CAARS-A  .102 .123  .151 .390  .426  .023 .587⇤ . .391 .396
CAARS-B  .432 .085  .328  .009  .194  .560⇤ .786⇤⇤ .550⇤ . .431
ASRS  .301 .218  .197 .048  .209  .299 .513⇤  .373 .570⇤ .
Personality traits: [H]onesty-Humility, [E]motionality, e[X]traversion, [A]greeableness, [C]onscientiousness, and
[O]penness to experience). CAARS: ADHD Index; CAARS-A: DSM IV Inattentive Symptoms Subscale;
CAARS-B: DSM IV Hyperactive-Impulsive Symptoms Subscale.
Robust correlation coefficients ⇢ˆG following the Gaussian rank correlation estimators (5).
(*) level of significance of 2p<.05 ; (**) level of significance of 2p<.01.
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Supplemental Table
Table S2: Robust correlations between personality traits with measures of performance to PGT.
H E X A C O CAARS CAARS-A CAARS-B ASRS
C
on
tro
ls
(N
=
18
)
TotG .168  .188  .057 .197 .157 .502⇤  .655⇤⇤  .383  .648⇤⇤  .368
TG(HF ) .012  .067  .229 .117  .132 .519⇤  .504⇤  .133  .442  .317
TG(LF ) .065  .274 .070 .146 .218 .236  .391  .293  .410  .244
RI .139  .332 .041 .055 .197 .245  .280  .045  .196  .161
RI(HF ) .168  .289 .119 .158 .124 .339  .232  .089  .155  .075
RI(LF )  .004  .373  .009  .113 .215 .049  .231  .231  .130  .098
RT .435 .395  .070 .011  .062 .103 .054 .126  .124 .319
RT (HF ) .462⇤ .335 .021  .058  .031 .157 .001 .039  .180 .222
RT (LF ) .584⇤ .214  .163  .007  .082 .010  .011  .091  .263 .178
A
D
H
D
(N
=
18
)
TotG .143  .062 .021 .153  .303 .113 .433 .014  .062 .192
TG(HF ) .073  .179 .083  .008  .020  .074 .227 .256  .095 .419
TG(LF ) .109 .173 .009 .044  .414 .247 .530⇤  .228  .049  .060
RI  .263  .257 .312  .567⇤ .072  .130 .294 .090 .498⇤ .244
RI(HF )  .259  .293 .394  .563⇤ .081  .136 .290 .070 .534⇤ .364
RI(LF )  .221  .215 .281  .542⇤ .011  .080 .295 .110 .459 .139
RT .030  .297 .004  .099 .179  .206  .290  .104  .093  .407
RT (HF ) .085  .266 .068  .044 .171  .221  .283  .116  .040  .441
RT (LF ) .151  .337  .026  .078 .232  .326  .310  .156  .115  .319
Robust correlation coefficients ⇢ˆG following the Gaussian rank correlation estimators (5).
(*) level of significance of 2p<.05 ; (**) level of significance of 2p<.01.
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Supplemental Table
Table S3: Median and averaged ERPs latencies (ms) ± SEM in both feedback frequencies conditions pooled together for N2,
P3a and P3b components over Fz, FCz, CZ, CPz, Pz and POz sites, after the trial start and after the gambling choice.
Onset
event
ERP
Latencies at recording sites (ms)
Fz FCz Cz CPz Pz POz
C
on
tro
ls
(N
=
36
)
Trial Start
N2
165.0 164.0 170.5 186.0 189.5 192.0
170.5±3.0 170.0±3.1 172.9±3.1 183.3±3.4 187.4±3.9 189.2±4.0
P3a
255.5 253.5 248.5 257.5 260.0 257.0
254.3±4.3 253.9±4.5 253.4±4.4 263.2±4.4 264.3±4.1 259.0±3.8
P3b
352.0 353.0 351.0 353.5 354.5 358.5
355.4±4.0 356.7±4.1 354.2±3.9 356.1±4.2 359.2±4.4 360.6±4.6
Gambling
choice
N2
174.5 166.0 168.0 177.5 176.5 184.0
172.6±2.8 168.1±2.2 167.5±2.7 176.1±3.3 175.8±3.0 178.4±3.1
P3a
237.0 236.0 235.5 240.0 241.0 243.5
241.8±2.5 241.1±2.3 238.7±2.7 243.8±2.8 243.7±3.1 242.5±3.2
P3b
356.0 357.0 358.0 357.0 369.0 370.5
357.9±3.6 357.0±4.0 358.2±4.3 358.9±3.6 366.5±3.9 369.2±3.6
A
D
H
D
(N
=
28
)
Trial Start
N2
174.5 174.0 169.5 180.0 183.0 187.5
172.6±2.8 171.1±3.0 168.5±3.0 179.5±3.7 181.2±4.1 182±4.9
P3a
243.0 241.0 253.0 254.0 260.0 258.5
246.1±4.2 242.7±4.4 248.2±4.5 251.2±4.8 256.2±5.4 255.9±6.2
P3b
356.5 356.5 352.0 355.0 352.0 350.0
349.2±5.0 351.4±4.9 350.9±4.5 352.4±5.0 350.2±5.2 349.3±5.4
Gambling
choice
N2
174.0 175.0 174.0 177.0 182.0 186.5
176.7±2.5 176.5±2.7 175.1±2.9 180.6±3.1 184.3±3.3 186.1±3.0
P3a
246.0 241.0 243.5 249.5 246.0 252.5
245.2±3.1 244.7±3.5 243.2±3.6 247.0±4.3 247.5±4.3 251.2±4.8
P3b
347.0 343.0 346.0 352.0 357.0 361.0
350.1±3.7 348.8±4.0 352.3±4.6 355.3±4.5 359.4±4.6 361.1±4.6
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6.4 Questionnaires
6.4.1 ASRS
UNIL/EPFL students were screened according to the their answers on the six first questions.
The 6-item screener has proven some validity. It consists in giving one point for each answer
greater than 1 in the first three items, and one point for any answer greater than 2 in each next
three items. Participants that had responded positively to a minimum of 4 of those items (within
the 6-item screener criteria) were considered as having ADHD symptoms, whereas those that
have responded to less than 4 items were considered as having no ADHD symptoms. Then, for
such individuals, the score on these 6-item screener was calculated, those having a score greater
than 22 were selected to participate as UNIL/EPFL students with high ADHD symptoms, and
the ones having a score lower than 10 were selected to participate as UNIL/EPFL students with
low ADHD symptoms. These criteria were chosen according to the score’s distribution of the
participants.
175
 Adult Self-Report Scale (ASRS-1.1) Symptom Checklist 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Les questions figurant au verso ont pour but de favoriser le dialogue entre vous et vos patients, et de vous aider 
à confirmer les éventuels symptômes d’un Trouble d’Hyperactivité avec Déficit de l’Attention (THADA). 
 
Description : La liste des symptômes est un instrument qui reprend les 18 critères du DSM-IV-TR. Parmi ceux-
ci, six sont les plus prédictifs du THADA. Ces six items composent l’ASRS v1.1 Screener et se retrouvent dans 
la partie A de la liste des symptômes. La partie B regroupe les 12 items restants. 
 
Instructions : 
 
Symptômes : 
1. Demandez au patient de remplir les parties A et B de la liste des symptômes en cochant la case qui 
correspond le mieux à la fréquence de chacun des symptômes. 
2. Cotation de la partie A. Si au moins quatre croix apparaissent dans la zone ombrée de la partie A, le 
patient présente des symptômes très évocateur de THADA, ce qui recommande une évaluation plus 
poussée. 
3. Les scores de fréquence de la partie B apportent des éléments additionnels et peuvent donner des indices 
sur la symptomatologie du patient. Attachez une attention particulière aux crois figurant dans la zone 
ombrée. La réponse en terme de fréquence est plus sensible pour certaines questions. Aucun score total 
ou probabilité diagnostic n’est attaché à ces 12 questions. Il a été démontré que les 6 questions de la 
partie A étaient les plus prédictives du diagnostic et doivent être utilisées comme outil de dépistage. 
 
Gêne : 
1. Parcourez la totalité de la liste des symptômes avec votre patient et évaluez  le niveau de gêne associé à 
chaque symptôme. 
2. Prenez en compte les situations scolaires/professionnelles, sociales et familiales. 
3. La liste des symptômes peut aider à l’évaluation de la gêne occasionnée car la fréquence des symptômes 
est souvent associée à leur sévérité. Si la fréquence des symptômes est très élevée, vous pourrez 
demander à votre patient de décrire comme ils impactent sa capacité à travailler, à prendre soin des 
choses à sa maison, ou à s’entendre avec d’autres personnes comme l’époux/épouse. 
 
Histoire : 
1. Evaluez la présence dans l’enfance de ces symptômes ou d’autres similaires. L’ADHD des adultes n’a 
pas été forcément diagnostiqué dans l’enfance. Cherchez dans l’histoire du patient les problèmes 
précoces ou persistants liés à l’attention ou au contrôle de soi. Certains symptômes doivent avoir été 
présents dans l’enfance, mais pas tous nécessairement. 
2. Demandez à consulter les bulletins scolaires. Mais souvenez-vous que de nombreux adultes étaient 
scolarisés alors que le THADA et ses symptômes n’étaient pas familiers. Plus qu’aux notes, accordez de 
l’importance aux commentaires des enseignants. Si vous ne pouvez pas avoir accès à ces bulletins, 
posez des questions comme « si j’étais un enseignant, comment est-ce que je décrirais votre attitude en 
classe ? » et « si je lisais vos bulletins scolaires, qu’est-ce que j’y trouverais ? » 
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Nom :………………………………………………….. Sexe : H / F Date : ……/……/20…. 
 
 
Répondez aux questions suivantes en vous auto-évaluant sur chacun des critères 
à l’aide de l’échelle à droite de la page. Pour répondre aux questions, cochez la 
case qui décrit le mieux vos sentiments ou vos comportements au cours des six 
derniers mois. Rendez ensuite le questionnaire entièrement rempli au 
professionnel de santé qui vous la remis avec lequel vous pourrez en discuter. Ja
m
ai
s 
R
ar
em
en
t 
Pa
rf
oi
s 
So
uv
en
t 
Tr
ès
 so
uv
en
t 
1. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à finaliser les derniers détails 
d'un projet une fois que le plus intéressant a été fait? 
ο ο ο ο ο
2. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à mettre les choses en ordre 
lorsque vous devez faire un travail qui demande une certaine organisation? 
ο ο ο ο ο
3. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés pour vous souvenir de vos 
rendez-vous ou de vos engagements? 
ο ο ο ο ο
4. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous tendance à éviter ou à remettre à plus tard un 
travail qui demande beaucoup de réflexion? 
ο ο ο ο ο
5. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous la bougeotte ou agitez-vous vos mains ou vos 
pieds lorsque vous devez rester assis pendant un long moment? 
ο ο ο ο ο
6. Avec quelle fréquence vous sentez-vous trop actif ou obligé de faire des 
choses, comme si vous étiez actionné par un moteur? 
ο ο ο ο ο
7. Avec quelle fréquence faites-vous des erreurs d’étourderie lorsque vous 
travaillez sur un projet ennuyeux ou difficile? 
ο ο ο ο ο
8. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à rester attentif lorsque vous 
faites un travail ennuyeux ou répétitif? 
ο ο ο ο ο
9. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à vous concentrer sur ce que 
les gens vous disent, même lorsqu'ils vous parlent directement? 
ο ο ο ο ο
10. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous tendance à égarer ou du mal à retrouver des 
choses à la maison ou au travail? 
ο ο ο ο ο
11. Avec quelle fréquence êtes-vous distrait par de l'activité ou du bruit autour de 
vous? 
ο ο ο ο ο
12. Avec quelle fréquence vous levez-vous pendant des réunions ou d'autres 
situations dans lesquelles vous êtes censé rester assis? 
ο ο ο ο ο
13. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous la bougeotte ou vous sentez-vous agité? ο ο ο ο ο
14. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à vous détendre et à vous 
relaxer pendant votre temps libre? 
ο ο ο ο ο
15. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous remarqué que vous étiez trop bavard lorsque 
vous étiez en compagnie d'autres personnes? 
ο ο ο ο ο
16. Avec quelle fréquence vous surprenez-vous terminant les phrases des autres 
dans une discussion avant qu'ils aient pu le faire eux-mêmes? 
ο ο ο ο ο
17. Avec quelle fréquence avez-vous des difficultés à attendre votre tour dans une 
file d'attente? 
ο ο ο ο ο
18. Avec quelle fréquence interrompez-vous les autres lorsqu'ils sont occupés? ο ο ο ο ο
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6.4.2 HEXACO PI-R
The scoring keys are shown following the questionnaire. Reversed items (R) were changed (1 →
5; 2 → 4; 3 → 3; 4 → 2; 5 → 1) and the sum of points was calculated according to the scoring
keys.
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DIRECTIONS 
 
Dans les pages suivantes, vous trouverez une série d’énoncés qui vous décrivent. 
Veuillez lire chaque énoncé et décider à quel point vous êtes d’accord ou en 
désaccord avec son contenu. Ensuite, écrivez le chiffre approprié, en vous fondant 
sur l’échelle suivante : 
 
    5 = tout à fait d’accord 
    4 = d’accord  
    3 = neutre (ni d’accord, ni en désaccord) 
    2 = pas d’accord 
    1 = pas du tout d’accord 
 
Veuillez répondre à tous les énoncés, même si vous n’êtes pas tout à fait certain(e) 
de votre réponse.  
 
 
Inventaire de 
personnalité 
HEXACO 
 
 
 
1 = pas du tout d’accord       2 = pas d’accord       3 = neutre (ni d’accord, ni en désaccord)       4 = d’accord        5 = tout à fait d’accord 
 1 
1  Visiter une galerie d’art m’ennuierait. 
2  J’organise et je prévois à l’avance afin d’éviter de tout bousculer à la dernière minute. 
3  Je garde rarement rancune, même contre les personnes qui m’ont causé de graves préjudices. 
4  Je me sens raisonnablement satisfait avec moi-même dans l'ensemble. 
5  J’ai peur de voyager en cas d’intempéries. 
6  Je n’aurais pas recours à la flatterie pour obtenir une augmentation de salaire ou une promotion, même si je crois que cela ait d’excellente chance de réussir. 
7  Apprendre l’histoire et les politiques d’autres pays m’intéresse. 
8  Je me donne au maximum afin d’atteindre un but. 
9  Les gens me disent parfois que je juge trop les autres. 
10  Je fais rarement part de mes opinions pendant des réunions de groupe. 
11  Parfois, je ne peux m’empêcher de m’inquiéter pour des incidents sans importance. 
12  Si j’avais la certitude de ne jamais me faire prendre, je volerais volontiers un million d’euros. 
13  J’aimerais bien créer une œuvre d’art comme un roman, une chanson ou une peinture. 
14  Lorsque je travaille, je me soucie peu des petits détails. 
15  Les gens disent parfois que je suis une personne têtue. 
16  Je préfère les emplois qui exigent une interaction sociale active à un emploi où il faut travailler seul. 
17  Lorsqu’une expérience douloureuse m’afflige, j’ai besoin de quelqu’un pour me sentir mieux. 
18  Avoir beaucoup d’argent n’est pas particulièrement important pour moi. 
19  Porter attention aux idées radicales est une perte de temps. 
20  Lorsque je  prends des décisions, je me fie à mon intuition du moment plutôt que de prendre le temps d’évaluer rationnellement la question. 
21  Les gens trouvent que je suis une personne qui se fâche facilement. 
22  La plupart du temps, je suis jovial(e) et optimiste. 
23  Voir quelqu’un pleurer me donne envie de pleurer moi-même. 
24  Je crois mériter plus de respect qu’une personne moyenne. 
25  Si j’en avais la chance, j’aimerais bien assister à un concert de musique classique. 
26  Au travail, mon désordre me cause parfois des problèmes. 
27  J’ai l’attitude de « pardonner et oublier » envers ceux qui m’ont traité injustement. 
28  J’estime que je suis une personne peu populaire. 
29  Les dangers physiques me font très peur. 
30  Pour obtenir quelque chose de quelqu’un en particulier, je rirais de ses blagues même si elles sont plates. 
 
Veuillez continuer…
1 = pas du tout d’accord       2 = pas d’accord       3 = neutre (ni d’accord, ni en désaccord)       4 = d’accord        5 = tout à fait d’accord 
 2 
 
31  Je n’ai jamais vraiment aimé feuilleter une encyclopédie. 
32  Je ne fais que le strict minimum de mon travail. 
33  Je juge souvent les autres avec indulgence. 
34  Dans des situations sociales, je suis la personne qui fait généralement les premiers pas. 
35  J’ai tendance à beaucoup moins m’inquiéter que la plupart des gens. 
36  Je n’accepterais jamais de pot-de-vin, aussi gros soit-il. 
37  On me dit souvent que j’ai beaucoup d’imagination. 
38  Je fais toujours mon travail avec minutie, même lorsque cela exige plus de temps. 
39  Je suis plutôt flexible dans mes opinions lorsque les gens ne sont pas d’accord avec moi. 
40  Me faire des amis est ma priorité quand je suis dans un nouvel environnement. 
41  Je peux gérer les situations difficiles sans le soutien moral de qui que ce soit. 
42  Posséder des articles de luxe me ferait très plaisir. 
43  J’aime bien les gens qui sont capables d’une vision non conventionnelle des choses. 
44  Je fais beaucoup d’erreurs, parce que je ne pense pas avant d’agir. 
45  La plupart des gens se fâchent plus rapidement que moi. 
46  La plupart des gens sont plus optimistes et dynamiques que moi. 
47  Je me sens très émotif(ve) quand une personne qui m’est proche s’en va pour une longue période. 
48  Je veux que les gens sachent que je suis une personne importante et supérieure. 
49  Je ne me considère pas comme une personne artistique ou créative. 
50  On me qualifie souvent de perfectionniste. 
51  Même lorsque les gens commettent de nombreuses erreurs, j’émets rarement des commentaires 
négatifs. 
52  J’estime parfois que je suis une personne sans valeur. 
53  Même en cas d’urgence, je ne panique pas. 
54  Je ne ferais pas semblant d’aimer une personne dans le seul but d’obtenir une faveur d’elle. 
55  Parler de philosophie m’ennuie. 
56  Je préfère être spontané(e) que de m’en tenir à un plan. 
57  Lorsqu’on me dit que j’ai tort, ma réaction première est de défendre mon point. 
58  Lorsque je suis en groupe, je suis souvent le ou la porte-parole. 
59  Je reste impassible même dans des situations où la plupart des gens deviennent très émotifs. 
60  Je serais tenté(e) d’utiliser de la fausse monnaie si j’étais certain(e) de ne jamais me faire prendre. 
 
 
Scoring Keys for the 60-Item Version  
 
Honesty-Humility  
 Sincerity    6, 30R, 54  
 Fairness    12R, 36, 60R  
 Greed-Avoidance   18, 42R  
 Modesty    24R, 48R  
Emotionality  
 Fearfulness    5, 29, 53R  
 Anxiety    11, 35R  
 Dependence    17, 41R 
 Sentimentality    23, 47, 59R 
Extraversion  
 Social Self-Esteem   4, 28R, 52R  
 Social Boldness   10R, 34, 58  
 Sociability    16, 40  
 Liveliness    22, 46R 
Agreeableness  
 Forgiveness    3, 27  
 Gentleness    9R, 33, 51  
 Flexibility    15R, 39, 57R  
 Patience    21R, 45  
Conscientiousness  
 Organization    2, 26R  
 Diligence    8, 32R  
 Perfectionism    14R, 38, 50  
 Prudence    20R, 44R, 56R  
Openness to Experience  
 Aesthetic Appreciation   1R, 25  
 Inquisitiveness    7, 31R 
 Creativity    13, 37, 49R  
 Unconventionality   19R, 43, 55R  
 
 
 
6.4.3 CBS
This questionnaire was not scored.
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UNITE DE RECHERCHE DU SUPEA (CHUV) 
ETUDE SUR LE SYNDROME D’HYPERACTIVITE AVEC DEFICIT D’ATTENTION 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE POUR LES ADULTES 
 
 
Nom, Prénom : _____________________________________  Date : _________ 
Date de naissance : _________________ 
 
 
 
CURRENT BEHAVIOR SCALE ( Russel A. Barkley, PhD)1 
 
Cochez s’il vous plaît la case qui décrit le mieux votre comportement.  
 
 Durant  les  6  dern iers  mo is  
Jamais ,  
Rarement  
Par fo is  
 
Souvent  Très  
souvent  
1 J’ai de la difficulté à attendre; je suis impatient/e.     
2 Je prends des décisions de manière impulsive.     
3 Je suis incapable de contrôler mes réactions ou mes 
réponses face à un évènement ou toute autre situation. 
    
4 J’ai de la difficulté à arrêter mes activités ou mon 
comportement quand cela est nécessaire. 
    
5 J’ai de la difficulté à changer ma manière de faire lorsque 
je reçois un feedback sur mon erreur.  
    
6 Je suis facilement distrait(e) par des pensées non 
pertinentes quand je dois me concentrer. 
    
7 Je suis enclin à la rêverie alors que je devrais me 
concentrer sur une tâche. 
    
8 J’ai tendance à remettre les choses au lendemain ou à 
retarder ce que je dois faire jusqu’à la dernière minute. 
   
9 Je fais des commentaires de manière impulsive sur les 
autres. 
    
10 J’ai tendance à faire des pauses dans mon travail et à ne 
pas faire tout ce que je suis supposé(e) faire. 
    
11 J’ai tendance à interrompre un travail rapidement s’il est 
ennuyeux ou déplaisant. 
    
12 Je suis incapable d’envisager l’obtention d’une 
récompense non-immédiate ou de suspendre une activité 
dans le but d’obtenir une récompense ultérieure.  
    
13 J’ai tendance à faire des choses sans prendre en 
considération leurs conséquences. 
    
14 Je change de programme à la dernière minute ou sur un 
coup de tête. 
    
                                                
1 In Biederman J. et al. (2008). Journal of Psychiatric Research 42, 304-310. Traduction de Michel Bader, Sarah 
Leopizzi et Coralie Voumard avec l’autorisation de Russel A. Barkley, mai 2008. 
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  Durant  les  6  dern ie rs  mo is  
  Jama is ,  
Rarement  
Par fo is  
 
Souvent  Très  
souvent  
15 Je commence un projet ou une tâche sans lire ou écouter 
attentivement les directives. 
    
16 J’ai une mauvaise perception du temps.     
17 J’ai de la difficulté à gérer mon temps.     
18 Je ne prends pas en considération les évènements passés 
pertinents ou mes expériences personnelles antérieures 
avant de répondre à des situations. 
    
19 Je ne pense pas au futur autant que les autres personnes de 
mon âge semblent le faire. 
    
20 Je ne me prépare pas pour le travail ou pour les tâches qui 
me sont assignés. 
    
21 Je ne réussis pas à respecter les échéances fixées.     
22 J’ai de la difficulté à planifier ou à préparer des 
événements à venir. 
    
23 J’oublie de faire des choses que je suis supposé(e) faire.     
24 J’ai des difficultés avec le calcul arithmétique mental.     
25 J’ai plus de peine que je ne le devrais à comprendre ce que 
je lis ; je dois relire le texte pour comprendre sa 
signification. 
    
26 Je semble ne pas me souvenir de ce que j’ai entendu ou lu 
précédemment. 
    
27 Je semble incapable d’atteindre les objectifs que je me suis 
fixés. 
    
28 Je suis en retard au travail ou aux rendez-vous     
29 J’ai de la difficulté à organiser mes pensées ou à clarifier 
mes idées. 
    
30 Je n’ai pas conscience de ce que je dis ou fais.     
31 Je suis incapable de garder en mémoire les choses dont je 
dois me souvenir. 
    
32 J’ai de la difficulté à être objectif(ve) à propos des choses 
qui m’affecte. 
    
33 J’ai de la difficulté à prendre en considération le point de 
vue des autres sur un problème ou une situation. 
    
34 J’ai de la difficulté à garder en tête l’importance ou le but 
des activités. 
    
35 J’ai tendance à perdre le fil de la discussion en parlant avec 
les autres. 
    
36 Lorsqu’on m’explique quelque chose de compliqué à faire, 
je ne peux pas retenir les informations nécessaires pour 
reproduire ou faire correctement la tâche. 
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  Durant  les  6  dern iers  mo is  
  Jama is ,  
Rarement  
Par fo is  
 
Souvent  Très  
souvent  
37 Je porte une attention limitée aux détails en travaillant.     
38 Je trouve difficile de ne pas perdre de vue l’objectif lors de 
la réalisation simultanée de plusieurs activités. 
    
39 Je ne peux pas faire les choses avant d’être confronté(e) au 
dernier délai. 
    
40 Je n’apprécie pas le travail ou les activités scolaires 
demandant un effort plus marqué. 
    
41 J’évalue difficilement le temps nécessaire pour faire 
quelque chose ou pour aller quelque part. 
    
42 Je me motive difficilement pour commencer à travailler.     
43 Je me mets facilement en colère ou deviens facilement 
contrarié(e). 
    
44 Je suis facilement frustré(e).     
45 Je réagis de manière excessive.     
46 Je manque de motivation pour poursuivre mon travail et le 
terminer. 
    
47 Je suis incapable de persister dans les tâches que je trouve 
inintéressantes. 
    
48 Je ne m’investis pas autant dans mon travail que je le 
devrais ou autant que les autres. 
    
49 J’ai de la difficultés à rester vigilant(e) ou éveillé(e) dans 
des situations monotones. 
    
50 Je suis facilement excité(e) par des activités qui se 
déroulent autour de moi. 
    
51 Je ne suis pas motivé(e) à me préparer à l’avance pour 
réaliser ce qui doit être fait. 
    
52 Je suis incapable de rester concentré(e) lors de lectures, de 
tâches administratives ou en travaillant. 
    
53 Je m’ennuie facilement.     
54 Les autres me disent que je suis paresseux (se) ou que je 
manque de motivation. 
    
55 Je dépends de l’aide des autres pour terminer mon travail.     
56 Les tâches doivent apporter une récompense immédiate, 
sinon je suis incapable de les faire. 
    
57 J’ai de la peine à terminer une activité avant d’en 
commencer une nouvelle. 
    
58 Je résiste mal à l’envie de faire quelque chose de plus 
amusant ou de plus intéressant lorsque je suis supposé(e) 
travailler. 
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  Durant  les  6  dern iers  mo is 
  Jama is ,  
Rarement  
Par fo is  
 
Souvent  Très  
souvent  
59 Je suis incapable de maintenir des amitiés ou des relations 
proches aussi longtemps que d’autres personnes. 
    
60 Je suis inconstant(e) dans la qualité ou dans la quantité de 
mon travail. 
    
61 Je ne me préoccupe pas des évènements futurs autant que 
les autres . 
    
62 Je ne réfléchis pas de manière critique avant d’entreprendre 
quelque chose. 
    
63 Je ne suis pas capable de travailler aussi bien que d’autres, 
sans supervision ou sans instructions fréquentes. 
    
64 Je réalise difficilement ce que j’avais l’intention de faire.     
65 J’ai de la peine à tenir les promesses ou les engagements 
faits aux autres.  
    
66 Je manque d’autodiscipline.     
67 J’ai de la difficulté à raisonner de manière adéquate dans 
des situations problématiques ou stressantes. 
    
68 J’ai de la difficulté à suivre les règles dans un contexte 
donné. 
    
69 Je ne suis pas très flexible dans mes comportements ou 
dans l’approche d’une situation; je suis extrêmement rigide 
dans ma manière de faire les choses. 
    
70 J’ai de la difficulté à organiser mes pensées.     
71 J’ai de la difficulté à exprimer mes pensées de manière 
claire. 
    
72 Je suis incapable de proposer ou de trouver des solutions à 
des problèmes, alors que les autres en sont capables.  
    
73 Souvent je ne trouve pas les bons mots quand j’aimerais 
expliquer quelque chose aux autres personnes. 
    
74 J’ai de la difficulté à mettre par écrit mes pensées aussi 
bien ou aussi vite que les autres. 
    
75 Je ne pense pas être aussi créatif(ve) ou inventif(ve) que 
mes pairs. 
    
76 Lorsque j’essaie d’atteindre mes objectifs ou de faire mes 
devoirs, je trouve que je ne suis pas capable d’envisager 
autant de solutions que les autres. 
    
77 J’ai plus de difficulté que les autres à apprendre des 
activités nouvelles ou complexes. 
    
78  J’ai de la difficulté à expliquer les choses dans le bon 
ordre ou de manière chronologique. 
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  Durant  les  6  dern iers  mo is 
  Jama is ,  
Rarement  
Par fo is  
 
Souvent  Très  
souvent  
79 Je ne vais pas à l’essentiel dans mes explications aussi vite 
que les autres. 
    
80 J’ai des difficultés à faire les choses de manière ordonnée 
ou chronologique. 
    
81 Je suis incapable de penser par moi-même ou de faire face 
aussi efficacement que les autres à des évènements 
inattendus. 
    
82 Je suis maladroit(e); J’ai plus de problèmes de coordination 
de mouvements que les autres. 
    
83 Mon écriture est médiocre ou peu soignée.     
84 J’ai de la difficulté à organiser ou réaliser mon travail en 
fonction des priorités ; je n’arrive pas bien à établir les 
priorités. 
    
85 Je suis plus lent/e que les autres à réagir à des événements 
inattendus. 
    
86 Je fais des blagues, je m’amuse, ou j’agis de manière 
irréfléchie alors que je devrais être sérieux (se). 
    
87 Je suis incapable de me souvenir aussi bien que les autres, 
de ce que j’ai fait ou des lieux où je suis allé(e).  
    
88 Je suis sujet(te) aux accidents.     
89 J’ai tendance à conduire à une vitesse excessive plus 
facilement que les autres. 
    
90 J’ai de la peine à gérer l’argent ou les cartes de crédits.     
91 J’ai plus de difficultés à me souvenir des événements de 
mon enfance que les autres. 
    
92 Je perds mon sang-froid.     
93 Je me dispute avec les autres.     
94 Je défie ou je refuse activement d’obéir aux demandes ou 
de me conformer aux règles des autres. 
    
95 J’agace de manière délibérée les gens.     
96 J’accuse les autres pour mes propres erreurs ou pour ma 
mauvaise conduite. 
    
97 Je suis susceptible ou facilement agacé(e) par les autres.     
98 Je suis en colère ou plein(e) de ressentiment.     
99 Je suis malveillant(e) ou vindicatif(ve)     
 
 
6.4.4 CAARS-S : SV
The response scale was adapted according to the technical manual’s instructions to range from
1 to 5 (instead of 0 to 4 points). Raw scores were calculated within each sub category: The
TA subscale (DSM-IV Inattentive symptoms) was composed of the following items: 1, 9, 13,
14, 19, 21, 26, 29, and 30. The TB subscale (DSM-IV Hyperactive/impulsive symptoms) was
composed of the following items: 2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 18, 22, 25, and 27. The TC subscale (DSM-IV
ADHD symptoms total) was composed the TA and TB items. The TD subscale (ADHD index)
was composed of the following items: 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23, 24, and 28. If an item
was missing, the subscale’s score was corrected ((score*total number of items)/valid number of
items, for instance a score of 13 with one missing value becomes 15, (13*9)/8)). However, if a
subscale contained more than 2 missing values, the subscale was considered as invalid. These
4 scores were then compared to a standardized table according to the age and gender of each
participants, allowing the comparison of individuals having different age and sex.
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ECHELLE D’EVALUATION DE CONNERS POUR LES ADULTES ATTEINTS DE TDAH (CAARS-S : SV) (C. K. Conners, 
Ph.D., D. Erhardt, Ph.D., and E. P. Sparrow, Ph.D.) 
 
Voici une liste de propositions concernant des comportements ou problèmes parfois rencontrés chez les adultes. Lisez attentivement 
chaque proposition et indiquez dans quelle mesure ou à quelle fréquence elle peut s’appliquer à votre situation récente. Entourez le 
chiffre correspondant à votre réponse. Pour cela, utilisez l’échelle suivante : 0 = pas du tout, jamais ; 1 = Un peu, de temps à autre ; 2 
= plutôt, souvent et 3 = beaucoup, très fréquemment. 
 
  Pas du tout, 
jamais 
Un peu, de 
temps à autre 
plutôt, 
souvent 
beaucoup, très 
fréquemment 
1. Je perds les objets dont j’ai besoin pour des 
tâches ou des activités (p. ex., pense-bête, 
crayons, livres ou outils). 
0 1 2 3 
2. Je parle trop. 0 1 2 3 
3. Je suis toujours en train de faire quelque 
chose, comme si j’étais monté(e) sur ressorts. 
0 1 2 3 
4. J’éprouve des difficultés à m’occuper 
calmement. 
0 1 2 3 
5. Je suis irascible/colérique. 0 1 2 3 
6. Je me lève alors que je devrais rester assis(e). 0 1 2 3 
7. Je fais toujours des caprices. 0 1 2 3 
8. J’éprouve des difficultés à faire la queue ou à 
attendre mon tour. 
0 1 2 3 
9. J’ai du mal à rester concentré lorsque je 
travaille. 
0 1 2 3 
10. J’évite les nouveaux défis par manque de 
confiance en moi. 
0 1 2 3 
11. Je ressens une agitation intérieure, même si 
j’ai l’air calme. 
0 1 2 3 
12. Les choses que j’entends ou que je vois me 
distraient de ce que je fais. 
0 1 2 3 
13. Je suis distrait(e) dans mes activités 
quotidiennes. 
0 1 2 3 
14. J’éprouve des difficultés à écouter ce que les 
autres disent. 
0 1 2 3 
15. Je n’exploite pas tout mon potentiel. 0 1 2 3 
16. Je ne tiens pas en place. 0 1 2 3 
17. Je ne parviens pas à mener les tâches à bien, 
sauf en cas d’absolue nécessité. 
0 1 2 3 
18. J’agite les mains ou les pieds ou je remue sur 
ma chaise. 
0 1 2 3 
19. Je fais des fautes d’inattention ou j’ai des 
difficultés à faire attention aux détails. 
0 1 2 3 
20. Je perturbe les activités des autres. 0 1 2 3 
21. Je n’aime pas les tâches ou les activités 
professionnelles qui demandent beaucoup de 
réflexion. 
0 1 2 3 
22. Je suis agité(e) ou trop actif(ve). 0 1 2 3 
23. Parfois, je suis tellement concentré(e) que j’en 
oublie tout le reste ; à d’autres moments, je 
suis tellement inattentif(ve) que je me laisse 
distraire facilement.  
0 1 2 3 
24. Je n’arrive pas à me concentrer sur un sujet, 
sauf s’il est vraiment intéressant. 
0 1 2 3 
25. Je réponds avant d’attendre la fin de la 
question. 
0 1 2 3 
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26. J’éprouve des difficultés à finir mon travail ou 
mes tâches. 
0 1 2 3 
27. J’interromps les autres lorsqu’ils travaillent ou 
se divertissent. 
0 1 2 3 
28. Mes erreurs passées ne me permettent pas 
d’avoir confiance en moi. 
0 1 2 3 
29. Je me laisse distraire par ce qui se passe 
autour de moi. 
0 1 2 3 
30. J’éprouve des difficultés à organiser mes 
tâches et activités 
0 1 2 3 
 
6.4.5 EHI
A laterality quotient (LQ) was calculated for each participants according to the following for-
mula:
LQ = 100 ∗
∑
x(i,R)−∑x(i,L)∑
x(i,R)+
∑
x(i,L)
where
∑
x(i, R) and
∑
x(i, L) are the number of “+” for an item in the right and left columns
respectively (meaning that if a participant responded “habituellement”, it was scored with one
“+”, and if the participant responded “toujours” it was scored with two “+” in both columns),
providing a score in between [-100,+100], -100 corresponding to a left handed participant, +100
to a right handed participant, and 0 to an ambidextrous individual.
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QUESTIONNAIRE DE LATERALISATION : 
 
Pour dix gestes quotidiens à réaliser, indiquez quelle main vous utilisez par une croix dans 
l’une des colonnes du tableau : 
 
Action Toujours à gauche 
Habituellement 
à gauche 
Sans 
préférence 
Habituellement 
à droite 
Toujours à 
droite 
Écrire £ £ £ £ £ 
Dessiner £ £ £ £ £ 
Lancer un objet £ £ £ £ £ 
Utiliser des 
ciseaux £ £ £ £ £ 
Tenir sa  
brosse à dents £ £ £ £ £ 
Utiliser un 
couteau (sans la 
fourchette) 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Utiliser une 
cuillère £ £ £ £ £ 
Balayer (main 
qui est au-dessus 
sur le manche) 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Craquer une 
allumette £ £ £ £ £ 
Dévisser un 
bouchon (main 
sur le bouchon) 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Total       
Oldfield, R.C. The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh 
inventory. Neuropsychologia. 9(1):97-113, 1971. 
 
 
6.4.6 MINI
The MINI was rated according the scoring instructions in the questionnaire (p.3), based on the
presence or absence of the symptoms in each module.
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INSTRUCTIONS GENERALES 
 
Le M.I.N.I. (DSM-IV) est un entretien diagnostique structuré, d’une durée de passation brève (moyenne 18,7 min. ± 
11,6 min.; médiane 15 minutes), explorant de façon standardisée, les principaux Troubles psychiatriques de l’Axe I du 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Le M.I.N.I. peut être utilisé par des cliniciens, après une courte 
formation. Les enquêteurs non-cliniciens, doivent recevoir une formation plus intensive. 
 
• Entretien : 
Afin de réduire le plus possible la durée de l’entretien, préparez le patient à ce cadre clinique inhabituel en lui 
indiquant que vous allez lui poser des questions précises sur ses problèmes psychologiques et que vous attendez de 
lui / d’elle des réponses en oui ou non. 
 
• Présentation : 
Le M.I.N.I. est divisé en modules identifiées par des lettres, chacune correspondant à une catégorie diagnostique. 
• Au début de chacun des modules (à l'exception du module « Syndromes psychotiques »), une ou plusieurs 
question(s) / filtre(s) correspondant aux critères principaux du trouble sont présentées dans un cadre grisé.  
• A la fin de chaque module, une ou plusieurs boîtes diagnostiques permet(tent) au clinicien d’indiquer si les 
critères diagnostiques sont atteints. 
 
• Conventions : 
Les phrases écrites en « lettres minuscules » doivent être lues "mot-à-mot" au patient de façon à standardiser 
l'exploration de chacun des critères diagnostiques. 
Les phrases écrites en « MAJUSCULES » ne doivent pas être lues au patient. Ce sont des instructions auxquelles le 
clinicien doit se référer de façon à intégrer tout au long de l'entretien les algorithmes diagnostiques. 
Les phrases écrites en « gras » indiquent la période de temps à explorer. Le clinicien est invité à les lire autant de fois 
que nécessaire au cours de l'exploration symptomatique et à ne prendre en compte que les symptômes ayant été 
présentés au cours de cette période.  
Les phrases entre (parenthèses ) sont des exemples cliniques décrivant le symptôme évalué. Elles peuvent être lues de 
manière à clarifier la question. 
Lorsque des termes sont séparés par un slash (/), le clinicien est invité à ne reprendre que celui correspondant au 
symptôme présenté par le patient et qui a été exploré précédemment (par ex. question A3). 
Les réponses surmontées d'une flèche ( è ) indiquent que l'un des critères nécessaires à l'établissement du 
diagnostic exploré n'est pas atteint. Dans ce cas, le clinicien doit aller directement à la fin du module, entourer 
« NON » dans la ou les boîtes diagnostiques correspondantes et passer au module suivant. 
 
• Instructions de cotation : 
Toutes les questions posées doivent être cotées. La cotation se fait à droite de chacune des questions en entourant, 
soit OUI, soit NON en fonction de la réponse du patient. 
Le clinicien doit s'être assuré que chacun des termes formulés dans la question ont bien été pris en compte par le 
sujet dans sa réponse (en particulier, les critères de durée, de fréquence, et les alternatives "et / ou"). 
Les symptômes imputables à une maladie physique, ou à la prise de médicaments, de drogue ou d’alcool ne doivent 
pas être côtés OUI. Le M.I.N.I. Plus qui est une version plus détaillée du M.I.N.I. explore ces différents aspects. 
 
Si vous avez des questions ou des suggestions, si vous désirez être formé à l’utilisation du M.I.N.I. ou si vous 
voulez être informés des mises à jour, vous pouvez contacter : 
 
Yves LECRUBIER / Thierry HERGUETA  
Inserm U302 
Hôpital de la Salpétrière 
47, boulevard de l’Hôpital 
F. 75651 PARIS 
FRANCE 
 
tel : +33 (0) 1 42 16 16 59 
fax : +33 (0) 1 45 85 28 00 
e-mail : hergueta@ext.jussieu.fr 
David SHEEHAN 
University of South Florida 
Institute for Research in Psychiatry 
3515 East Fletcher Avenue  
TAMPA, FL USA 33613-4788 
 
 
ph : +1 813 974 4544 
fax : +1 813 974 4575 
e-mail : dsheehan@com1.med.usf.edu 
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A. EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR 
 
 
A1 
 
Au cours des deux dernières semaines, vous êtes-vous senti(e) 
particulièrement triste, cafardeux(se), déprimé(e), la plupart du temps au 
cours de la journée, et ce, presque tous les jours ? 
 
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
1 
 
A2 
 
Au cours des deux dernières semaines, aviez-vous presque tout le temps le 
sentiment de n’avoir plus goût à rien, d’avoir perdu l’intérêt ou le plaisir 
pour les choses qui vous plaisent habituellement ? 
 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
2 
  
A1 OU A2 SONT-ELLES COTEES OUI ? 
 
è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
A3 Au cours de ces deux dernières semaines, lorsque vous vous sentiez 
déprimé(e) et/ou sans intérêt pour la plupart des choses : 
    
 a Votre appétit a-t-il notablement changé, ou avez-vous pris ou perdu du poids 
sans en avoir l’intention ? (variation au cours du mois de ± 5 %, c. à d. ± 3,5 
kg / ± 8 lbs., pour une personne de 65 kg / 120 lbs.)  
COTER OUI, SI OUI A L’UN OU L’AUTRE 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
3 
 
 b 
 
Aviez-vous des problèmes de sommeil presque toutes les nuits 
(endormissement, réveils nocturnes ou précoces, dormir trop)? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
4 
 
 c 
 
Parliez-vous ou vous déplaciez-vous plus lentement que d’habitude, ou au 
contraire vous sentiez-vous agité(e), et aviez-vous du mal à rester en place, 
presque tous les jours ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
5 
  
 d 
 
Vous sentiez-vous presque tout le temps fatigué(e), sans énergie, et ce 
presque tous les jours ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
6 
 
 e 
 
Vous sentiez-vous sans valeur ou coupable, et ce presque tous les jours ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
7 
 
 f 
 
Aviez-vous du mal à vous concentrer ou à prendre des décisions, et ce 
presque tous les jours ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
8 
 
 g 
 
Avez-vous eu à plusieurs reprises des idées noires comme penser qu’il 
vaudrait mieux que vous soyez mort(e), ou avez-vous pensé à vous faire du 
mal ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
9 
    
A4 Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN A3 ? 
 (ou 4 si A1 OU A2 EST COTEE NON) 
 
SI LE PATIENT PRESENTE UN EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR ACTUEL : 
 
 
 NON OUI 
EPISODE DEPRESSIF 
MAJEUR ACTUEL 
 
A5 a
  
 
 
 
 b 
Au cours de votre vie, avez-vous eu d’autres périodes de deux semaines ou 
plus durant lesquelles vous vous sentiez déprimé(e) ou sans intérêt pour la 
plupart des choses et où vous aviez les problèmes dont nous venons de 
parler ? 
 
Cette fois ci, avant de vous sentir déprimé(e) et/ou sans intérêt pour la 
plupart des choses, vous sentiez-vous bien depuis au moins deux mois ? 
  
 
è 
NON 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
A5b EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ?   NON OUI 
EPISODE DEPRESSIF 
MAJEUR PASSE  
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A’. EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR AVEC CARACTERISTIQUES MELANCOLIQUES (option) 
SI LE PATIENT PRESENTE UN EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR ACTUEL (A4 = OUI), EXPLORER CI-DESSOUS : 
 
 
A6  a 
 
A2 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
12 
 
  b 
 
Au cours de cette dernière période, lorsque vous vous sentiez le plus mal, 
aviez-vous perdu la capacité à réagir aux choses qui vous plaisaient ou qui 
vous rendaient joyeux(se) auparavant ? 
SI NON : Lorsque quelque chose d’agréable survenait, étiez vous incapable 
de vous en réjouir, même temporairement ? 
   
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
13 
  
A6a OU A6b SONT-ELLES COTEES OUI 
 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 Au cours des deux dernières semaines, lorsque vous vous sentiez 
déprimé(e) et sans intérêt pour la plupart des choses : 
 
    
A7  a Les sentiments dépressifs que vous ressentiez étaient-ils différents de ceux 
que l’on peut ressentir lorsque l’on perd un être cher ? 
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
14 
 
 b Vous sentiez-vous, en général, plus mal le matin que plus tard dans la 
journée ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
15 
 c Vous réveilliez-vous au moins deux heures trop tôt, en ayant des difficultés à 
vous rendormir, presque tous les jours? 
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
16 
 d A3c EST ELLE COTEE OUI ?  NON OUI 
 
17 
 e A3a EST-ELLE COTEE OUI (ANOREXIE OU PERTE DE POIDS) ?  NON OUI 
 
18 
 f Vous sentiez-vous excessivement coupable ou ressentiez-vous une 
culpabilité qui était hors de proportion avec ce que vous viviez ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
19 
      
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN A7 ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
EPISODE DEPRESSIF 
MAJEUR  
avec Caractéristiques 
Mélancoliques 
ACTUEL 
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B. DYSTHYMIE 
 
NE PAS EXPLORER CE MODULE SI LE PATIENT PRESENTE UN EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR ACTUEL 
 
 
B1 
 
Au cours des deux dernières années, vous êtes-vous senti(e) triste, 
cafardeux(se), déprimé(e), la plupart du temps ? 
 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
20 
 
B2 
 
Durant cette période, vous est-il arrivé de vous sentir bien pendant plus de 
deux mois ? 
  
 
NON 
 
è 
OUI 
 
 
21 
 
B3 
 
Depuis que vous vous sentez déprimé(e) la plupart du temps : 
    
 
 a 
 
Votre appétit a-t-il notablement changé ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
22 
 
 b 
 
Avez-vous des problèmes de sommeil ou dormez-vous trop ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
23 
 
 c 
 
Vous sentez-vous fatigué(e) ou manquez-vous d’énergie ? 
  
NON  
 
OUI 
 
24 
 
 d 
 
Avez-vous perdu confiance en vous-même ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
25 
 
 e 
 
Avez-vous du mal à vous concentrer, ou des difficultés à prendre des 
décisions ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
26 
 
 f 
 
Vous arrive-t-il de perdre espoir ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
27 
  
 
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 2 OUI EN B3 ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
B4 
 
 
 
Ces problèmes entraînent-ils chez vous une souffrance importante ou bien 
vous gênent-ils de manière significative dans votre travail, dans vos relations 
avec les autres ou dans d’autres domaines importants pour vous? 
 
  
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
28 
      
 
 
 
B4 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
DYSTHYMIE 
ACTUEL 
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C. RISQUE SUICIDAIRE 
 
      
 Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous :     
 
C1 
 
Pensé qu’il vaudrait mieux que vous soyez mort(e), ou souhaité être 
mort(e) ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
1 
 
C2 
 
Voulu vous faire du mal ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
2 
 
C3 
 
Pensé à vous suicider ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
3 
 
C4 
 
Etabli la façon dont vous pourriez vous suicider ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
4 
 
C5 
 
Fait une tentative de suicide ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
5 
 
 
 
C6 
 
Au cours de votre vie,  
 
Avez-vous déjà fait une tentative de suicide ? 
 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
     
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS UN OUI CI-DESSUS  
 
 
SI OUI, SPECIFIER LE NIVEAU DU RISQUE SUICIDAIRE COMME SI DESSOUS : 
  
 C1 ou C2 ou C6 = OUI : LEGER 
 C3 ou (C2 + C6) = OUI : MOYEN 
 C4 ou C5 ou (C3 + C6) = OUI : ELEVE 
   
 NON OUI 
 
RISQUE SUICIDAIRE 
ACTUEL 
 
 LEGER    
 MOYEN    
 ELEVE    
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D. EPISODE (HYPO-)MANIAQUE 
 
 
D1 a 
 
Avez-vous déjà eu une période où vous vous sentiez tellement exalté(e) ou 
plein(e) d’énergie que cela vous a posé des problèmes, ou que des personnes 
de votre entourage ont pensé que vous n’étiez pas dans votre état habituel ? 
NE PAS PRENDRE EN COMPTE LES PERIODES SURVENANT UNIQUEMENT SOUS L’EFFET 
DE DROGUES OU D’ALCOOL. 
SI LE PATIENT NE COMPREND PAS LE SENS D’EXALTE OU PLEIN D’ENERGIE, EXPLIQUER 
COMME SUIT : Par exalté ou plein d’énergie, je veux dire être excessivement 
actif, excité, extrêmement motivé ou créatif ou extrêmement impulsif. 
 
SI OUI 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
1 
 b Vous sentez-vous, en ce moment, exalté(e) ou plein(e) d’énergie ?  NON OUI 2 
 
D2 a 
 
Avez-vous déjà eu une période où vous étiez tellement irritable que vous en 
arriviez à insulter les gens, à hurler, voire même à vous battre avec des 
personnes extérieures à votre famille ?  
NE PAS PRENDRE EN COMPTE LES PERIODES SURVENANT UNIQUEMENT SOUS L’EFFET 
DE DROGUES OU D’ALCOOL. 
 
SI OUI 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
3 
 b Vous sentez-vous excessivement irritable, en ce moment ?  NON OUI 4 
 
 
 
 
D1a OU D2a SONT-ELLES COTEES OUI ? 
 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
D3 
 
SI D1b OU D2b = OUI : EXPLORER SEULEMENT L’EPISODE ACTUEL 
SI D1b ET D2b = NON : EXPLORER L’EPISODE LE PLUS GRAVE  
 
Lorsque vous vous sentiez exalté(e), plein d’énergie / irritable : 
    
 
 a 
 
Aviez-vous le sentiment que vous auriez pu faire des choses dont les autres 
seraient incapables, ou que vous étiez quelqu’un de particulièrement 
important ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
5 
 
 b 
 
Aviez-vous moins besoin de sommeil que d’habitude (vous sentiez-vous 
reposé(e) après seulement quelques heures de sommeil ?) 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
6 
 
 c 
 
Parliez-vous sans arrêt ou si vite que les gens avaient du mal à vous 
comprendre ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
7 
 
 d 
 
Vos pensées défilaient-elles si vite dans votre tête que vous ne pouviez pas 
bien les suivre ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
8 
 
 e 
 
Etiez-vous si facilement distrait(e) que la moindre interruption vous faisait 
perdre le fil de ce que vous faisiez ou pensiez ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
9 
 
 f 
 
Etiez-vous tellement actif(ve), ou aviez-vous une telle activité physique, que 
les autres s’inquiétaient pour vous ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
10 
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 g 
 
Aviez-vous tellement envie de faire des choses qui vous paraissaient 
agréables ou tentantes que vous aviez tendance à en oublier les risques ou les 
difficultés qu’elles auraient pu entraîner (faire des achats inconsidérés, 
conduire imprudemment, avoir une activité sexuelle inhabituelle) ? 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN D3  
OU 4 SI D1a = NON (EPISODE PASSE) OU D1b = NON (EPISODE ACTUEL) ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
D4 
 
Les problèmes dont nous venons de parler ont-ils déjà persisté pendant au 
moins une semaine et ont-ils entraîné des difficultés à la maison, au travail/à 
l’école ou dans vos relations avec les autres 
ou avez-vous été hospitalisé(e) à cause de ces problèmes ? 
COTER OUI, SI OUI A L’UN OU L’AUTRE 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
     
  
D4 EST-ELLE COTEE NON ? 
 
 
 
 
SI OUI, SPECIFIER SI L’EPISODE EXPLORE EST ACTUEL OU PASSE  
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
EPISODE 
HYPOMANIAQUE 
 
 ACTUEL  
 PASSE   
 
    
  
D4 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
 
 
 
SI OUI, SPECIFIER SI L’EPISODE EXPLORE EST ACTUEL OU PASSE 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
EPISODE MANIAQUE 
 
 ACTUEL  
 PASSE   
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E. TROUBLE PANIQUE 
 
 
E1  
 
Avez-vous déjà eu à plusieurs reprises des crises ou des attaques durant 
lesquelles vous vous êtes senti(e) subitement très anxieux(se), très mal à 
l’aise ou effrayé(e) même dans des situations où la plupart des gens ne le 
seraient pas ? Ces crises atteignaient-elles leur paroxysme en moins de 10 
minutes ? 
NE COTER OUI QUE SI LES ATTAQUES ATTEIGNENT LEUR PAROXYSME EN MOINS DE 10 
MINUTES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
E2 
SI E1 = NON, ENTOURER NON EN E5, ET PASSER DIRECTEMENT A F1 
 
Certaines de ces crises, même il y a longtemps, ont-elles été imprévisibles, 
ou sont-elles survenues sans que rien ne les provoque ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
E3 
 
SI E2 = NON, ENTOURER NON EN E5, ET PASSER DIRECTEMENT A F1 
 
A la suite de l’une ou plusieurs de ces crises, avez-vous déjà eu une période 
d’au moins un mois durant laquelle vous redoutiez d’avoir d’autres crises ou 
étiez préoccupé(e) par leurs conséquences possibles ? 
  
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
  
 
 
E4 
 
SI E3 = NON, ENTOURER NON EN E5, ET PASSER DIRECTEMENT A F1 
 
Au cours de la crise où vous vous êtes senti(e) le plus mal : 
    
 a Aviez vous des palpitations ou votre cœur battait-il très fort ?  NON OUI 4 
 b Transpiriez-vous ou aviez-vous les mains moites ?  NON OUI 5 
 c Aviez-vous des tremblements ou des secousses musculaires ?  NON OUI 6 
 d Aviez-vous du mal à respirer ou l’impression d’étouffer ?  NON OUI 7 
 e Aviez-vous l’impression de suffoquer ou d’avoir une boule dans la gorge ?  NON OUI 8 
 f Ressentiez-vous une douleur ou une gêne au niveau du thorax?  NON OUI 9 
 g Aviez-vous la nausée, une gêne au niveau de l’estomac ou une diarrhée 
soudaine ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
10 
 h Vous sentiez-vous étourdi(e), pris(e) de vertiges, ou sur le point de vous 
évanouir ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
11 
 i Aviez-vous l’impression que les choses qui vous entouraient étaient étranges 
ou irréelles ou vous sentiez-vous comme détaché(e) de tout ou d’une partie 
de votre corps ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
12 
 j Aviez-vous peur de perdre le contrôle ou de devenir fou (folle)?  NON OUI 13 
 k Aviez-vous peur de mourir ?  NON OUI 14 
 l Aviez-vous des engourdissements ou des picotements ?  NON OUI 15 
 m Aviez-vous des bouffées de chaleur ou des frissons ?  NON OUI 16 
 
E5 
 
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 4 OUI EN E4 ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 SI E5 = NON, PASSER A E7   Trouble Panique  Vie entière  
E6 Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous eu de telles crises à plusieurs reprises 
(au moins 2 fois) en ayant constamment peur d’en avoir une autre ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
17 
 SI E6 = OUI, PASSER A F1   Trouble Panique  Actuel  
 
E7 
 
Y A-T-IL 1, 2 OU 3 OUI EN E4 ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
18 
   Attaques  
Paucisymptomatiques vie entière 
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F. AGORAPHOBIE 
 
  
F1 
 
Etes-vous anxieux(se) ou particulièrement mal à l'aise dans des endroits ou 
dans des situations dont il est difficile ou gênant de s'échapper ou bien où il 
serait difficile d'avoir une aide si vous paniquiez, comme être dans une foule, 
dans une file d’attente (une queue), être loin de votre domicile ou seul à la 
maison, être sur un pont, dans les transports en commun ou en voiture ? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
SI F1 = NON, ENTOURER NON EN F2 
  
    
 
F2 
 
 
Redoutez-vous tellement ces situations qu’en pratique vous les évitez ou 
bien êtes-vous extrêmement mal à l’aise lorsque vous les affrontez seul(e) ou 
bien encore essayez-vous d’être accompagné(e) lorsque vous devez les 
affronter ? 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
20 
    Agoraphobie  
Actuel 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
F2 (AGORAPHOBIE ACTUEL) EST-ELLE COTEE NON 
et  
E6 (TROUBLE PANIQUE ACTUEL) EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
TROUBLE PANIQUE  
sans Agoraphobie  
ACTUEL 
 
    
 
  
 
F2 (AGORAPHOBIE ACTUEL) EST-ELLE COTEE OUI 
et  
E6 (TROUBLE PANIQUE ACTUEL) EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
TROUBLE PANIQUE  
avec Agoraphobie 
ACTUEL 
 
    
 
  
 
F2 (AGORAPHOBIE ACTUEL) EST-ELLE COTEE OUI 
et 
E5 (TROUBLE PANIQUE VIE ENTIERE) EST-ELLE COTEE NON ? 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
AGORAPHOBIE  
sans antécédents de  
Trouble Panique 
ACTUEL 
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G. PHOBIE SOCIALE 
 
 
G1 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous redouté ou avez-vous été gêné d’être le 
centre de l’attention ou avez-vous eu peur d’être humilié(e) dans certaines 
situations sociales comme par exemple lorsque vous deviez prendre la parole 
devant un groupe de gens, manger avec des gens ou manger en public, ou 
bien encore écrire lorsque l’on vous regardait ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
G2 
 
 
Pensez-vous que cette peur est excessive ou déraisonnable ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
2 
 
G3 
  
 
Redoutez-vous tellement ces situations qu’en pratique vous les évitez ou 
êtes-vous extrêmement mal à l’aise lorsque vous devez les affronter ? 
 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
3 
 
G4 
 
Cette peur entraîne-t-elle chez vous une souffrance importante ou vous gêne-
t-elle vraiment dans votre travail ou dans vos relations avec les autres ? 
 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
4 
  
 
    
  
G4 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
PHOBIE SOCIALE 
ACTUEL 
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H. TROUBLE OBSESSIONNEL COMPULSIF 
 
 
H1 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous souvent eu des pensées ou des pulsions 
déplaisantes, inappropriées ou angoissantes qui revenaient sans cesse alors 
que vous ne le souhaitiez pas, comme par exemple penser que vous étiez sale 
ou que vous aviez des microbes, ou que vous alliez frapper quelqu’un 
malgré vous, ou agir impulsivement ou bien encore étiez-vous envahi(e) par 
des obsessions à caractère sexuel, des doutes irrépressibles ou un besoin de 
mettre les choses dans un certain ordre ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
  
NE PAS PRENDRE EN COMPTE DES PREOCCUPATIONS EXCESSIVES CONCERNANT LES 
PROBLEMES DE LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE NI LES OBSESSIONS LIEES A UN TROUBLE DU 
COMPORTEMENT ALIMENTAIRE, A DES DEVIATIONS SEXUELLES, AU JEU 
PATHOLOGIQUE, OU A UN ABUS DE DROGUE OU D’ALCOOL PARCE QUE LE PATIENT 
PEUT EN TIRER UN CERTAIN PLAISIR ET VOULOIR Y RESISTER SEULEMENT A CAUSE DE 
LEURS CONSEQUENCES NEGATIVES 
 
    
 
 
 
H2 
 
SI H1 = NON, PASSER A H4 
 
Avez-vous essayé, mais sans succès, de résister à certaines de ces idées, de 
les ignorer ou de vous en débarrasser ? 
 
SI H2 = NON, PASSER A H4 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
H3 
 
Pensez-vous que ces idées qui reviennent sans cesse sont le produit de vos 
propres pensées et qu’elles ne vous sont pas imposées de l’extérieur ? 
 
  
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
3 
 
 
H4 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous souvent éprouvé le besoin de faire 
certaines choses sans cesse, sans pouvoir vous en empêcher, comme vous 
laver les mains, compter, vérifier des choses, ranger, collectionner, ou 
accomplir des rituels religieux ? 
 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
  
 
H3 OU H4 SONT-ELLES COTEES OUI ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
H5 
 
Pensez-vous que ces idées envahissantes et/ou ces comportements répétitifs 
sont déraisonnables, absurdes, ou hors de proportion ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
5 
 
H6 
 
Ces pensées ou ces pulsions envahissantes et/ou ces comportements 
répétitifs vous gênent-ils(elles) vraiment dans vos activités quotidiennes, 
votre travail, ou dans vos relations avec les autres, ou vous prennent-ils 
(elles) plus d’une heure par jour ? 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
6 
      
  
H6 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
TROUBLE 
OBSESSIONNEL-
COMPULSIF 
ACTUEL 
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I. ETAT DE STRESS POST-TRAUMATIQUE (option) 
 
 
I1 
 
Avez-vous déjà vécu, ou été le témoin ou eu à faire face à un événement 
extrêmement traumatique, au cours duquel des personnes sont mortes ou 
vous-même et/ou d’autres personnes ont été menacées de mort ou ont été 
grièvement blessées ou ont été atteintes dans leur intégrité physique ? 
EX DE CONTEXTES TRAUMATIQUES : ACCIDENT GRAVE, AGRESSION, VIOL, ATTENTAT, 
PRISE D’OTAGES, KIDNAPPING, INCENDIE, DECOUVERTE DE CADAVRE, MORT SUBITE 
DANS L’ENTOURAGE, GUERRE, CATASTROPHE NATURELLE...  
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
I2 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé, avez-vous souvent pensé de façon pénible à cet 
événement, en avez-vous rêvé, ou avez-vous eu fréquemment l’impression 
de le revivre ?  
 
  
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
I3 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé : 
 
    
 a Avez-vous essayé de ne plus penser à cet événement ou avez-vous évité tout 
ce qui pouvait vous le rappeler ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
3 
 b Aviez-vous du mal à vous souvenir exactement de ce qu’il s’est passé ?  NON OUI 4 
 c Aviez-vous perdu l’intérêt pour les choses qui vous plaisaient auparavant ?  NON OUI 5 
 d Vous sentiez-vous détaché(e) de tout ou aviez-vous l’impression d’être 
devenu(e) un (une) étranger(ère) vis à vis des autres ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
6 
 e Aviez-vous des difficultés à ressentir les choses, comme si vous n’étiez plus 
capable d’aimer ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
7 
 f Aviez-vous l’impression que votre vie ne serait plus jamais la même, que 
vous n’envisageriez plus l’avenir de la même manière ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
8 
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN I3 ? 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
I4 
 
Au cours du mois écoulé : 
    
 a Aviez-vous des difficultés à dormir ?  NON OUI 9 
 b Etiez-vous particulièrement irritable, vous mettiez-vous facilement en 
colère ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
10 
 c Aviez-vous des difficultés à vous concentrer ?  NON OUI 11 
 d Etiez-vous nerveux(se), constamment sur vos gardes ?  NON OUI 12 
 e Un rien vous faisait-il sursauter ?  NON OUI 13 
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 2 OUI EN I4 ? 
 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
I5 Au cours du mois écoulé, ces problèmes vous ont-ils vraiment gêné dans 
votre travail, vos activités quotidiennes ou dans vos relations avec les autres 
? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
14 
      
  
I5 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
ETAT DE STRESS 
POST-TRAUMATIQUE 
ACTUEL 
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J. DEPENDANCE ALCOOLIQUE / ABUS D’ALCOOL 
 
 
J1 
 
Au cours des 12 derniers mois, vous est-il arrivé à plus de trois reprises de 
boire, en moins de trois heures, plus que l’équivalent d’une bouteille de vin 
(ou de 3 verres d’alcool fort) ? 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
1 
 
J2 
 
 a 
 
Au cours des 12 derniers mois : 
 
Aviez-vous besoin de plus grandes quantités d’alcool pour obtenir le même 
effet qu’auparavant ? 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 b 
 
Lorsque vous buviez moins, vos mains tremblaient-elles, transpiriez-vous ou 
vous sentiez-vous agité(e) ? 
Ou, vous arrivait-il de prendre un verre pour éviter d’avoir ces problèmes ou 
pour éviter d’avoir la  « gueule de bois » ? 
COTER OUI, SI OUI A L’UN OU L’AUTRE 
  
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 c 
 
Lorsque vous buviez, vous arrivait-il souvent de boire plus que vous n’en 
aviez l’intention au départ ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
4 
 
 d 
 
Avez-vous essayé, sans pouvoir y arriver, de réduire votre consommation ou 
de ne plus boire ?  
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
5 
 
 e 
 
Les jours où vous buviez, passiez-vous beaucoup de temps à vous procurer 
de l’alcool, à boire ou à vous remettre des effets de l’alcool ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
6 
 
 f 
 
Avez-vous réduit vos activités (loisirs, travail, quotidiennes) ou avez-vous 
passé moins de temps avec les autres parce que vous buviez ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
7 
 
 g 
 
Avez-vous continué à boire tout en sachant que cela entraînait chez vous des 
problèmes de santé ou des problèmes psychologiques ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
8 
  
 
    
 
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN J2 ? 
 
 
   
      NON OUI 
 
DEPENDANCE 
ALCOOLIQUE 
ACTUEL 
 
    
  
LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL UNE DEPENDANCE ALCOOLIQUE ? 
 
 
  
NON 
 
è 
OUI 
 
J3 Au cours des 12 derniers mois : 
 
    
 a Avez-vous été à plusieurs reprises ivre ou avec la « gueule de bois » alors 
que vous aviez des choses à faire au travail (/à l’école) ou à la maison ? Cela 
a-t-il posé des problèmes ?  
NE COTER OUI QUE SI CELA A CAUSE DES PROBLEMES 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
9 
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 b 
 
Vous est-il arrivé d’être sous l’effet de l’alcool dans une situation où cela 
était physiquement risqué comme conduire, utiliser une machine ou un 
instrument dangereux, faire du bateau, etc. ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
10 
 
 c 
 
Avez-vous eu des problèmes légaux parce que vous aviez bu comme une 
interpellation ou une condamnation ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
11 
 
 d 
 
Avez-vous continué à boire tout en sachant que cela entraînait des problèmes 
avec votre famille ou votre entourage ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
12 
  
 
    
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 1 OUI EN J3 ? 
 
 
   
      NON OUI 
 
ABUS D’ALCOOL 
ACTUEL 
 
    
211
 M.I.N.I. 5.0.0 French version / DSM-IV / current (August 1998) 
Y. Lecrubier, E. Weiller, T. Hergueta, P. Amorim, L.I. Bonora, J.P. Lépine (INSERM-PARIS, FRANCE) / D. Sheehan, J. Janavs, R. Baker, K.H. Sheehan, E. Knapp, M. Sheehan (University of South Florida-TAMPA, USA) 
CARTE DES SUBSTANCES 
 
AMPHETAMINE ESSENCE MORPHINE 
CANNABIS ETHER NEIGE 
CAPTAGON FEUILLE DE COCA OPIUM 
CATOVIT HASCHICH PALFIUM 
COCAÏNE HEROÏNE RITALINE 
CODEINE L.S.D. SHIT 
COLLE MARIJUANA TEMGESIC 
CRACK MESCALINE TOLUENE 
ECSTASY METHADONE TRICHLORETHYLENE 
 
 
 
M.I.N.I. 
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K. TROUBLES LIES A UNE SUBSTANCE (NON ALCOOLIQUE)  
 
 
K1 
  
 
Maintenant je vais vous montrer / vous lire (MONTRER LA CARTE DES 
SUBSTANCES / LIRE LA LISTE CI-DESSOUS), une liste de drogues et de 
médicaments et vous allez me dire si au cours des 12 derniers mois, il vous 
est arrivé à plusieurs reprises de prendre l’un de ces produits dans le but de 
planer, de changer votre humeur ou de vous « défoncer » ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ENTOURER CHAQUE PRODUIT CONSOMME : 
 
Stimulants : amphétamines, « speed », Ritaline, pilules coupe-faim. 
Cocaïne : cocaïne, « coke », crack, « speedball ». 
Opiacés : héroïne, morphine, opium, méthadone, codéine, mépéridine, fentanyl. 
Hallucinogènes : L.S.D., « acide », mescaline, PCP, « angel dust », « champignons », ecstasy. 
Solvants volatiles : « colle », éther. 
Cannabinoïdes : haschisch, « hasch », THC, cannabis, « herbe », « shit ». 
Sédatifs : Valium, Xanax, Témesta, Halcion, Lexomil, secobarbital, « barbis ». 
Divers : Anabolisants, Stéroïdes, « poppers ». Prenez-vous d’autres substances ? 
 
SPECIFIER LA (OU LES) SUBSTANCE(S) LES PLUS CONSOMMEE(S) : ________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPECIFIER CE QUI SERA EXPLORE CI DESSOUS : 
• SI CONSOMMATION DE PLUSIEURS SUBSTANCES (EN MEME TEMPS OU 
SEQUENTIELLEMENT) : 
CHAQUE SUBSTANCE OU CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES SEPAREMENT 
UNIQUEMENT LA SUBSTANCE (OU CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES) LA 
PLUS CONSOMMEE 
• SI SEULEMENT UNE SUBSTANCE (OU CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES) 
CONSOMMEE : 
UNIQUEMENT UNE SUBSTANCE (OU CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
K2 En considérant votre consommation de [NOMMER LA SUBSTANCE OU LA CLASSE DE 
SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE], au cours des 12 derniers mois : 
    
 
 a 
 
Avez-vous constaté que vous deviez en prendre de plus grandes quantités 
pour obtenir le même effet qu’auparavant ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
1 
 
 b 
 
Lorsque vous en preniez moins, ou arrêtiez d’en prendre, aviez-vous des 
symptômes de sevrage (douleurs, tremblements, fièvre, faiblesse, diarrhée, 
nausée, transpiration, accélération du cœur, difficultés à dormir, ou se sentir 
agité(e), anxieux(se), irritable ou déprimé(e)) ? 
Ou vous arrivait-il de prendre autre chose pour éviter d’être malade 
(SYMPTOMES DE SEVRAGE) ou pour vous sentir mieux ? 
COTER OUI, SI OUI A L’UN OU L’AUTRE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 c 
 
Vous arrivait-il souvent lorsque vous commenciez à en prendre, d’en prendre 
plus que vous n’en aviez l’intention ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
3 
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 d 
 
Avez-vous essayé, sans y arriver de réduire votre consommation ou d’arrêter 
d’en prendre ?  
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
4 
 
 e 
 
Les jours où vous en preniez, passiez-vous beaucoup de temps (> 2 heures) à 
essayer de vous en procurer, à en consommer, à vous remettre de ses (leurs) 
effets, ou à y penser ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
5 
 
 f 
 
Avez-vous réduit vos activités (loisirs, travail, quotidiennes) ou avez-vous 
passé moins de temps avec les autres parce que vous vous droguiez ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
6 
 
 g 
 
Avez-vous continué à prendre [NOMMER LA SUBSTANCE OU LA CLASSE DE 
SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE] tout en sachant que cela entraînait chez vous des 
problèmes de santé ou des problèmes psychologiques ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
7 
      
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN K2 ? 
 
 
SPECIFIER LA (LES) SUBSTANCE(S) : 
_________________________________________________________ 
   
      NON OUI 
 
DEPENDANCE à une (des) 
SUBSTANCES(S) 
ACTUEL 
 
      
 LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL UNE DEPENDANCE POUR LA(LES) 
SUBSTANCES(S) CONSOMMEE(S) ? 
 
  
NON 
è 
OUI 
 
K3 Au cours des 12 derniers mois : 
 
    
 a Avez-vous été à plusieurs reprises intoxiqué(e) par [NOMMER LA SUBSTANCE 
OU LA CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE] ou « défoncé(e) » alors que vous 
aviez des choses à faire au travail (/à l’école) ou à la maison ? Cela a-t-il 
posé des problèmes ?  
NE COTER OUI QUE SI CELA A CAUSE DES PROBLEMES 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
8 
 
 b 
 
Vous est-il arrivé d’être sous l’effet [NOMMER LA SUBSTANCE OU LA CLASSE DE 
SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE] dans une situation où cela était physiquement 
risqué comme conduire, utiliser une machine ou un instrument dangereux, 
faire du bateau, etc. ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
9 
 
 c 
 
Avez-vous eu des problèmes légaux parce que vous aviez pris [NOMMER LA 
SUBSTANCE OU LA CLASSE DE SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE] comme une 
interpellation ou une condamnation ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
10 
 
 d 
 
Avez-vous continué à prendre [NOMMER LA SUBSTANCE OU LA CLASSE DE 
SUBSTANCES SELECTIONNEE] tout en sachant que cela entraînait des problèmes 
avec votre famille ou votre entourage ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
11 
    
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 1 OUI EN K3 ? 
 
 
SPECIFIER LA (LES) SUBSTANCE(S) : _______________________________________ 
 
   
      NON OUI 
 
ABUS DE SUBSTANCE(S) 
ACTUEL 
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L. TROUBLES PSYCHOTIQUES 
 
POUR TOUTES LES QUESTIONS DE CE MODULE, EN CAS DE REPONSE POSITIVE DEMANDER UN EXEMPLE. 
NE COTER OUI QUE SI LES EXEMPLES MONTRENT CLAIREMENT UNE DISTORSION DE LA PENSEE ET / OU DE LA 
PERCEPTION OU S’ILS SONT CULTURELLEMENT INNAPROPRIES. 
AVANT DE COTER, EVALUER LE CARACTERE « BIZARRE » DES REPONSES. 
 
IDEES DELIRANTES BIZARRES : LE CONTENU EST MANIFESTEMENT ABSURDE, INVRAISEMBLABLE, ET NE PEUT 
ETRE BASE SUR DES EXPERIENCES HABITUELLES DE LA VIE. 
HALLUCINATIONS BIZARRES : VOIX QUI FONT DES COMMENTAIRES SUR LES PENSEES OU LES ACTES DU PATIENT 
OU PLUSIEURS VOIX QUI PARLENT ENTRE ELLES. 
 
  
A présent, je vais vous poser des questions sur des expériences un peu 
inhabituelles ou bizarres qui peuvent survenir chez certaines personnes. 
     
     BIZARRE  
L1 a Avez-vous déjà eu l’impression que quelqu’un vous espionnait, ou 
complotait contre vous, ou bien encore que l’on essayait de vous faire du 
mal ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
OUI 
 
1 
 b SI OUI : Actuellement, avez-vous cette impression ?  NON OUI OUI 
è L6a 
 
2 
L2 a 
  
Avez-vous déjà eu l’impression que l’on pouvait lire ou entendre vos 
pensées ou que vous pouviez lire ou entendre les pensées des autres ? 
 
 
 
NON 
  
OUI 
 
3 
 b SI OUI : Actuellement, avez-vous cette impression ?  NON  OUI 
è L6a 
 
4 
L3 a Avez-vous déjà cru que quelqu’un ou que quelque chose d’extérieur à vous 
introduisait dans votre tête des pensées étranges qui n’étaient pas les vôtres 
ou vous faisait agir d’une façon inhabituelle pour vous ? Avez-vous déjà eu 
l’impression d’être possédé ? 
  
 
 
NON 
  
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
5 
 b SI OUI : Actuellement, croyez-vous cela ?  NON  OUI 
è L6a 
 
6 
L4 a Avez-vous déjà eu l’impression que l’on s’adressait directement à vous à 
travers la télévision ou la radio ou que certaines personnes que vous ne 
connaissiez pas personnellement s’intéressaient particulièrement à vous ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
7 
 b SI OUI : Actuellement, avez-vous cette impression ?  NON OUI OUI 
è L6a 
 
8 
L5 a Avez-vous déjà eu des idées que vos proches considéraient comme étranges 
ou hors de la réalité, et qu’ils ne partageaient pas avec vous ? 
NE COTER OUI QUE SI LE PATIENT PRESENTE CLAIREMENT DES IDEES DELIRANTES 
HYPOCHONDRIAQUES OU DE POSSESSION, DE CULPABILITE, DE RUINE, DE GRANDEUR 
OU D’AUTRES NON EXPLOREES PAR LES QUESTIONS L1 A L4 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
OUI 
 
9 
 b SI OUI : Actuellement, considèrent-ils vos idées comme étranges ? 
 
 NON OUI OUI 10 
L6 a Vous est-il déjà arrivé d’entendre des choses que d’autres personnes ne 
pouvaient pas entendre, comme des voix ? 
COTER OUI « BIZARRE » UNIQUEMENT SI LE PATIENT REPOND OUI A LA QUESTION : 
Ces voix commentaient-elles vos pensées ou vos actes ou entendiez-vous 
deux ou plusieurs voix parler entre elles ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
OUI 
 
 
11 
 b SI OUI : Cela vous est-il arrivé au cours du mois écoulé ? 
 
 NON OUI OUI 
è L8b 
12 
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L7 a Vous est-il déjà arrivé alors que vous étiez éveillé(e), d’avoir des visions ou 
de voir des choses que d’autres personnes ne pouvaient pas voir ? 
COTER OUI SI CES VISIONS SONT CULTURELLEMENT INAPPROPRIEES. 
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
13 
 b SI OUI : Cela vous est-il arrivé au cours du mois écoulé ? 
 
 NON OUI 14 
 
 
L8  b 
 
OBSERVATION DE L’INTERVIEWER : 
ACTUELLEMENT, LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL UN DISCOURS CLAIREMENT INCOHERENT 
OU DESORGANISE, OU UNE PERTE NETTE DES ASSOCIATIONS ? 
  
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
15 
L9  b ACTUELLEMENT, LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL UN COMPORTEMENT NETTEMENT 
DESORGANISE OU CATATONIQUE ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
16 
L10b DES SYMPTOMES NEGATIFS TYPIQUEMENT SCHIZOPHRENIQUES (AFFECT ABRASE, 
PAUVRETE DU DISCOURS / ALOGIE, MANQUE D’ENERGIE OU D’INTERET POUR DEBUTER 
OU MENER A BIEN DES ACTIVITES / AVOLITION) SONT-ILS AU PREMIER PLAN AU COURS 
DE L’ENTRETIEN ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
17 
    
L11 
 
DE L1 A L10, Y A-T-IL AU MOINS  
 
 UNE QUESTION « b » COTEE OUI BIZARRE 
OU 
 DEUX QUESTIONS « b » COTEES OUI (NON BIZARRE) ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
SYNDROME PSYCHOTIQUE 
ACTUEL 
 
      
L12 DE L1 A L7, Y A-T-IL AU MOINS  
 UNE QUESTION « a » COTEE OUI BIZARRE 
OU 
 DEUX QUESTIONS « a » COTEES OUI (NON BIZARRE) ? 
 (VERIFIER QUE LES 2 SYMPTOMES SONT SURVENUS EN MÊME TEMPS) 
OU 
 L11 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
SYNDROME PSYCHOTIQUE 
VIE ENTIERE 
L13a SI L11 EST COTEE OUI OU S’IL Y A AU MOINS UN OUI DE L1 A L7 : 
 
LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL  
 UN EPISODE DEPRESSIF MAJEUR (ACTUEL OU PASSE) 
OU UN EPISODE MANIAQUE (ACTUEL OU PASSE) ? 
  
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 b SI L13a EST COTEE OUI :  
Vous m’avez dit tout à l’heure avoir présenté une (des) période(s) où vous 
vous sentiez déprimé(e) / exalté(e) / particulièrement irritable. Les idées ou 
impressions dont nous venons de parler telles que (CITER LES SYMPTOMES 
COTES OUI DE L1 A L7) sont-elles survenues uniquement pendant cette (ces) 
période(s) où vous étiez déprimé(e) / exalté(e) / irritable ? 
  
 
 
 
 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
    
  
L13b EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
TROUBLE DE L’HUMEUR 
AVEC CARACTERISTIQUES 
PSYCHOTIQUES 
ACTUEL 
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M. ANOREXIE MENTALE 
 
 
M1 a 
 
Combien mesurez-vous ? 
  
|__|__|__| cm 
 
 
  b 
 
Au cours des 3 derniers mois, quel est a été votre poids le plus faible ? 
  
|__|__|__| kg 
 
 
  c 
 
LE POIDS DU PATIENT EST-IL INFERIEUR AU SEUIL CRITIQUE INDIQUE 
POUR SA TAILLE ? VOIR TABLEAU DE CORRESPONDANCE EN BAS DE PAGE 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
1 
  
Au cours des trois derniers mois : 
    
 
M2 
 
Avez-vous refusé de prendre du poids, malgré le fait que vous pesiez peu ? 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
2 
 
M3 
 
Aviez-vous peur de prendre du poids ou redoutiez-vous de devenir trop 
gros(se) ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
3 
 
M4 a 
 
Vous trouviez-vous encore trop gros(se), ou pensiez-vous qu’une partie de 
votre corps était trop grosse ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
4 
 
  b 
 
L’opinion ou l’estime que vous aviez de vous-même étaient-elles largement 
influencées par votre poids ou vos formes corporelles ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
5 
 
  c 
 
Pensiez-vous que ce poids était normal, voire excessif ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
6 
 
 
M5 
 
 
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 1 OUI EN M4 ? 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
M6 
 
POUR LES FEMMES SEULEMENT : Ces trois derniers mois, avez-vous eu un arrêt 
de vos règles alors que vous auriez dû les avoir (en l’absence d’une 
éventuelle grossesse) ? 
  
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
7 
      
  
POUR LES FEMMES : M5 ET M6 SONT-ELLES COTEES OUI ? 
POUR LES HOMMES : M5 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
ANOREXIE MENTALE 
ACTUEL 
 
    
 
 
 
 
TABLEAU DE CORRESPONDANCE TAILLE - SEUIL DE POIDS CRITIQUE (SANS CHAUSSURE, SANS VETEMENT) 
TAILLE (cm) 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 
Femmes 37 38 39 41 43 45 47 50 52 54 57 
POIDS (kg)            
Hommes 41 43 45 47 49 51 52 54 56 58 61 
(15% DE REDUCTION PAR RAPPORT AU POIDS NORMAL)
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N. BOULIMIE 
 
 
N1 
 
Au cours de ces trois derniers mois, vous est-il arrivé d’avoir des crises de 
boulimie durant lesquelles vous mangiez de très grandes quantités de 
nourriture dans une période de temps limitée, c’est à dire en moins de 2 
heures ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
8 
N2 Avez-vous eu de telles crises de boulimie au moins deux fois par semaine au 
cours de ces 3 derniers mois ?  
 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
9 
 
N3 
 
Durant ces crises de boulimie, avez-vous l’impression de ne pas pouvoir 
vous arrêter de manger ou de ne pas pouvoir contrôler la quantité de 
nourriture que vous prenez ? 
  
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
10 
 
N4 
 
De façon à éviter une prise de poids après ces crises de boulimie, faites-vous 
certaines choses comme vous faire vomir, vous astreindre à des régimes 
draconiens, pratiquer des exercices physiques importants, ou prendre des 
laxatifs, des diurétiques, ou des coupe-faim ? 
  
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
N5 
 
L’opinion ou l’estime que vous avez de vous-même sont-elles largement 
influencées par votre poids ou vos formes corporelles ? 
 
  
è 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
12 
N6 LE PATIENT PRESENTE-T-IL UNE ANOREXIE MENTALE ? 
 
 NON OUI 13 
 SI N6 = NON, PASSER A N8     
 
N7 
 
Ces crises de boulimie surviennent-elles toujours lorsque votre poids est en 
dessous de ____ kg* ? 
* REPRENDRE LE POIDS CRITIQUE DU PATIENT DANS LA TABLE DU MODULE 
ANOREXIE MENTALE EN FONCTION DE SA TAILLE ET DE SON POIDS.  
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
14 
      
 
N8 
 
N5 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ET N7 COTEE NON (OU NON-COTEE) ? 
 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
BOULIMIE 
ACTUEL 
 
    
  
N7 EST-ELLE COTEE OUI ? 
 
 
   
 NON OUI 
 
ANOREXIE MENTALE 
Binge-eating / Purging type 
ACTUEL 
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O. ANXIETE GENERALISEE 
 
 
O1  a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      b 
 
Au cours des six derniers mois, vous êtes-vous senti(e), excessivement 
préoccupé(e), inquiet(e), anxieux(se), pour des problèmes de la vie de tous 
les jours, au travail/à l’école, à la maison, ou à propos de votre entourage, ou 
avez-vous eu l’impression de vous faire trop de souci à propos de tout et de 
rien ? 
 
NE PAS COTER OUI SI L’ANXIETE SE RESUME A UN TYPE D’ANXIETE DEJA EXPLORE 
PRECEDEMMENT COMME LA PEUR D’AVOIR UNE ATTAQUE DE PANIQUE (TROUBLE 
PANIQUE), D’ETRE GENE EN PUBLIC (PHOBIE SOCIALE), D’ETRE CONTAMINE (TOC), 
DE PRENDRE DU POIDS (ANOREXIE MENTALE) ETC... 
 
Avez-vous ce type de préoccupations presque tous les jours ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
O2 
 
 
Vous est-il difficile de contrôler ces préoccupations ou vous empêchent-elles 
de vous concentrer sur ce que vous avez à faire ?  
  
 
è 
NON 
 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
O3 
 
DE O3a A O3f, COTER NON LES SYMPTOMES SURVENANT UNIQUEMENT 
DANS LE CADRE DES TROUBLES EXPLORES PRECEDEMMENT 
 
Au cours des six derniers mois lorsque vous vous sentiez 
particulièrement préoccupé(e), inquiet(e), anxieux(se), vous arrivait-il 
souvent: 
    
 
 a 
 
De vous sentir agité(e), tendu(e), les nerfs à fleur de peau ?  
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
4 
 
 b 
 
D’avoir les muscles tendus ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
5 
 
 c 
 
De vous sentir fatigué(e), faible, ou facilement épuisé(e) ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
6 
 
 d 
 
D’avoir des difficultés à vous concentrer ou des passages à vide ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
7 
 
 e 
 
D’être particulièrement irritable ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
8 
 
 f 
 
D’avoir des problèmes de sommeil (difficultés d’endormissement, réveils au 
milieu de la nuit, réveils précoces ou dormir trop) ? 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
9 
 
  
     
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN O3 ? 
   
 NON OUI 
 
ANXIETE GENERALISEE 
ACTUEL 
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P. TROUBLE DE LA PERSONNALITE ANTISOCIALE (option) 
 
 
P1 
 
Avant l’âge de 15 ans, avez-vous : 
 
 
 
   
 a Fréquemment fait l’école buissonnière ou passé la nuit en dehors de chez 
vous ? 
 
 NON OUI 1 
 b Fréquemment menti, triché, arnaqué les gens ou volé ? 
 
 NON OUI 2 
 c Brutalisé, menacé ou intimidé les autres ? 
 
 NON OUI 3 
 d Volontairement détruit ou mis le feu ? 
 
 NON OUI 4 
 e Volontairement fait souffrir des animaux ou des gens ? 
 
 NON OUI 5 
 f Contraint quelqu’un à avoir des relations sexuelles avec vous ? 
 
 NON OUI 6 
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 2 OUI EN P1 ? 
 è 
NON 
 
OUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P2 
 
NE PAS COTER OUI LES REPONSES CI-DESSOUS, SI LES COMPORTEMENTS 
SONT UNIQUEMENT PRESENTES DANS DES CONTEXTES POLITIQUES OU 
RELIGIEUX. 
 
Depuis l’âge de 15 ans, avez-vous : 
 
    
 a Eu souvent des comportements que les autres trouvaient irresponsables 
comme ne pas rembourser des sommes dues, agir impulsivement ou 
volontairement ne pas travailler pour assurer le minimum vital ? 
 
  
 
NON 
 
 
OUI 
 
 
7 
 b Fait des choses illégales (même si vous n’avez pas été pris) comme détruire 
le bien d’autrui, voler, vendre de la drogue ou commettre un crime ? 
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
8 
 c Souvent été violent physiquement, y compris avec votre conjoint ou vos 
enfants ? 
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
9 
 d Souvent menti ou arnaqué les autres dans le but d’obtenir de l’argent ou du 
plaisir, ou menti juste pour vous amuser ?  
 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
10 
 e Exposé des gens à des dangers sans vous préoccuper d’eux ? 
 
 NON OUI 11 
 f Ressenti aucune culpabilité après avoir menti, ou blessé, maltraité ou volé 
quelqu’un ou détruit le bien d’autrui ? 
  
NON 
 
OUI 
 
12 
      
  
Y A-T-IL AU MOINS 3 OUI EN P2 ? 
   
 NON OUI 
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